

From Anti-Imperialism to Anti-Socialism

The Evolution of Peking's Foreign Policy

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INTRODUCTION

This short monograph on the evolution of the foreign policy of the present Chinese leadership was prepared by members of the staff of the Foreign Policy Department at the Far East Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

The authors set out to describe and analyse the foreign policy of the Chinese People's Republic and its international relations in accordance with this essential principle of Marxist-Leninist methodology: "...to examine every question from the standpoint of how the given phenomenon arose in history and what were the principal stages in its development, and, from the standpoint of its development, to examine what it has become today."¹

The aim throughout has been to examine China's foreign policy from the point of view of whether or not the Chinese leaders were adhering to the socialist principles solemnly proclaimed by the Chinese Government in the General Programme adopted at the First Session of the National Political Consultative Committee on September 29, 1949, and in the Constitution of the PRC passed in 1954.

China's foreign policy from the establishment of the People's Republic to the present falls into five distinct periods:

1. from 1949 to 1957
2. from 1958 to 1963

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 473.

3. from 1963 to 1966
4. from 1966 to 1969
5. post 1969.

§ 1. THE PERIOD 1949-1957

Following the Chinese revolution and the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic in 1949, China became a part of the socialist community, able to rely on its powerful support and pursue socialist principles in her foreign policy. In a situation where the shock force of imperialism, US imperialism, was inspiring a broad anti-communist offensive and organising the cold war, the emergence of the Chinese People's Republic in East Asia was regarded by the imperialist forces as a major defeat, for which they tried to "compensate" by launching an even more violent anti-communist campaign than they had prewar.

The triumph of the revolution in China was attended by a growth of nationalism, which was encouraged by part of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, namely Mao Tse-tung and his entourage. Yet internationalist forces were considerable in the Party at the time and exercised the decisive influence on the domestic and foreign policy of the People's Republic in the first years of its existence.

The socialist principles in China's foreign policy were reconfirmed at the Eighth Party Congress in September 1956.

Right up to 1958 China increased its influence immeasurably as a great Asian power enjoying the political and economic support of the whole socialist community and implementing together with it the principles of peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries.

The united socialist community advanced at the head of all the revolutionary forces, waging an implacable struggle against imperialism and its encroachments on the independence and freedom of the peoples. This solidarity played a major role in countering imperialist hostility towards China and, in particular, US attempts to interrupt her peaceful socialist development by organising acts of provocation on her borders.

§ 2. THE PERIOD 1958-1963

It was during this period that the foreign policy of the Chinese leaders showed the first signs of rejection of the principles of peaceful coexistence which ultimately led to a radical *volte-face* in Peking's policy and the adoption of an extremist "special course". In the international field this was reflected in an intensification of the aggressive foreign policy of the Mao group, particularly evident during the Formosa Strait crisis in 1958. The subsequent bellicosity of the Chinese leaders was partly an attempt to divert the attention of the Chinese people from the internal difficulties that arose in 1959 due to the failure of Mao Tse-tung's economic "experiments" (the "great leap forward" and the people's communes).

The Sino-Indian conflict (1959 and 1962), which violated the 1954 Pancha-Shila principles proclaimed by the agreement between China and India, produced an atmosphere of mistrust and anxiety in South and South-East Asia.

Progressives throughout the world were equally alarmed by the departure of the Chinese leadership from Marxist-Leninist principles in their foreign policy theory, manifested at the beginning of the sixties in attacks on the principle of peaceful coexistence and subscription to the misguided theory that war is a moving force of social progress.

The Chinese leaders began to show contempt for the efforts of the socialist countries to achieve an international détente. Both in the international field and in domestic policy, they began to abandon step by step, in the pursuit of their nationalistic aims, not only the decisions of their own Eighth Party Congress of 1956 but also the joint stand agreed upon and set forth in the documents of the 1957 and 1960 International Meetings of Communist and Workers' Parties.

Nevertheless, at this stage the Chinese leaders were not prepared to risk an open breach with the socialist community and the international communist movement.

§ 3. THE PERIOD 1963-1966

By 1963 the Chinese leaders were forced to face facts and realise that they had failed to get the socialist community and the world communist movement to accept their platform based on the nationalistic, great-power ambitions of the Mao group, and the latter's claim to leadership of the socialist camp and the international communist movement.

Peking was setting up in opposition to the general line of the world communist movement and the concerted actions of the socialist community with its own highly fallacious "general course", involving complete abandonment of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and a slide towards great-power chauvinism and racism. The Peking leaders began to ascribe their disagreements with the great majority of Communist and Workers' parties on fundamental current issues to relations with the CPSU and the USSR alone, adopting an anti-Soviet policy and striving to isolate the USSR and split the international communist and world revolutionary movement.

Thus there arose a new front of ideological struggle with the extremely pernicious and dangerous theories and practice of Maoism, in defence of Marxism-Leninism, for the purity of its principles and healthy development of the whole world communist movement.

The CPC Central Committee stated its "general course" for world development in a letter of 14 June, 1963, addressed to the CPSU Central Committee.

The Chinese leaders began by revising the thesis of the communist movement that the chief, decisive contradiction in the world today is the contradiction between socialism and capitalism. They declared that the chief contradiction is that between the national liberation movement and imperialism, that Asia, Africa and Latin America had become "the knot of all contradictions in the world, the main seedbed of revolutionary storms in the world today", and that "the struggle of the peoples of these areas is of decisive importance to the cause of the international proletariat as a whole".

This expressed the desire of the Mao group to use the Third World countries to further their own great-power

ambitions, to secure hegemony in those areas of the globe, and denigrate and discredit the leading, decisive revolutionary role of the world socialist system and the international proletariat, the role of its class struggle for world development.

Genuine Marxist-Leninists have never ignored the importance of the national liberation movement and its major role in the world revolutionary process. But this movement, while resolving democratic tasks of a general nature and striking telling blows at imperialism, could not by itself destroy the socio-economic system of imperialism—state-monopoly capitalism with its powerful military and police apparatus of force and coercion.

In declaring the national liberation struggle of the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries to be at the centre of the world revolutionary movement, the Mao group were in fact asserting that the chief revolutionary force in our time is not the international working class and its creation the world socialist system, but the petty bourgeoisie, and in many countries even the national bourgeoisie, aspiring to dominate the national liberation movement.

The Peking leaders set out to disrupt the alliance between the national liberation movement and the international working class, to detach and isolate the former from the world socialist system and have it accept the adventuristic Maoist line.

They tried to split the international communist movement, organising pro-Maoist groups in various countries and declaring them to be "new Marxist-Leninist parties".

As a *leitmotiv* of their propaganda the Maoists advanced the totally unfounded accusation that the CPSU and other Communist and Workers' parties were entirely renouncing their support for revolutionary struggle and just liberation wars against imperialism in favour of "peaceful coexistence", "peaceful competition" and "peaceful transition", and had begun to extend peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems to relations between exploiters and exploited, between the oppressed and oppressor classes.

Maoist propaganda fabrications were unable, however, to undermine faith in the stand of the CPSU and fraternal

Communist and Workers' parties, who defended the course of creating favourable conditions for the triumph of socialism on an international scale. The stand adopted by the international communist movement was in full accordance with the Marxist-Leninist view of a just revolutionary war being one of the forms of the class struggle against imperialism. Genuine Marxist-Leninists hold that the working class and oppressed peoples have every right to choose any means of struggle for their liberation, armed or peaceful, depending on the particular conditions and alignment of social forces that obtain in a country.

The Maoist platform basically consisted in entrenching in China's foreign policy and in the international arena the new "special course" which involved replacing the idea of the leading role of the international working class in the world revolutionary process with the absurd idea of petty-bourgeoisie leadership, making an absolute of the "theory" of violence, insisting on armed struggle, as the only appropriate form of struggle, irrespective of the objective and subjective factors inherent in the development of the revolutionary liberation movement in different countries.

Developing their theory of violence, the Maoists propagated the view that international tension was useful and even necessary for the world revolutionary movement, and obstructed any measures taken by the socialist countries in an effort to improve relations between countries with different socio-political systems. Peking attacked the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and began to present the struggle of progressive forces for a détente and disarmament as "capitulation to imperialism". The Chinese leaders were clearly eager to build up China's military capacity, above all her missile and nuclear potential. They were therefore interested in the continuance of international tension, as "justifying" Peking's actions. Hence China's refusal to take part in any kind of world disarmament conference.¹

The extremism in foreign policy was the reverse side of the medal—the corollary of the voluntarism in domestic policy and economic construction. As early as 1958 Mao

¹ See *Jenmin jihpao*, June 20, 1966.

had imposed his policy of the "great leap forward" and people's communes on the country, insisting that it would lead to the building of communism in China in a very short time. But these amateurish experiments undermined the whole economy and prevented the successful completion of the second five-year plan. As a result strong opposition to Mao Tse-tung's special course both in economic and foreign policy gradually began to develop within the Party.

Under the influence of this opposition, from 1961 onwards there had been a gradual return to the system of financial autonomy for enterprises which had been disrupted during the "great leap forward", and there were criticisms in the press of the "economic theories" of Mao Tse-tung which had not stood the test.

The reverses the Mao group had suffered in the international field, the isolation of China from the socialist community and comprehensive criticism of Maoism in the world communist and workers' movement contributed no less to the growth of opposition within the CPC leadership. The bankruptcy of Maoist foreign policy was especially patent in Indonesia in 1965, and also in the failure to convene the "Second Bandung" Afro-Asian conference.

§ 4. THE PERIOD 1966-1969

Instead of altering their erroneous course, Mao and his followers set about organising a direct take-over to put an end to opposition to the Maoist line and remove all obstacles to the establishment of the personal rule of Mao Tse-tung and the establishment of a military dictatorship. It was accomplished with the aid of the Hungweiping units, largely composed of schoolchildren and students led by Mao supporters and later by the Army.

The military coup accomplished by the Maoists was christened the "great proletarian cultural revolution". It lasted from the spring of 1966 right up to the Ninth Party Congress in 1969.

Workers on the ideological front (in literature, the theatre, etc.) were the first to be purged and repressed. Leading scientists and scholars were submitted to public humiliation and mockery by the Hungweipings. Then it was the turn of

the Party cadres to be attacked and persecuted. All the Party committees, from the Central Committee to Party committees at factory level were eliminated. The public organisations of the working people (the trade unions, etc.) were disbanded.

The anarchy let loose by the Hungweipings and later the Tsaofans ("trouble-makers") caused nationwide chaos. Workers' claims for better working conditions and wage increases were treated as examples of "economism" and were all but declared to be "counter-revolution". The preaching of extreme asceticism was attended by quotations from Mao's "hyper-revolutionary" postulates: "In production strive for high indices, in life maintain a low level." "Poverty is good." "It will be a terrible day when everyone is rich."

"Hungweiping diplomacy" also became a regular feature of China's foreign policy. The most outrageous acts of vandalism and abuse were directed against the Soviet Embassy in Peking, and also the embassies of other countries (Mongolia, India, Britain, etc.). Violent anti-Soviet actions were organised in Hanoi, Baghdad, Pnom-Penh and even Paris. Chinese students went so far as to organise a despicable act of provocation in Red Square in Moscow, right by the Lenin Mausoleum.

Diplomats from various countries were vilified and insulted. The staff of the embassies of the socialist countries had all sorts of accusations of "degeneration", "restoration of capitalism" and "coming to terms with the imperialists" hurled at them.

During the "cultural revolution" the Maoists tried more than ever to pose as the "one and only" anti-imperialist force, and above all as a force opposing the encroachments by the USA on the independence and freedom of the developing countries. Yet the "ultra-revolutionary" vocabulary of the Maoists could not conceal Peking's attempt to dominate the national liberation movement of the colonial and dependent countries in the interests of furthering its Sinocentrist foreign policy programme.

The Maoists adopted a distinctly passive attitude over the US "escalation" of the war in Indochina. At the same time it was increasingly clear that the Maoists were striving to fan as many military conflicts as possible in South and

South-East Asia ("to impose several Vietnams on American imperialism"), to act there "by proxy" and get others to do the dirty work for them, without allowing China herself to be drawn into conflict with American imperialism. The Maoists were clearly trying to provoke a nuclear conflict between the USA and the USSR.

The real situation was that two systems, the socialist and the capitalist, had clashed in South-East Asia. While the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries offered increasing aid and support to the peoples of Indochina fighting for their freedom and independence, attempting to make the United States stop the barbaric war as soon as possible, the Maoists (until 1970) hoped that a situation of protracted conflict could be sustained in South-East Asia and were not in favour of a rapid solution to the Vietnam problem since they hoped to bring the USA and the Soviet Union into conflict there or use it to promote their great-power aims, to provide China with a "breathing-space" in which to build up her military capacity, primarily by expanding her nuclear arsenal.

At the same time with the aid of false accusations of a "deal between the USA and the USSR" the Maoists camouflaged the sterile, purely propagandistic essence of their "anti-Americanism" and its alleged "militancy". American imperialism, in turn, made use of the Maoist theory of "people's war" and "offensive revolutionary war" to frighten China's neighbours with the bogey of a Chinese threat.

By the time the Ninth Party Congress was held in 1969 the Mao group had completed their destruction of the Party and the Youth League. "Revolutionary committees" composed of staunch Mao supporters headed by Army men had replaced the constitutional government bodies (the people's committees) and the legally elected Party committees.

The Army had been used to put an end to the Hungweiping and Tsaofan anarchy. These young loyal "soldiers of Mao" who had been so zealous in carrying out his plans were now no longer needed and were herded en masse to the border areas and remote villages for "re-education".

In an attempt to fan anti-Soviet hysteria in China before the Ninth Party Congress, in March 1969, the Maoists instigated acts of armed provocation on the Ussuri River in

the neighbourhood of Damansky Island and later along sectors of the western border with the USSR. The attention of the whole world was riveted by these events. The fact that the chauvinistic energy of the Maoists was being directed exclusively against the USSR and the socialist community provided the imperialists with vast new opportunities.

§ 5. THE PERIOD SINCE 1969

The Ninth Party Congress in 1969 marked the beginning of a new stage in the anti-socialist, anti-Soviet course of China's foreign policy.

The anti-Soviet course now became the basis of Peking's foreign policy programme and assumed a long-term character.

During the "cultural revolution" the Maoists had begun to deny the existence of a socialist community, declaring it "an absurd revisionist theory". The Maoists rejected a class evaluation of the alignment of forces in the world. A great deal was made of Mao's statement at the Congress: "As for the question of world war, there are only two possibilities: one is that war will lead to revolution, the other that revolution will prevent war." As this pseudo-revolutionary formula shows, the struggle for peace and an international détente was completely excluded from foreign policy practice and "revolution" was entirely linked to war.

After the Ninth Congress, the Chinese press continued to insist that "the proletariat cannot do without war", and called upon people "not to forget for a minute" about "the great strategic course of Mao Tse-tung" and "in the name of the people (!?) to prepare for war, natural disasters and famine". There were appeals to prepare for war with the USSR, "for conventional war and nuclear war".¹ The Chinese ruling clique rejected the possibility of any co-operation with the USSR and other socialist countries. Peking began to voice ever more frequent criticisms of the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA which are a reliable barrier against the enemies of socialism. It rejected the solution by negotiation of such fundamental international issues as collective security, disarmament, putting an end to the war in Viet-

¹ *Kuangming jihpao*, June 3, 1969.

nam, and the Middle East crisis, insisting that negotiation with the capitalist countries "is sabotage and suppression of the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed peoples, an encroachment on the independence and sovereignty of other countries and a threat to their security".

Yet even before the Ninth Congress the Maoists had been forced to realise that they had failed in their head-on attempts to achieve a dominant position by undermining socialist community and the anti-imperialist front of peoples struggling for their freedom from imperialist oppression hand in hand with the socialist community and in discrediting the peaceful policy of the USSR.

In view of the total failure of their home and foreign policy, after the Ninth Congress the Maoists were obliged to alter their tactics in the international sphere.

The Maoists' tactical manoeuvring was illustrated in a statement made by Mao on May 20, 1970. "The danger of a new world war still exists and the peoples of all countries should prepare for it. However, revolution is the main tendency in the world today."¹ This formula was conjured up with a view to camouflaging the refusal to pursue a policy of "people's wars", and also to arriving at an agreement with the imperialist states.

During the "cultural revolution" "export of revolution" continued to feature to some extent in Chinese foreign policy—the attempt to fan "people's wars" in neighbouring countries to promote China's own great-power interests and maintain a state of constant tension there, and also to "export" "revolutionary war" to other continents. After the Ninth Congress, however, there was a marked tendency to flirt with imperialism, to reject the old "extremist" methods in favour of "normal diplomacy". Yet foreign policy in the period ushered in by the Ninth Congress retained a logical connection with that of the preceding periods and the aims of the Chinese leaders remained essentially unchanged, namely, anti-Sovietism and the attempt to use and provoke all kinds of international contradictions, above all those between the socialist camp and imperialism, to achieve the consolidation of China as a power capable of imposing its will on other

¹ *Jenmin jihpao*, May 21, 1970.

states and determining international relations with its policy. The Peking leaders have been cherishing the hope of creating a Chinese bloc under the pretext of the struggle of the "middle" and "small" countries against the "hegemony of the two superpowers".

After the 9th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, "fresh" nuances were defined in Peking's policy. At the end of 1970 Maoists dropped their "objections" to the Paris peace talks on Vietnam. Peking began to declare more and more often its support for the "five principles of peaceful coexistence" and readiness to maintain relations with both capitalist and socialist countries on that basis. Yet while officially extending these principles to the USSR and the whole socialist community, Peking continued to refuse to adopt a proletarian class approach to social phenomena and stepped up its anti-Soviet, anti-socialist activity, clearly with a view to being rewarded with recognition by the imperialist powers. Peking's "new" tactics were clearly intended to promote an open rapprochement with the leading countries of the capitalist world.

The anti-socialist foreign policy of the present Chinese leadership, quite apart from the fact that it diverted the forces of the socialist community to the struggle against Maoism, clearly conflicted with the interests of the struggle of the Third World nations for freedom and national independence, against the neo-colonialist aspirations of imperialism. This caused grave concern among Marxist-Leninists and progressives throughout the world.

The documents of the 24th Congress of the CPSU (March 30-April 9, 1971), attended by 102 delegations from abroad, including some from Left-wing socialist and national-democratic parties as well as from Communist and Workers' parties, stated that the CPSU stands for consistent defence of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and all possible measures to strengthen the unity of the world communist movement and the defence of the Soviet Union.

The Congress resolution on the Report of the CPSU Central Committee went on to say: "The Congress resolutely rejects the slanderous inventions of Chinese propaganda concerning the policy of our Party and state. At the same time, our Party stands for normalisation of relations between

the USSR and the PRC, and restoration of good-neighbourliness and friendship between the Soviet and the Chinese peoples. Improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China would meet the vital, long-term interests of both countries, the interests of world socialism, the interests of intensifying the struggle against imperialism."¹ However, subsequent events showed that the Peking leaders chose to ignore these arguments.

In February 1971, the flame of the US aggressive war not only raged in South Vietnam but had been carried into the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (a resumption of air raids) and also to Laos and Cambodia, involving over two million men.

The actions of the Chinese leaders showed to what extent Peking was prepared to change its course and co-operate with the USSR and other socialist countries in opposing Washington in the situation that had emerged. On March 18, 1971, in a big editorial in the magazine *Hungchi* and the newspapers *Jenmin jihpao* and *Jiefangjun Bao*, formally dedicated to the centenary of the Paris Commune, the Chinese leadership poured a stream of lies and abuse on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, other Marxist-Leninist parties and the general line of the international communist movement. This violent tirade was a hint to Washington that China would continue to refuse to co-operate with the USSR and other socialist countries over the Vietnam issue.

The anti-Soviet, anti-socialist actions of the Chinese leaders and the fact that the Soviet Union was declared China's number one enemy (as was asserted in the Chinese press in 1971) was a shot in the arm for the capitalist states. There followed a wave of diplomatic recognitions of China, which the bourgeois press referred to as the "China boom".

In October 1971, as a result of years of efforts by the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community and many of the developing countries, China was restored to her rightful place in the United Nations by an absolute majority.

Countries with progressive regimes hoped that this would

¹ 24th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1971, pp. 212-13.

help strengthen the unity of the forces of peace and the anti-imperialist front, and that China would join other countries in pursuing a progressive course in the international arena. Yet the first steps of the Chinese delegate to the UN were used for the demonstration of Peking's negative attitude to disarmament or to any steps towards a détente in Europe and Asia.

At the same time, the Chinese leaders began to extend their contacts with the developing countries, declaring that China, like the great majority of Asian, African and Latin American countries, belonged to the Third World. By January 1, 1973, 51 of the 89 countries with which Peking had diplomatic relations belonged to the Third World.

The establishment of diplomatic relations reflects the objective necessity for coexistence between countries with different social systems. But the distinctive feature of the new tactics of the Chinese leaders is that "peaceful coexistence" is being used purely as a cover and is being applied in a highly selective manner, while their former policy remains in force.

The Peking leaders are taking advantage of the establishment of official relations with many countries to achieve their old great-power aims, strengthening their contacts with the capitalist countries. This can be seen in the increasing share of the capitalist countries in China's foreign trade, which by 1970 reached 82 per cent.

The Peking leaders camouflage their attempt to knock together an anti-Soviet bloc of "small" and "medium" countries with references to "Afro-Asian solidarity", and the need for the Third World to stand united against the "expansion and dominance" of "one or two superpowers".

At the same time, such appeals do not prevent Peking from making active overtures to the reactionary circles of the USA, which are making use of the present Chinese leadership for their own aggressive purposes in the general interests of imperialism.

Chinese politicians have no qualms about using any means at all to achieve their aims. Their lack of principles knows no bounds. They are prepared to side with the most reactionary regimes in order to further their great-power ambitions.

With their calls to arms against "social-imperialism", as they call the USSR, their so-called theory of the "super-powers", the Chinese leaders are in fact dealing a blow at world socialism and the national liberation movement, diverting the developing countries from their principal tasks—from choosing the most expedient and objectively necessary means and methods of restructuring their economies, the paths of progressive development—which is playing into the hands of the imperialists.

Thus, having begun a struggle with the socialist community and the world communist movement ostensibly for the "purity" of Marxism-Leninism against the "Soviet revisionists" over ten years ago, the Peking splitters slid down a slippery path to rapprochement with imperialism, which essentially conflicts with their official slogans expressed in the "general line" of 1963, the "twenty-five points".

The Twenty-Fourth CPSU Congress prepared a Peace Programme corresponding to the interests of social progress and universal security. The Programme met with the approval of peace-loving forces throughout the world and has become an influential factor in world politics. It provides an excellent action programme for peace and the freedom and independence of nations. The peaceful foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the socialist community has produced an international climate more favourable for world peace.

The constructive foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government corresponds to the vital interests of all nations.

The 10th Congress of the CPC (August 1973) did not bring with it any changes in the anti-Soviet, anti-socialist course pursued by the Peking leadership. Not only did the overall policy adopted by the 9th Congress directed against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries remain unchanged but it became even more pronounced, as is borne out by the report delivered by Chou En-lai at the 10th Congress.

The efforts of the Maoists are aimed above all at impeding the implementation of the Peace Programme adopted at the 24th Congress of the CPSU, at undermining the

Leninist course of all socialist countries directed towards the relaxation of tension and the consolidation of security for all the peoples of the world.

The Peking leaders are now making the most of every opportunity to obstruct disarmament efforts, moves to limit atomic armaments and to reduce tension whether it be in Europe, the Middle East or Asia.

The Maoists openly support the course pursued by reactionary bourgeois circles which advocates consolidation of NATO. They make use of UN bodies as a rostrum for slanderous attacks against the USSR, the socialist countries, the Warsaw Treaty and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

At the meeting organised in the Crimea for leaders of Communist and Workers' parties from the socialist countries, July 30-31, 1973, it was stressed emphatically that the socialist countries were pursuing a principled class-oriented policy. Indispensable features of this policy are consolidation of peace and international security, support for the liberation struggle of peoples of all countries and continents and resistance in face of all encroachments on their freedom and independence.

As was pointed out at the Crimea meeting it is vital that all interested states should advance in the direction of the main goal—the securing of universal peace and consolidation of the positive achievements in the international arena, which came particularly to the fore in 1973 in the course of the visits which Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, paid to the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and France. These visits led up to the conclusion of important agreements, including the US-Soviet agreement to avert nuclear war, that was in keeping with the vital interests of all progressive mankind.

The implementation of a concerted Leninist foreign policy by the fraternal socialist countries is viewed by all progressive forces as a pledge that firm peace will be achieved, that mankind will be freed from the threat of thermonuclear war and successfully put up a determined resistance to policies leading to provocation of aggression and fanning of the cold war pursued by the reactionary

imperialist circles, with which the Maoist leadership is hand in glove.

The cohesion of all peace-loving forces in support of a policy designed to reduce tension and improve the international situation on the basis of the Peace Programme now being pursued by the socialist countries will ensure the failure of the policy of imperialist reaction and Maoist opportunism.

CHAPTER ONE

FROM SOLIDARITY WITH WORLD SOCIALISM TO STRUGGLE AGAINST IT

§ 1. CHINA AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE WORLD SOCIALIST COMMUNITY (1949-1957)

The period 1949-1957 was a period of rapid growth of all-round co-operation between China and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This reflected the decisive influence of socialist internationalist forces in China and very largely determined the country's successful advance along a socialist path in those years.

By the end of 1957 China had signed hundreds of treaties, agreements, protocols, joint declarations, and so on, with the socialist countries providing a legal basis for her co-operation with them in various spheres of political, economic, scientific and technological, cultural and other relations.

Particularly important was the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance concluded on February 14, 1950.¹ The treaty provided the basis for extensive co-operation between the two countries in the international field and the development of bilateral relations involving comprehensive Soviet assistance to China in building a new society. It played a role of exceptional importance in ensuring the security of China and preventing im-

¹ Simultaneously, agreements were concluded whereby the Chanchung Railway was to be handed over to China gratis not later than the end of 1952, and likewise the military and port installations at Port Arthur and Dalny were to be transferred after a peace treaty had been signed with Japan but not later than the end of 1952, and China received 300 million dollars worth of Soviet credits on exceptionally reasonable terms.

perialist aggression against the new Chinese state in the difficult initial period of its existence.

The military-political alliance between the USSR and China was welcomed by the peoples of both countries and by progressives throughout the world.

The Sino-Soviet alliance. Political co-operation with the socialist countries

The situation that developed in the Far East at the beginning of the fifties clearly confirmed the tremendous historical importance of the treaty of alliance between the USSR and China.

In the summer of 1950, under cover of the United Nations flag, the USA began military aggression in the Korean peninsula, at the same time to all intents and purposes occupying Taiwan. As a result, along with the already existing hotbed of war in Indochina, a new threat to world peace arose in Korea.

The danger of imperialist aggression spreading to continental China made the rapid strengthening and modernisation of the Chinese Armed Forces imperative. With Soviet assistance China modernised her land forces and created a well-equipped Air Force and Navy in a very short time.

The alliance with the USSR was a firm guarantee of the security of China, preventing US aggression spilling over onto her territory.

Sino-Soviet co-operation in rendering aid to the Korean people revealed the great strength of the alliance. Only a year after their invasion of Korea, the interventionists were forced to sit down at the conference table.

China's participation in the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam in 1954 apart from the important role it played in thwarting imperialist aggression in Korea also showed that the new China could increase its international prestige and influence world events as a progressive, constructive force, only by forming a united front with the socialist and other revolutionary forces.

As a member of the world socialist community, China took a common stand with the other socialist countries on practically all international problems.

In May 1955, when in answer to the ratification of the Paris agreements the socialist countries concluded the defensive Warsaw Pact, China fully supported this step.

China's official statements on the events in Hungary and Poland in 1956 contained assessments similar to those made by the other socialist countries and the international communist movement. "We firmly support the struggle of the Hungarian people and the worker-peasant revolutionary government of Hungary in defence of the cause of socialism, and the just action of the Soviet Union, imbued with the spirit of proletarian internationalism, undertaken in connection with the events in Hungary," the Chinese Government announced.¹

**The development of co-operation with
the socialist countries in economic and other areas**

In the first years of its existence the Chinese People's Republic was very badly in need of cadres capable of running and developing all spheres of the national economy competently and efficiently, and developing and consolidating the social revolution. By drawing on Soviet experience, with the assistance of Soviet advisors, China managed to create such an apparatus quickly, and by 1951 was ready to introduce economic planning.

Trade with the socialist countries, and especially the USSR, was extremely important for China in view of the blockade organised by the imperialists. The USSR accounted for 23.4 per cent of China's total foreign trade in 1950, 35.8 per cent in 1951 and 51.5 per cent in 1952.²

By 1957 Sino-Soviet trade was up 32.4 per cent from 1952 and 130 per cent from 1950. Moreover, it represented more than half China's total foreign trade turnover on average throughout the five-year plan period, and 20-25 per cent of Soviet foreign trade.³

Over 95 per cent of China's imports from the USSR be-

¹ *Pravda*, November 9, 1956.

² M. I. Sladkovsky, *Studies of External Economic Relations Between the USSR and China*, 1957, p. 310 (in Russian).

³ *Economic Development of the People's Democracies* (Review for 1957), Moscow, 1958, p. 149 (in Russian).

tween 1950 and 1955 were producer goods. The price of Soviet plant and equipment delivered was on average 20-30 per cent lower than the British and American, while the price of heavy industrial plant, such as large lathes, etc., which China was particularly in need of, was as much as 30-60 per cent cheaper.¹

As early as 1950-1952 China began to receive complete plant from the USSR, so that it was largely thanks to co-operation with the Soviet Union that the period of restoration of China's economy was to a certain degree a period of its development.

China's first five-year plan, successfully completed in 1957, was drawn up assuming expansion of co-operation with the USSR and other socialist countries.

Between March 1953 and April 1956, China and the Soviet Union signed several important economic agreements, according to which the USSR contracted to assist China in building, overhauling and expanding 161 large factories and other projects. Moreover, the USSR continued to give technical assistance for completing 50 projects under the 1950 agreement. The industrial enterprises among these 211 projects, as the Chinese leaders themselves admitted, formed the backbone of China's modern industry. Indeed, 44 per cent of all capital investment in industry during the first five-year plan went into this group of enterprises.²

Over ten thousand Soviet technicians, excluding those sent under agreements on military co-operation, were sent to China in the fifties. Thousands of Chinese engineers, technicians, workers and factory management personnel and about a thousand scientists came to the Soviet Union for training. Eleven thousand students and post-graduates completed their higher education in Soviet colleges. The Soviet technicians in China helped create an efficient system for training highly qualified personnel for the major economic branches. The USSR provided China practically free of charge with over 24,000 sets of scientific and technical documentation, including the plans for 1,400 large enterprises.³ The importance of this assistance far exceeds any

¹ Peng Ming, *History of Sino-Soviet Friendship*, pp. 310-311.

² *China Today*, Moscow, 1969, p. 255 (in Russian).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 266.

considerations of a purely economic nature. China could not have hoped to acquire such documentation elsewhere in the fifties. The fact that the USSR generously shared with a brother country her scientific and technological experience, the use of which influenced the whole course of building the material-technical base of socialism in China, was and remains a splendid example of fulfilment of internationalist duty and socialist solidarity.

Before the establishment of the People's Republic, China had practically no economic relations at all with most of the East European countries. In the period 1950-1957 trade between China and Eastern Europe increased 17.5 times over and accounted for about a quarter of China's total foreign trade. By 1953 lathes, cranes, engines, tractors, rolling stock and building equipment accounted for 51 per cent of their exports to China, and the proportion increased in the years that followed.¹

During the first five-year plan China began to receive complete plant from the European socialist countries, for over a hundred projects in all, including electric power stations, chemical plants and sugar refineries, etc.² All the European socialist countries, with the exception of Albania and Yugoslavia, assisted China on major economic projects. The GDR, in particular, helped China build 41 enterprises.³

Scientific and technical co-operation with the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, which developed rapidly from the beginning of the first five-year plan on the basis of bilateral agreements, was very important for China.

China exported mainly food products, raw materials for heavy industry and also consumer goods to these countries.

In 1954 China offered her first credits to a European socialist country—Albania. In November 1956-1957 Hungary received free assistance from China and also long-term credits at an annual interest of 2 per cent.

China's trade and economic links with the socialist coun-

¹ Y. N. Kapelinsky et al., *The Development of the Economy and Foreign Economic Links of the Chinese People's Republic*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 461, 465 (in Russian).

² Y. N. Kapelinsky et al., *op. cit.*, p. 463.

³ M. S. Kapitsa, *The PRC. Two Decades, Two Policies*, Moscow, p. 98 (in Russian).

tries of Asia also began to develop in 1950-1951, but only assumed a significant scale in the mid-fifties. By 1957 China was the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's chief trading partner and was in second place in the trade of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the Mongolian People's Republic.¹ China's own successes in economic construction enabled her to assume part of the internationalist duty of the socialist countries in aiding these three countries in their economic development.

Scientific co-operation between China and the socialist countries developed apace, and there was a growth in cultural exchanges and links between trade unions, youth, sports and other public organisations.

Taken as a whole, the ties between China and the socialist community were a major factor determining the successful completion of all the cardinal tasks of socialist construction in China and strengthening the position of scientific socialism there.

The general line the CPC adopted in 1952 for the stage of transition to socialism envisaged close co-operation of the Party and the people with the USSR and other socialist countries.

Socialist foreign policy principles were embodied in the Chinese Constitution of September 1954 and elaborated in the documents of the Eighth Party Congress of September 1956. The Congress called upon all Party members "to resolutely oppose any dangerous inclination towards great-nation chauvinism or bourgeois nationalism".² Nevertheless, nationalist elements in the CPC leadership strove to deform the process of development of China's foreign policy on the basis of socialist principles.

It is common knowledge that right up to the end of the forties Mao Tse-tung and his fellow-thinkers held that after the triumph of the revolution China would occupy an intermediate position between the socialist and capitalist world. Accordingly, for them the ideal socio-political system for China was a "new democracy" permitting the continued

¹ Y. N. Kapelinsky et al., *op. cit.*, p. 474.

² Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Vol. 1, Documents, Peking, 1956, p. 110.

existence of private enterprise alongside the state sector for a long time. Moreover, as it became clear in the mid-sixties, this stage of "new democracy" might last well over a hundred years, since according to Mao, a period of up to ten generations was required to build socialism, i.e., about two hundred years.

Although under the influence of the internationalist elements in the CPC, then in the majority, the Second Central Committee Plenum of the 7th convocation (March 1949) clearly formulated the task of transforming China after the revolution "from an agrarian country into an industrial country, from a new democratic state into a socialist state", Mao in his speech at the first session of the People's Political Consultative Council of China in September 1949 made no mention of this task, although there was an oblique reference to it in the General Programme, the PRC's first constitutional act, which was passed at the session. Mao's appeals and statements in his speech were confined to national aspects of the Chinese people's struggle. Moreover Mao justified the need for China "to stand united with all peace-loving and freedom-loving countries, above all the Soviet Union and the countries of new democracy" in his speech purely "so as not to be isolated".¹

From late 1949 nationalistic forces in the CPC had begun to popularise at home and abroad the thesis that the Chinese revolution was a classic example for all countries of the colonial periphery of imperialism, restricting the international importance of the experience of the October Revolution and the subsequent experience of building the new society in the USSR to the region of the advanced capitalist countries. Thus, the world socialist system as a source of experience for the world revolutionary forces was divided in two, and the main currents of the international revolutionary process—the struggle of the working class of the capitalist countries and the national liberation movement—acquired, as it were, two centres of gravity. In other words, right from the start, the nationalistic forces in the PRC leadership attempted to sow the seeds of schism in the socialist system and the entire world revolutionary movement.

¹ *The Establishment of the Chinese People's Republic. Documents and Materials*, Moscow, 1950, p. 11 (in Russian).

They persistently tried to substitute peaceful coexistence for socialist internationalism—the basis for relations between socialist countries. This was also expressed in the Chinese Government Declaration of 2 November, 1956, and the Sino-Vietnamese communiqué in November of the same year. It was done most openly in October 1957 by Kuo Mo-jo, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, who declared: "We are firmly convinced that the development of Sino-Soviet friendship will serve as a model of peaceful coexistence for all nations."¹

As early as 1956-1957 the Chinese leaders began to distort the relations based on equality proper to socialist countries, insisting on the right of one country to act as a kind of Supreme Court in the affairs of the socialist community. The claim to such a role was clearly revealed in the behaviour of the Chinese delegation led by Mao Tse-tung at the Moscow Meeting of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties in November 1957.

Although not daring or not considering that the time was yet ripe to assume a frankly anti-Soviet posture, Mao Tse-tung and his followers had since 1955 taken to contrasting the methods of socialist construction employed in China and the Soviet Union. In December of that year, Mao put forward the thesis that socialism should be built "better, bigger, faster and more economically", stressing that on the basis of such a principle it would be possible "to build socialism without looking all the time to the Soviet Union".² This thesis of Mao's was not adopted at the time by the CPC. However, in the autumn of 1957, Mao and his supporters got their own back at the 3rd Plenum of the CPC Central Committee. The Plenum supported the slogan "better, bigger, faster and more economically", and approved of a purge of the Party ranks, in the course of which under the pretext of struggling against "Right-wing elements" Communists internationalists were also repressed. In 1957 the Central Committee adopted a decision putting a stop to the publication of the newspaper *Friendship* in Russian for circulation in the USSR. This unexpected decision was given an

¹ *Soviet Sinology*, No. 1, 1958, p. 22 (in Russian).

² See *Recent History of China*, Moscow, 1972, p. 277 (in Russian).

equally unexpected and curious explanation by the Chinese. It was supposedly "dictated by the desire not to give Soviet readers superfluous information about features of life in China",¹ although it was for the purpose of informing Soviet people of such features that the newspaper had been founded in the first place.

The struggle in the CPC between the two lines, the internationalist and the nationalistic, which intensified at this period, resulted in more and more concessions to the petty-bourgeois nationalistic forces over the cardinal question of close cohesion of socialist forces in China with those in the world at large, above all with the Soviet Union. It was the concessions in this field that heralded the transformation of the ideological and political platform of the Chinese leadership, so that a striving for great-power hegemony became the basic feature of China's home and foreign policy. These concessions were to be fatal to the development of socialism in China.

The basic experience of China's development, international relations included, in the years 1949-1957 confirms beyond doubt that China had every opportunity for healthy development along the socialist path and that concessions to nationalism, and especially anti-Sovietism, invariably lead a country off this path.

§ 2. THE MAOISTS BID FOR HEGEMONY IN THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY (1958-1963)

The years 1958-1963 were a stage of active pursuit by the Chinese leadership of great-power ambitions and a bid to cast China in the role of leader of the socialist community. In 1958-1959 it was hoped that this might be achieved thanks to the "unprecedented" success in social and economic development that was expected to result from the "great leap forward", the organisation of people's communes, and the political mobilisation of the masses. After the total failure of their attempt to provide a shining example of how to make rapid strides towards communism with the socialist countries following automatically in their wake, the Chinese

¹ *Questions of History*, No. 5, 1969, p. 41 (in Russian).

leaders took to trying to dictate to them on the basis of Maoist petty-bourgeois Left-wing revisionist ideology, purporting to be the highest achievement of socialist ideology. So that whereas in 1958-1959 the Maoists did not deem it necessary to embark on an open ideological and political confrontation with the socialist world, in the period 1960-1963 the Chinese leaders could no longer hope to achieve their aim without extensive direct propaganda of their "special" position, without a struggle to win over individual socialist countries and hence without adopting in practice a policy of splitting the socialist community.

Peking's policy of disrupting Sino-Soviet friendship and co-operation

Up to the beginning of the sixties Sino-Soviet relations had not undergone any notable change on the surface.

At the request of the Chinese Government, the Soviet Union, in an effort to help the Chinese people create the material-technical base of socialism by tested scientific means and thus reduce the harmful effects of the Maoist experiments on the course of socialist construction in China, undertook to help China with the construction and expansion of a further 125 enterprises in various branches of heavy industry in August 1958 and February 1959. By 1960 the total number of enterprises and projects to be completed with Soviet assistance had risen to 420, including 100 military industrial projects.¹ In 1959 the volume of trade between the two countries reached a record level, exceeding 1,840 million rubles.²

Between 1958 and the first half of 1960 high-level exchanges of visits between the two countries continued and joint communiqués were signed expressing a common stand on matters concerning mutual relations and also on international questions.

Nevertheless, it was in 1958 that a new phase began in

¹ M. S. Kapitsa, *The PRC. Two Decades, Two Policies*, p. 175; *The Leninist Policy of the USSR Towards China*, Moscow, 1969, p. 201 (both in Russian).

² *International Political-Economic Yearbook*, Moscow, 1960, p. 209 (in Russian).

the development of Sino-Soviet relations, since the intensifying undercurrent regressive processes in the CPC introduced a permanent negative trend above all in the most important sphere of relations between the two countries, the sphere of political co-operation. In 1958 the change in the attitude of the Chinese leaders to various matters of bilateral co-operation became more and more evident. The Chinese leaders became "more and more capricious, less and less tractable. One had the impression that they had long been seeking a pretext for a quarrel".¹

The negative trends in China's policy towards the Soviet Union could not pass unnoticed by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government. From July 31 to August 3, 1958, on the initiative of the Soviet Union, a meeting was held between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Chairman of the PRC, at which the Soviet position on questions of co-operation with China was made clear. Mao Tse-tung declared that as a result all misunderstandings had been removed. In practice, however, the Chinese continued to foster tension in Sino-Soviet relations.

The Soviet Party and Government delegation attending the celebrations to mark the tenth anniversary of the PRC on October 1, 1959, again proposed to the Chinese leadership comradely discussion of various questions that had arisen. But this proposal was not given serious consideration.

In April 1960, with the publication of *Long Live Leninism!*, which propounded the Maoist views on fundamental questions of international development and basic strategy and tactics of the revolutionary movement, Peking announced the beginning of open ideological and political struggle against the CPSU and the USSR, against the line of the international socialist forces.

At the Bucharest Conference held June 24-26, 1960, and attended by representatives of fifty-one Communist and Workers' parties, the Chinese delegation was isolated and the "special" views of the Chinese leadership on current issues were rejected.

¹ M. S. Kapitsa, *The PRC. Two Decades, Two Policies*, p. 173.

Despite a continued growth of economic and also scientific and technological co-operation, by the late fifties the negative results of the Chinese stand were becoming more and more evident in these areas of Sino-Soviet relations too. In particular, there was the question of China's treatment of Soviet specialists, who during the "great leap forward" were placed in a position where it was impossible for them to work properly and give effective assistance since the Chinese refused to build or run equipment according to accepted technological standards. As a result there were accidents and cases of Soviet equipment breaking down from being overloaded. The Chinese blamed the Soviet technicians for this, accusing them of incompetence, technical conservatism and a host of other sins.

On September 5, 1958, the Soviet Union proposed a considerable reduction in the number of technicians and the withdrawal of technical advisors. In their reply of September 15, the Chinese agreed to this in principle. The position of Soviet technicians in China continued to deteriorate, and their protests were consistently ignored by the Chinese side. Moreover, in violation of the generally accepted principles of relations between socialist countries, the Chinese began to undertake propaganda of the Maoist views on major current issues among Soviet citizens working in the country. Such importuning increased, especially after the publication of *Long Live Leninism!* As a result of all this, the presence of Soviet technicians in China became a sharp political issue between the two countries. At the end of July 1960, the Soviet Government was forced to recall them. The Soviet Union subsequently proposed sending technicians back to China on several occasions (in 1960-1961 and 1963), on the condition that they were provided with normal working conditions.¹ However, the Chinese leaders did not respond to these offers, but continued to exaggerate the question of the withdrawal of technicians and use it to fan anti-Soviet feeling in China and to justify the failure of the Maoist social and economic policy.

Whereas in 1958-1959 negative features in the field of

¹ O. B. Borisov, B. T. Koloskov, *Sino-Soviet Relations. 1945-1970. A Short Review*, Moscow, 1971, p. 260 (in Russian).

economic co-operation arose against a background of a growth of trade and Soviet aid to China in industrial construction, in the sphere of cultural exchanges co-operation had been steadily declining for some time.

**Attempts by the Chinese leaders to impose
the Maoist foreign policy line
on the socialist community**

At the end of the fifties the Chinese leaders began to revise the country's foreign policy. This was expressed in the fact that in 1958-1959 Peking did not take a single initiative with a view to reducing international tension. Moreover, while officially supporting the peaceful policy of the USSR, the Chinese leaders tried in 1958 to get the USSR and other socialist countries to follow their own line of exacerbating the international situation. In August 1958 the Chinese embarked on a number of military actions in the area of the Formosa Strait (artillery bombardment of the islands of Quemoy and Matsu), which threatened to lead to a serious increase in international tension. Moreover, Peking tried to create the impression that this "trial of strength" in the Formosa Strait had been undertaken after consultations with the USSR, thereby hoping to provoke a conflict between the USA and the USSR.

The stand taken by the Soviet Union over the Taiwan crisis thwarted imperialist attempts to take advantage of the adventurism of the Maoist wing of the Chinese leadership and take military action against China.¹

In 1959 China chose India for a new "trial of strength". But the reaction of the USSR and other socialist countries to the Sino-Indian conflict showed that they were not prepared to follow the Maoist foreign policy course directed against the interests of the progressive forces of the world.

Peking's attempts begun in the mid-fifties to establish "special" relations with the socialist countries of Europe and Asia and stress the difference between its own policy towards them and that of the Soviet Union were continued and stepped up in the years that followed. However, from

¹ See *Problems of the Far East*, No. 1, 1973, p. 106.

1958 onwards, a new element was introduced when the Chinese began propagating the thesis that Yugoslavia was not a socialist country.¹ Peking's "special", "ultra-liberal" policy towards Yugoslavia in 1956-1957 was now replaced by an equally "special", but this time "ultra-rigid" policy. China's attempt to use her great-power position to exert naked pressure on the European and Asian socialist countries was first revealed in her relations with Yugoslavia and was used by the Chinese leaders for oblique attacks on other socialist countries, particularly the USSR.

Unlike Sino-Soviet relations, not to mention Sino-Yugoslav relations, China's relations with the other socialist countries at this period continued to develop strongly in all spheres. On September 30, 1958, friendship societies were founded in China with all the socialist countries of Europe and Asia, save Yugoslavia. More actively than ever, China continued to introduce into trade relations with the socialist countries the practice of concluding long-term agreements (she no longer concluded such agreements with the USSR).

In 1959 China's trade with these countries reached its peak, and showed an increase of 34 per cent with the European group and almost 70 per cent with the Asian as compared with 1957.

At the end of the fifties China was continuing to increase economic aid to a number of socialist countries and assuming new commitments to assist the building and reconstruction of industrial enterprises and other projects in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Mongolia, the Korean People's Democratic Republic and Cuba, despite the fact that in many cases she was unable to ensure sufficient standards of quality and supply them with complete plant and machinery. As a result, by 1962 Cuba had rejected Chinese assistance in the construction of a number of enterprises since they failed to meet the technical standards required by Cuban industry. The majority of industrial enterprises built with Chinese assistance in Mongolia had later to be rebuilt with the aid and technical assistance of the CMEA countries.

¹ See, for example, the article by Kang Sheng, Candidate Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, *Jenmin jihpao*, June 14, 1958.

In trying to make political capital out of demonstratively extensive economic aid (especially as regards the number of projects) to neighbouring socialist countries, China was far from ignoring the material benefits to be reaped from it. Thus, having assisted the DRV to restore rail transport, according to an agreement of January 25, 1958, China acquired the right to duty-free transport through the DRV for freight from the province of Yunan and back.¹ Within approximately three years the saving this brought had practically made up for the "free" assistance the DRV had received in 1955.²

At the end of the fifties there was a considerable increase in the frequency of exchanges of official and unofficial visits at a high level between China and the Asian socialist countries, and also Albania. China showed a special interest in the GDR and Hungary.

By the end of the fifties the secret and open, oblique and direct attempts by the Chinese leadership to muster support from at least part of the socialist community for its struggle against the Soviet Union, and hence against the unity of the world socialist system, had produced only marginal results.

An anti-Soviet line becomes a basic feature of the government ideology and policy of the PRC in the years 1960-1963

The unambiguously anti-Soviet character of Peking's policy became even more evident at the beginning of the sixties in that it was being conducted in the face of persistent Soviet efforts to prevent a deterioration in relations with the CPC and the Chinese Government. The constructive proposals for improving relations between the two countries were dismissed by Peking in an increasingly offhanded manner. The meeting between CPSU and CPC delegations held in Moscow, September 17-22, 1960, on the initiative of the CPSU, showed that the Chinese leadership intended to widen the area of disagreement with the CPSU and promote

¹ *Nhan Dan*, January 25, 1958.

² According to *Druzhba* (No. 4, 1958, p. 23), the saving from the spring to the end of 1958 amounted to 150 million yuan.

discord in the international communist movement. However, at the Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow in November 1960, the CPC delegation found itself isolated and finally signed the documents of the international communist forum.

Yet neither this nor the Chinese Government's declarations of friendship with the Soviet Union and of the Chinese leaders' devotion to socialist unity were determining any longer Peking's actual policy towards the Soviet Union.

In mid-1960, the Chinese leadership resorted to provoking incidents on the Soviet border, and from the end of 1961 an open, systematic anti-Soviet propaganda campaign was run in the CPC and among the working people in China.

Since the end of 1962 there has not really been a single further occasion when China has acted in the international field in partnership with the socialist countries. By that time the petty-bourgeois nationalistic forces in the Chinese leadership had so strengthened their position that a proletarian class approach in assessing the opposing forces in the world had been totally discarded.

The meeting between CPSU and CPC delegations held in Moscow in July 1963 on the Soviet initiative once again revealed that the Chinese leadership had no intention of patching up relations with the Soviet Union in the interests of the socialist and all anti-imperialist forces. Broken off by the Chinese delegation, this meeting was a watershed marking the adoption of an anti-Soviet attitude as a fundamental principle of the foreign policy theory of the Chinese leaders and a major element in their practical foreign policy course as a whole, especially their relations with the socialist community.

Peking adopts methods of naked pressure on the European and Asian socialist countries

The failure of the attempts to impose its ideological and political platform on the socialist countries forced the Chinese leadership to manoeuvre and resort to various methods of political and economic pressure in relations with them. Chinese propaganda went out of its way to present the KPDR, the DRV and Cuba as examples of countries that had

achieved victories in revolution and construction "through self-help". In 1961, Chinese trade with the CMEA countries (exclusive of Albania) was less than half what it had been in 1959, whereas trade with the other socialist countries increased by over 60 per cent between 1960 and 1962.

The increasing tendency in Chinese policy from 1960 onwards to base relations with the socialist countries on diktat developed at the end of 1962 and the beginning of 1963 into a series of sharp attacks by Peking on the leadership of the European socialist countries. Peking's actions towards them became more and more provocative and aggressive. The same was true of Peking's attitude to the Mongolian People's Republic, which joined CMEA in 1962 and from the very start had taken a clear and determined stand in the struggle against the Maoists' great-power splitting policy.

With regard to Cuba, which at the beginning of the sixties lay under a mortal threat from American imperialism, Peking did not resist the temptation of applying a certain amount of pressure. Annoyed by the growing ties between the Soviet Union and Cuba, Fidel Castro's visit to Moscow in April 1963, and his high appraisal of the internationalist position of the USSR, notably during the Caribbean crisis, and Cuba's rejection of Chinese technical assistance, in 1963 Peking reduced her trade with Cuba by 27 per cent compared to the preceding year.

The Maoist attacks on the unity of the socialist system also served to reinforce the long-standing attempts by the international forces of anti-communism to undermine the unity of world socialism. From that time on, therefore, opposition to the combined actions of the Maoists and anti-communists and ensuring the solidarity of the socialist countries became a major and most urgent task of the global struggle of the forces of progress against imperialist reaction.

§ 3. CHINA'S ISOLATION FROM THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY. THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP ADOPT A COURSE OF OPEN OPPOSITION TO IT (1963-1969)

The summer of 1963, which saw the publication of a detailed statement of the "special" ideological and political

platform of the Chinese leadership,¹ marked the beginning of a new phase in relations between China and the socialist countries. Peking now demonstrated quite openly and extensively a growing hostility to the socialist world as a whole.

Provocation—the chief Maoist method of disrupting relations between China and the socialist countries

Launching an ideological and political struggle against the socialist countries, the Chinese leaders did all they could to present China as the offended party, whose rights were somehow being encroached upon by the others. But since this was far from being the case, they were forced to resort more frequently than ever to the tactics of provocation. This was patently evident in Peking's insistence on her "right" to conduct subversive propaganda in the socialist countries. The Maoists sometimes went to absurd lengths in an effort to present attack on the latter as self-defence. Thus, in reply to a protest by the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the dissemination of Maoist propaganda material in Hungary, a Chinese Embassy official found nothing better to say than that this protest represented interference in the internal affairs of China!²

In a statement of August 10, 1967, the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic voiced a strong protest against lawless actions provoked by the Chinese authorities against the Mongolian Embassy and its staff.

The provocative tactics employed by Peking also involved actions undertaken at various levels and in the most diverse areas of Sino-Soviet relations in the period 1963-1969. They included the harassment by Chinese students of a demonstration of Soviet citizens and foreign representatives at the

¹ *The Proposals Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement ("The Twenty-Five Points")*, published June 14, 1963.

² From the speech of Comrade János Kádár at a meeting in Budapest, August 5, 1963.

US Embassy in Moscow on March 4, 1965, continual Chinese violations of the Soviet border, territorial claims against the USSR advanced by Mao in the summer of 1964, the Chinese leaders' insistence in November 1964, and again in March and November 1965, that the CPSU should renounce its new programme, the decisions of the 20th, 21st and 22nd congresses, as a condition for a normalisation of relations between the two countries, and the Hungweiping "siege" of the Soviet Embassy in Peking in 1966 and 1967, and in March 1969.

These provocative tactics were employed by the Chinese leaders partly in order to engender the myth of a threat to China from the North. As early as the spring and summer of 1964, the claim that the USSR was about to break off diplomatic relations with China and even declare war on her was a constant theme of rumours specially spread among the population. In order to lend credibility to this myth, Peking resorted to the tactics of provocation in more and more dangerous forms and on an ever wider scale, right up to the end of the "cultural revolution", which even went as far as military incursions into Soviet territory in the spring and summer of 1969.

**The Maoists cease co-operating with
the socialist community
in the international sphere.**

The global character of Peking's anti-Soviet line

From the summer of 1963 the Chinese leadership took every possible step to ensure that an anti-Soviet, anti-socialist line became more and more firmly established in China's foreign policy and to prevent a renewal of Sino-Soviet co-operation in the international arena, despite all the efforts of the CPSU and the USSR and the other socialist countries and Communist parties.

Peking's anti-Soviet policy began to acquire a global character, pervading all its actions, big and small, in the international field. From that time on opposition to the Soviet Union in every single matter became the principle underlying the entire attitude of the Chinese leaders to all and every international question. Peking was no longer in-

terested in the actual Soviet attitude to a question. As the Chinese representative at the conference of Afro-Asian solidarity in Moshi in 1963 put it: "Do as you like, we shall be against you."¹

On July 31, August 15 and September 1, 1963, the Chinese leadership issued slanderous statements concerning the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water, signed by the governments of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain on August 5, which was met with approval by socialist and other progressive forces throughout the world.

In 1963-1964, in an attempt to discredit the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the eyes of the developing countries, the Chinese leadership launched the thesis of the "egoism" of the "rich" powers. In October 1963, they even made the preposterous claim that Soviet aid to young countries that had recently won national independence was "damaging" their economic and political interests.²

From the beginning of the sixties Peking was feverishly seeking forces in the world that might support it in a global campaign to discredit the Soviet Union. The fact that the powerful propaganda machine of world anti-communism eagerly took up and promoted anything that was anti-Soviet and any slander against the world socialism emanating from Peking, suited Peking very well up to a point, yet at the same time it somewhat belied its claims to be a "revolutionary force". Peking needed support from quarters prepared to do the same but apparently from a genuine "revolutionary" standpoint. This was to be the purpose of the "new Marxist-Leninist" groups and parties—"ultra-Left" organisations knocked together by the Maoists in the capitalist countries. Set up under outside influence and lacking any mass social support in the countries concerned, they naturally turned out to be pretty ineffectual.

¹ For the Unity of the International Communist Movement. Documents and Materials, Moscow, 1964, p. 198 (in Russian).

² Jenmin jihpao, October 22, 1963.

**The struggle between the internationalist line
of the CPSU and the nationalistic line
of the Chinese leadership over matters concerning
the development of Sino-Soviet relations**

In a conversation with French parliamentarians at the end of February 1964, Mao Tse-tung referred in quite plain terms to the Soviet Union as one of China's enemies. And in order that there might remain no doubts on this matter, five months later he told a Japanese delegation that China had well-founded claims to extensive areas of the Soviet Far East and Central Asian republics.

Thus, in the spring and summer of 1964, the Chinese began to actually base relations with the Soviet Union on the assumption that it was a hostile nation. The turning down of the invitation to send a delegation to the 23rd CPSU Congress (March-April 1966) marked the final breach between the CPC Central Committee and the Soviet Union in party matters, the most important area of political links between socialist countries.

At meetings of the National People's Congress held in camera in November-December 1963, the 11th and 12th Plenums of the CPC Central Committee (August 1966 and October 1968, respectively) and finally at the Ninth Party Congress held after the "cultural revolution", which had destroyed the former Government and Party apparatus in China, Mao Tse-tung's petty-bourgeois nationalistic group managed to consolidate its anti-Soviet course as the main foreign policy line of the CPC and the Chinese Government. In a document issued by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 8, 1969, Peking first announced officially that not only between the CPC and the CPSU but also between "China and the USSR irreconcilable contradictions exist" and that "the struggle between them will continue for a long time to come".¹ Thus, the process of transference by Peking of ideological differences to the sphere of inter-state relations between China and the Soviet Union was complete and had been officially announced by the Chinese leadership.

¹ *Jenmin jihpao*, October 8, 1969.

Against the background of this intensive process the persistent, systematic efforts of the CPSU and the Soviet Government throughout the period 1963-1969 to overcome China's isolation from the world socialist forces and normalise relations with her, dictated by concern for the future of socialism in China and the unity and solidarity of world socialism, stands out in sharp relief. This line was repeatedly expressed and confirmed both in official messages to Peking and at plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and the 23rd CPSU Congress, in statements by the Soviet Government. It was expressed in various constructive proposals for resolving the real problems of Sino-Soviet relations through talks, in particular, the question of clarifying certain sectors of the border, and also for developing links between the two countries and co-operation between them on the widest range of questions concerning the anti-imperialist struggle. The visits to China by A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, in 1965 and 1969, were extremely important actions by the Soviet Union in the framework of this fundamental political line, which operates as a constant positive factor throughout the intricate and difficult stage in relations between the two countries which began at the end of the fifties. Despite all the attempts by the CPSU and the Soviet Government to maintain official relations with China, the Chinese leadership has pursued a steady course towards their curtailment.

But unlike co-operation between China and the USSR in the international arena, which by 1963 had been totally broken off by Peking, the Maoists took several years longer to reduce economic and cultural relations and scientific and technological exchange to a minimum with no practical significance for either country. Up to the end of 1966 the Chinese continued to show a certain interest in cultural exchanges, seeing them as a possible channel for spreading Maoist ideas and anti-Soviet propaganda in the USSR.

Economic links with the USSR were reduced more and more rapidly as China developed her trade with the capitalist world. The share of Sino-Soviet trade in China's total foreign trade decreased to 21.3 per cent in 1963, to 7.4 per cent in 1966, 2.7 per cent in 1967 and approximately 1 per cent in 1969.

On April 21, 1965, the Chinese announced a total refusal of Soviet assistance in the construction of industrial enterprises. By 1967 scientific and technological co-operation, co-operation between the Soviet and Chinese academies of sciences and also cultural exchanges, which had already been reduced to a formal minimum, had ceased altogether.

By their reorientation of China's economic ties towards the capitalist countries the Maoists caused irreparable damage to the Chinese economy. For over a decade China has been deprived of outside aid, including the scientific and technological aid she so vitally needs.

The "differential" policy of the Chinese leaders

In the period 1963-1969, the Maoists made particularly energetic attempts to draw socialist countries into the orbit of their policy. They resorted now to methods of direct pressure (ideological, economic and political), now to a more "liberal" approach, only to return once more to wielding the knout. In actual fact in 1963-1965 the Mao group had approved of all forms of subversive activity in the socialist community, which they have employed, subsequently, in numerous variations, right down to the present.

Peking propaganda borrowed a traditional device employed by the ideologists of anti-communism, and from 1963 began to make a great deal of the old story that the unity of the countries of the socialist community is evidence of their dependence on the Soviet Union.¹ Behind all this propaganda bluster the Maoists stepped up their efforts in the good old great-power tradition to impose their own anti-Soviet course on the socialist countries, exerting crude political and economic pressure on them. Thus, for example, in 1964 Peking withdrew practically all Chinese workers who were in Mongolia according to previous agreements. Provocative incidents were staged on the Mongolian border, designed to show that the Chinese leaders did not feel themselves at all bound by the border treaty concluded between the two countries in 1962.

¹ See *Jenmin jihpao*, September 4, 1963 (the article "How Certain Fraternal Parties Attack China, Following the Instructions of the Warder").

However, as early as 1964 the Chinese leaders had apparently realised that a head-on attack on the socialist countries as a means of attracting them to their side and gaining their allegiance was ineffective and produced precisely the opposite effect, exposing the true motives of Maoist policy.

The Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee thus renounced the tactics of crude pressure and expressed its aim as follows: "To achieve normalisation of relations with all socialist countries, save the Soviet Union, in order to muster all forces for struggle against the CPSU and the USSR."¹

Accordingly in 1964-1966 the Chinese leadership demonstrated its "special attention" to a number of socialist countries. In 1964 China announced that she was willing to expand and improve relations with the GDR, including inter-party links. In early 1965 Hungary and a number of other socialist countries were informed of such a readiness.

This "differential" policy, intended to disrupt the unity of the socialist community, was combined with an increasingly negative attitude to collective organisations and forms of co-operation between the socialist countries. In the summer of 1965 China withdrew from the Joint Nuclear Research Institute, ignored an invitation to co-operate in the sphere of space research, and since 1966 has ceased sending observers to the CMEA commissions.

Peking's obvious effort to step up its splitting activity, despite the fact that it provokes the imperialists to aggression against the world socialism, was bound to cause grave concern in all the socialist countries and an increasingly critical attitude to the role of the Maoists in the confrontation of the two world systems. Consequently, even by the end of 1964, mounting reverberations of great-power wrath began to be heard in the relations between the People's Republic of China and a number of socialist countries. In certain instances, government and Party delegations were "deprived of the honour" of meeting Mao Tse-tung, although hitherto he had even been receiving tourist groups arriving from the socialist countries on which Peking was

¹ *The Foreign Policy of the PRC. On the Essence of the Foreign Policy Course of the Present Chinese Government*, Moscow, 1971, p. 64 (in Russian).

relying. In the middle of 1965, the Chinese delegation did not arrive to take part in the Havana forum of fighters against colonialism.

Increasing direct and indirect resistance to Peking's splitting policy by a growing number of socialist countries and the intensification of the struggle within the CPC leadership, which altered the balance further in favour of the extreme nationalistic elements, made the matter of pursuing a "differential" policy far more complicated. Not surprisingly, therefore, towards the end of 1965 it was abandoned.

Peking returns to a tough great-power policy towards all the socialist countries

In the situation that obtained in the mid-sixties, the Maoists were only able to strengthen their position in China and continue to lead the country to the right, pursuing their selfish great-power aims, behind a smoke screen of ever more strident and increasingly "Left-wing" slogans. Under cover of "Left-wing" phrases Peking returned to a tough great-power policy towards all the socialist countries. The first symptom was the sharp deterioration in Sino-Cuban relations, at the end of 1965 and beginning of 1966, and the tension that arose in 1966 between the PRC and the KPDR.

Peking did not even deign to reply or supply any explanation at all to the protest of the Cuban President and Prime Minister of September 14, 1965, concerning the dissemination of subversive propaganda material in Cuba, and at the talks that began in November 1965 in Peking to discuss trade between the two countries for 1966 the Cuban delegation was informed of a reduction of Chinese deliveries of rice from 250,000 to 135,000 tons and a reduction in purchases of Cuban sugar, which placed Cuba in an extremely awkward position.

In attempting to blackmail Cuba at the secret talks between the trade delegations, the Chinese leadership were apparently angling for Cuban concessions by way of renunciation of the struggle for the unity of the world anti-imperialist forces. However, the Cuban leaders exposed the economic blackmail for what it was and gave it an accurate political evaluation.

In a statement on February 5, 1966, Fidel Castro said that the methods and procedures of meddling in the internal affairs of Cuba employed by China "were exactly the same as those used by the United States Embassy when it tried to interfere in the internal affairs of Cuba and impose in one form or another its will on the nation".¹

In February 1965 the Chinese leadership turned down a request by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam addressed to all members of the socialist community to issue a joint condemnation of American aggression and announce joint support for the Vietnamese people.

In the summer of 1966 Peking's relations with the Korean People's Democratic Republic became strained. The latter, in the words of the French journalist Jean Vidal, "suffered approximately the same fate as Cuba".² The KPDR strongly rejected Peking's claims to dictate her will to her.

The effects of the Chinese Government's hostile policy towards the socialist countries were clearly manifested in connection with the escalation of American aggression against the DRV, which was largely made possible by the splitting tactics adopted by the Chinese leadership. China's isolation from the socialist countries reached its culmination during the "cultural revolution", i.e., during the period when Maoist attacks on the socialist forces within China were at their height.

China's isolation from the socialist countries on the pretext of struggle with "revisionism"

When the "cultural revolution" began China withdrew her ambassadors from all the socialist countries, and from most of the capitalist countries too. (The only Chinese Ambassador not recalled was the Ambassador in Cairo.) In itself, this "equal" approach to the two systems was a symptom of China's blatantly nationalistic policy of withdrawal from

¹ *Granma*, February 6, 1966, p. 5.

² Jean-Emile Vidal, *Où va la Chine?* Éditions Sociales, Paris, 1967, p. 215.

the socialist community, which the Chinese leaders tried to present as disassociation from "revisionist" countries that had become "bourgeois".

Whereas after 1966 the Chinese press openly referred to the leadership of the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the Mongolian People's Republic as "revisionist cliques",¹ several influential figures in China during the period of the "cultural revolution" also referred privately to those socialist countries which official propaganda refrained from qualifying thus as "revisionist". Thus, in a report on current international problems delivered at an enlarged meeting of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee in September 1967, Yao Wen-yuan, member of the "cultural revolution" group under the CPC Central Committee, said: "Korea is at present pursuing a patently anti-Chinese policy. Like the Soviet revisionists she is accusing us of a great-power approach and sectarianism, Left-wing adventurism and other 'isms'.... Castro is also a revisionist." Peking's dissatisfaction with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was expressed in the report as follows: "There are people in Vietnam who recognise that they are waging a people's war but do not recognise the fact that the war they are waging is based on the theory of Chairman Mao. Thus, Vo Nguyen Giap in Vietnam says that he invented the people's war."²

Peking refrained from commenting on the socialist development of Rumania. In 1967 China broke off scientific and technological co-operation with Rumania, and only resumed it in October 1970.

In 1966-1967, the Maoists using the Hungweipings launched vicious attacks on the Korean People's Democratic Republic. The anti-Korean campaign at that time assumed such proportions that the Koreans felt obliged to voice an official protest. In the following years attacks on the KPDR leadership appeared from time to time in the Hungweiping press. In September 1968 China did not send a delegation

¹ See *Jenmin jihpao*, May 4, 1967, Hsinhua News Agency Information Bulletin, June 12, August 19, September 18, 1967.

² *Polityka*, February 19, 1972. (This Polish newspaper published an abridged version of the text of Yao Wen-yuan's report.)

to the celebrations to mark the 20th anniversary of the KPDR, which were attended by representatives from sixty countries.

Although Peking officially maintained the appearance of friendly relations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, its great-power disregard for the interests of other nations was nevertheless manifest here too. The Chinese authorities obstructed the passage of Soviet military supplies bound for the DRV via China on the grounds that complications had arisen with transport in connection with the "movement of the revolutionary masses". In September 1968 the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused a request by the GDR for an Interflug transport plane carrying medical and other vital supplies for Vietnam to fly over the People's Republic of China.¹ The Chinese authorities repeatedly obstructed deliveries of food supplies, especially flour, from Mongolia to fighting Vietnam.²

The Chinese Government not only ignored protests made by the socialist countries over the officially inspired Hungweiping outrages against embassies and diplomats, but even tried to "justify" their right to continue to disregard the principles of international law. Diplomatic immunity was declared to be a "survival" of "bourgeois institutions", and the actions of the Hungweipings "a perfectly legitimate revolutionary act", a reply to the "provocation of the revolutionary masses" by foreign diplomats.³

By the end of the sixties, the political isolation of China from the socialist countries had been reinforced by a complete reorientation of China's foreign economic links. In 1969 trade with the socialist countries only accounted for 23.8 per cent of the total as compared with 76.2 per cent for the capitalist countries.

Peking's head-on attack on world socialism in the years of the "cultural revolution" was mounted within China, in bilateral relations between China and the socialist countries and in the sphere of global struggle between the two world systems, especially in the "hot spots" of the struggle.

¹ *Izvestia*, September 13, 1968.

² *Pravda*, August 14, 1969.

³ *Jenmin jihpao*, July 15, 1967.

The Chinese leadership once more adopts a "differential" policy towards the socialist countries

In the spring of 1968, a foreign policy commission of the Central Committee of the CPC spoke of the need to concentrate on the struggle against the USSR, and disrupt the socialist community, encouraging the development of "separatist tendencies" in the socialist countries and provoking and intensifying centrifugal forces in the world socialist movement. This change of course did not mean, however, that relapses of "Hungweiping diplomacy" were to be totally excluded. Thus a new wave of vicious attacks on the socialist countries by Peking followed the events in Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968. The targets were not only the countries that had extended fraternal assistance to the Czechoslovak people but also those socialist countries which had evaluated this assistance from a class standpoint.

A new feature of the "differential" policy as resumed by the Chinese leadership at this stage was that it no longer had struggle for the ideological supremacy of Maoism as its prime aim. Peking was now trying not to complicate the matter of pursuing this policy with tasks of secondary importance for its great-power global aims, and transferred the main front of the struggle for these aims from the sphere of ideology to the sphere of international relations.

The clearest evidence of Peking's new approach to its "differential" policy was the "sudden" interest the Chinese leaders showed in developing ties with Yugoslavia, which since 1958 Chinese propaganda had made a constant target in its "anti-revisionist" campaign. In March 1969 the first trade agreement between the two governments after a long interval was signed. At the same time the first steps were taken towards restoring diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level and renewing cultural exchanges.

In 1968 the Chinese leadership took measures towards reviving trade with the Korean People's Democratic Republic after a gap of two years. They also showed great eagerness to sign trade agreements with other socialist countries, completing the appropriate talks in July of the same year. No agreement was concluded with the USSR.

**Failure of the Maoist policy of provoking a "border war" with the USSR.
Sino-Soviet government negotiations open in Peking**

At the beginning of the "cultural revolution" the Chinese authorities mounted an increasing number of acts of provocation in the area near the Soviet border. In 1967 the total number of border incidents reached 2,000, twice as many as in the year before.

Addressing representatives of the Chinese bourgeois-democratic parties on March 26, 1967, Premier Chou En-lai said that a "border war between China and the USSR will start sooner than a war with the USA".

On March 2 and 15, 1969, the Chinese authorities provoked armed clashes on the Sino-Soviet border in the area of Damansky Island in the Ussuri River, and on August 13 further incidents in the Jalanashkol area on the western border with the USSR. Peking used these armed provocations to stir up further anti-Soviet hysteria in China before the Ninth Party Congress and immediately after it, to present China as a victim of aggression by her "Northern neighbour" and to lend support to its slanderous charge that "social-imperialism" (as the Maoists refer to the USSR) represented a special threat to China and the world as an excuse for the militarisation of Chinese society and for pressing ahead with building up the country's nuclear and missile potential.

Having duly rebuffed the provocateurs on the border, the Soviet Union once more demonstrated its constant desire for better relations with China. Thus, a Soviet Government statement of March 15, 1969, said: "All assertions made by Peking propaganda to the effect that the Soviet Union and the CPSU are hostile to the Chinese people are absolutely unfounded. The Soviet Union does not seek conflicts, but on the contrary is taking all possible measures to avoid them."¹

The Maoist acts of armed provocation on the Soviet border produced anger and indignation not only in the Soviet Union but among progressives throughout the world.

¹ *A Dangerous Course. On Events in China*, Moscow, 1969, p. 260 (in Russian).

Strong condemnation of the border incidents engineered by the Peking "revolutionaries" was expressed at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in June 1969.

Despite continuing Maoist provocations, the Soviet Union did not relax its efforts in pursuit of a normalisation of relations with China. Following a Soviet initiative, a meeting was held on September 11, 1969, between A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Chou En-lai, Premier of the Chinese State Council. Several aspects of Sino-Soviet relations were discussed at the meeting and in the ensuing official correspondence as a result of which the two sides agreed to renew the talks on border questions. The talks opened in Peking on October 20, 1969. But the Chinese showed no inclination for a real businesslike discussion of frontier questions. Moreover, in the autumn of 1969, an unprecedented provocative campaign to prepare the population for defence from "attack from the North" was launched in China. Industrial enterprises were moved to the heart of the country, the rural and urban population were mustered to build shelters and defence installations, practice air raid alarms were held and stores of food and medicines were built up in various localities for the event of a "state of siege". The Peking talks became protracted.

**§ 4. THE EARLY SEVENTIES:
A NEW PHASE IN THE EVOLUTION TOWARDS
THE RIGHT OF THE ANTI-SOVIET,
ANTI-SOCIALIST POLICY OF THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP**

Alignment with imperialism becomes the main feature of Peking's struggle against the socialist community

From the middle of 1970 the Mao Tse-tung-Chou En-lai group set an open course for alignment with the anti-socialist forces of the capitalist world as a whole. Peking supported its policy of reliance on the West in foreign policy matters in 1972 with requests for aid from the capitalists for China's economic development. Thus, in a conversation with members of a Japanese trade delegation in August 1971, Chou En-lai said that "since the Chinese economy is lagging, we

should like to increase its development rates with the aid of foreign technology and various equipment".¹

Meanwhile, by the end of the sixties, the internal political struggle in China which followed the failure of attempts to achieve hegemony on an "ultra-Left" platform had intensified and this led Peking to show some sort of response to the Soviet proposals for a normalisation of relations between the two countries at governmental level. In 1970 diplomatic relations were restored and the two countries exchanged ambassadors. An inter-governmental trade agreement was signed for 1970-1971, the first since 1967. A Sino-Soviet commission on navigation on border rivers met from July to December 1970 and again from December 6, 1971 to March 21, 1972, although no real breakthrough was achieved. The trade talks of 1970-1972 were more successful, and trade between the two countries rose from 42 million rubles worth in 1970 to 139 million in 1971 and 210 million in 1972.

At the talks on trade and payments for 1972, the Soviet delegation made several proposals for developing economic links between the two countries, which were largely rejected by the Chinese on the grounds that conditions were not yet ripe for their achievement.

The above-mentioned contacts on matters of trade and navigation on border rivers, the exchange of official greetings on the occasion of public holidays, some extension of protocol functions in 1972 and the continuing talks between government delegations in Peking on border questions formally exhaust the results of the present first phase in the process of normalising relations between China and the USSR.

This initial phase has undoubtedly been the consequence of the purposeful activity of the Soviet side. It has also been due partly to certain changes in the position of the Chinese leadership produced by the above-mentioned political struggle within China. However, in September 1971 this struggle culminated in a clear victory for the extreme nationalistic wing in the Chinese leadership and the removal from the political stage of a large group of important figures, including Lin Piao, Mao's appointed successor.

¹ *The Mainichi*, January 8, 1972.

Dissonances in Peking's anti-Soviet racket
in 1970-1971

Against the background of increased brainwashing of the Chinese people in an anti-Soviet spirit by stirring up fear of a "military threat from the North", completely new notes began to make themselves heard in the Chinese propaganda orchestra in 1970 which were clearly discordant with this main theme. The Chinese national press began to make intervals in its anti-Soviet campaign. Lin Piao in a speech during the celebrations to mark the twenty-first anniversary of the Chinese revolution spoke of "modern revisionism" in comparatively restrained tones. Indeed, Mao himself, addressing the deputy head of the Soviet delegation at the border negotiations, who was present among the foreign guests on the podium in Tien An Men Square during the May day celebrations, said: "We must continue our talks with the greatest zeal in order to establish friendly good-neighbour relations."¹ After Mao Tse-tung's May day statement, Chou En-lai was on several occasions to demonstrate perfect samples of political hypocrisy.

Mounting anti-Sovietism becomes the main feature of Peking's policy towards the USSR in 1970-1972

The Peking leaders have done everything in their power not only to neutralise the Chinese people's growing realisation thanks to a degree of normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations, that the "threat from the North" is purely a hoax, but have tried, in the course of normalisation, to implant greater mistrust of and hostility towards the Soviet Union in the minds of the Chinese people.

To begin with, the Chinese began to prepare for the talks with the USSR by sharply stepping up their propaganda campaign to promote the idea of a growing "threat from the North" in the autumn of 1969. The campaign soon acquired such a scale and became so abusive that the Soviet

¹ Quoted from Edgar Snow's interview with Chou En-lai published in the Italian magazine *Epoca*, December 13, 1970.

Union deemed it necessary to make an official protest. A TASS statement of March 14, 1970, completely repudiated the Chinese charges designed to blacken Soviet policy towards China.¹

Having created such a background for the talks, Peking began to present its participation in them as a method of struggling with the opponent "at bayonet point".²

The most vicious anti-Soviet lampoons were fed to the broadest possible sections of the population. Thus, an article timed for the centenary of the Paris Commune was published as a separate brochure, in the languages of the national minorities of China included, and broadcast over the air no less than two hundred times in the period March 17-April 23, 1971, alone. It was after the publication of this article that *The New York Times* wrote with an almost unconcealed sigh of relief, on March 19, 1971: "Peking has effectively torpedoed any tendency abroad to assume that real relaxation or improvement has taken place in Sino-Soviet relations."

In 1971, and especially in 1972, China again embarked on a demonstrative drive to build various defence works and shelters. In so doing the Chinese authorities are no longer so concerned with impressing the Chinese people with this "visual propaganda" as with impressing foreign visitors, chiefly from Western countries. An article in *Svenska Dagbladet* (November 27) on a visit by a group of Scandinavian journalists to China in November 1972 remarked that "the demonstration of air raid shelters in Peking is an invariable element in the anti-Soviet campaign being mounted in China".

On December 21, 1972, L. I. Brezhnev denounced the patently bogus charges put forth in Peking concerning a Soviet threat to China in no uncertain terms. "If these statements are not hypocritical, it is impossible to understand why in this case China has not replied to our proposal, repeatedly made since 1969, to assume clear, firm and permanent commitments ruling out an attack by one country on the other. If Peking is really concerned about

¹ *Pravda*, March 14, 1970.

² *Jenmin jihpao*, June 19, 1971.

China's security, why has not the PRC leadership agreed to conclude a special treaty renouncing the use of force, the draft of which was submitted to the Chinese side on January 15, 1971? The draft of this treaty stated unequivocally that the sides—and I quote—'shall not use against each other armed forces employing any type of arms, including: (a) conventional, (b) missile, or (c) nuclear'. No, the Chinese leaders' complaints about a mythical 'Soviet threat' quite obviously do not stand up to scrutiny."¹

The nature of normalisation of relations between China and the European and Asian socialist countries, and with Cuba. A new phase in the "differential policy"

By August 1971 China had restored diplomatic relations and exchanged ambassadors with all the socialist countries. Chinese ambassadors appeared first of all in Tirana and Bucharest, and last of all in Czechoslovakia and Mongolia. The process of normalisation of diplomatic relations was thus drawn out over almost two years, although all the socialist countries showed a genuine readiness to speed things up. China only re-established the fullest and most comprehensive links at this time, including inter-party links, with the Korean People's Democratic Republic. Links with Albania and the DRV had been retained anyway, although in many areas purely on a formal basis.

The urgent need for industrial goods had moved China to maintain the tendency towards a growth in trade with all the countries of the world socialist system which had been in evidence since the latter half of 1970. The share of machinery and plant increased noticeably in China's imports from these countries. China became more active in concluding trade agreements with them. Building up its trade and other economic relations with a number of socialist countries on the basis of long-term agreements, Peking, after a prolonged interval, began in 1971 to use long-term contracts for the delivery of some goods in trade with Yugoslavia also. The People's Republic of China resumed participa-

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, Moscow, 1972, pp. 46-47.

tion at the international trade fairs being held in socialist countries.

Towards the middle of 1973, the People's Republic of China concluded new or renewed old agreements on scientific and technical co-operation with a number of socialist countries. Unlike the process of normalisation of relations with the USSR, which began after the "cultural revolution" but was then frozen by the Chinese while still at the initial stage, the restoration of links with other socialist countries still continues. This difference clearly expresses the basic purpose of China's "differential" policy, which is intended to place Sino-Soviet relations in a category apart from contacts between Maoist China and the countries of the world socialist system.

It is hardly surprising that the Peking diplomats and China's foreign policy planners should be trying to convince the socialist countries that Maoist China has no essential quarrel with them, but that there are only insoluble differences with the Soviet Union. Latterly Chinese diplomacy has launched the idea that the extension of ties with individual socialist countries is a bridge to a future improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. This idea is as much a provocation as is the thesis that Peking only has contradictions with the Soviet Union. The truth of the matter is that China has no need to take roundabout routes to arrive at a genuine normalisation of relations with the USSR and the restoration of good-neighbour relations. Ever since Peking's policy took an anti-Soviet course, the Soviet Union has constantly kept the door open for talks with China on the widest range of questions concerning bilateral relations and world politics.

Peking's attempts to show that it is seeking ways to restore friendly relations with the Soviet Union are completely transparent since over the last few years the Chinese leaders have been declaring the USSR the biggest source of danger to national freedom and the independence of the peoples, presenting imperialism, including US imperialism, as practically the most important stabilising factor for peace and international security.

Naturally enough, all the ruses employed by Peking to disrupt the unity of the world socialist system are perfectly

visible to all but those who deliberately close their eyes to them. Thus, the Polish *Trybuna Ludu* said in an article on the fiftieth anniversary of the Communist Party of China: "We seek normalisation of inter-state relations with the Chinese People's Republic. But we resolutely reject every attempt to make use of our readiness to normalise relations for purposes other than the strengthening of the unity of the entire socialist community. Under no circumstances can an anti-Soviet policy and orientation on splitting the socialist community and the international communist movement serve as a platform for genuine normalisation."¹

A similar approach is characteristic of the efforts of socialist countries to overcome the unnatural relations Peking is trying to force on world socialism. They work to achieve this from a standpoint of firm condemnation of the anti-socialist theory and practice of Maoism.

Speaking at a session of the State Assembly of the Hungarian People's Republic on June 24, 1971, Zoltan Komócsin, member of the Political Bureau of the Hungarian Socialist-Workers' Party, emphasised: "We are eager for a normalisation of Sino-Hungarian and Albano-Hungarian relations," but "we will not permit the international relations of the Hungarian People's Republic to be used by anybody for anti-Soviet purposes". *Neues Deutschland*, the newspaper of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany Central Committee, wrote on March 26, 1971: "We proceed from the principle that whoever attacks the Soviet Union and slanders it, attacks us." A Czechoslovak-Bulgarian joint communiqué of March 17, 1972, strongly condemned the adventuristic anti-Soviet splitting policy of the present Chinese Government and Party leadership which is directed against the unity of the socialist countries and the international communist and workers' movement, and does incalculable damage to the cause of socialism and the struggle against imperialism.

Retreat at the expense of proletarian internationalism, aloofness from the struggle against Maoism and a "neutral" stand towards it are not going to help in the complicated task of returning China to the path of unity with the socialist community. As *Neues Deutschland* wrote on August 14, 1971,

¹ *New Times*, No. 33, August 1971, p. 20.

"Whoever adopts a policy of tolerance and concessions with respect to the great-power chauvinism of the Mao group is encouraging their splitting policy, violating the basic principles of proletarian internationalism and making more difficult the struggle against imperialism."

Naturally, in return for such retreats and concessions, Peking willingly accepts the widest normalisation and development of relations. However, such normalisation is by no means in the interests of socialism. It is a concession to national egoism, which is indeed the basis of Peking's chauvinistic "differential" policy.

It was quite evident that by the seventies the Maoists were still at square one in their struggle against the unity of the world socialist system. All the most abusive charges, the labels, the sly manoeuvres and the most reckless hostile actions against the Soviet Union had produced none of the desired results for Peking. The authority of the Soviet Union remained intact. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that in December 1972, for the celebrations to mark that great milestone in the historical advance of mankind towards socialism and communism, the 50th anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, representative delegations arrived in Moscow from all the socialist countries with only two exceptions: China and Albania.

Peking attempts to step up its splitting action
in the socialist community with the demagogical slogan
of defence of the national
interests of the "small and medium countries"

At the beginning of the seventies Peking abandoned its "ultra-Left" demagogic and renounced its claims to be a Mecca for the world socialist forces and launched a noisy campaign in "defence" of the national interests and sovereignty of the "small and medium countries", which were supposedly being threatened, primarily by "social-imperialism". It took the majority of the socialist countries, too, under its unsolicited "protection" and ardently "defended" them, from the same positions, however, from which world anti-communism has been "defending" them for three decades. In complete unison with the forces of imperialist reac-

tion, Peking deliberately misinterpreted any new steps by fraternal countries to develop and improve forms of co-operation, especially economic co-operation, as evidence of the political and economic expansion of "Soviet imperialism" or "one of the superpowers". According to Peking, what the socialist countries apparently need is not to unite in order to successfully build socialism, i.e., for the purpose of achieving social and national equality for peoples and nations, but "to wage a struggle for independence from the Soviet Union". Incidentally, this was the same line taken by American congressmen in 1959 when they decided to hold annual weeks of the so-called "enslaved peoples".

Apart from this "wholesale defence", so to speak, Peking also "defended" the interests of individual socialist countries. Thus, it "protected" the interests of the KPDR by doing everything possible to encourage the militarist forces of neighbouring Japan to step up the process of rearmament and by appealing to the USA not to withdraw its troops from the Far East. As for the DRV, which was resisting American aggression and struggling for the national unity of the Vietnamese people, Peking "defended" it by declaring a US withdrawal from the Pacific area to be undesirable and by a firm refusal to give political and military aid to the Vietnamese liberation forces in co-operation with the rest of the socialist countries.

Peking was equally "solicitous" about defending the sovereign rights and interests of the GDR. This is what Ernst Majonica, who can hardly be suspected of sympathy for the socialist community, had to say on the subject: "They (the Chinese leaders—*Author*) had no interest in the GDR receiving diplomatic recognition from Third World countries, and slackened their efforts to encourage them to establish diplomatic relations with Pankow (the GDR Government residence—*Author*). . . ."¹

Over a decade of Maoist activity in the international arena has clearly demonstrated that "the most faithful" champions of socialism (as the Maoists called themselves in

¹ Ernst Majonica, *Bonn-Peking*, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Berlin, 1971, S. 124, 125.

the years of "ultra-Left" agitation), "champions" of the national independence of the "small and medium countries" (as the Maoists have dubbed themselves since the beginning of the seventies) act against the interests of world socialism as a whole and each socialist country individually. The seventies brought further confirmation of the words of L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, when he said: "China's foreign policy has, in effect, departed from proletarian internationalism and shed all socialist class content."¹

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow, 1969, Prague, 1969*, p. 158.

CHAPTER TWO

CHINA'S POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD

Before 1917, Lenin indicated the importance of establishing *what class* is determining the basic trend in world politics and mankind's onward progressive advance, and *what class* is the fulcrum of the age and reflects "the main direction of its development, the main characteristics of the historical situation in that epoch, etc."¹

After the October Socialist Revolution which marked the beginning of the collapse of capitalism as a socio-political system and progressive mankind's advance towards a new social order, towards socialism and communism, the international working class assumed this role. It became the fulcrum of the new age, acquiring the predominant role in the intricate and diverse revolutionary process in the modern world. Today, with the collapse of the colonial system of imperialism, the world revolutionary process also includes the millions of combatants in the anti-imperialist liberation movement.

The development of the Third World countries

The emergence of socialism from the confines of a single country, the USSR, and the formation of the world socialist system had a tremendous impact on the entire course of the world revolutionary process, tending to bring all its units into a single stream.

The collapse of the colonial system of imperialism led to the establishment of new sovereign, independent states

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 145.

in the former colonies and dependencies of Asia and Africa. They now number over seventy. As was noted at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties (1969), all this has substantially altered the world political structure and changed the balance of power to the detriment of imperialism.¹

Today, with the growing influence of the world socialist system, a number of former colonial countries have joined the mainstream of development. These countries are trying to escape from their dependent, inferior status in the world capitalist economy. There is a growing conviction among Third World politicians that the fundamental socio-economic problems the developing countries face cannot be solved on the basis of capitalism which has discredited itself by its cruel colonial policy and perpetuation of poverty and backwardness.

A number of developing countries are realising more and more that the socialist path of development is the only possible way of achieving broad economic and social progress.

At the same time, the socio-economic structure of the majority of countries that have freed themselves from colonial dependence is heterogeneous, and this and the resulting contradictions inherent in the national liberation movement in this world determine the special character of the revolutionary process there.

On the one hand, there is the bourgeois-nationalistic wing of the movement gradually striving to become a unit of the international bourgeoisie. On the other hand, a working class is emerging, and a revolutionary-democratic wing. It is the latter two forces, acting as a united front, that represent the chief prospect for the progressive development of the national liberation revolutions.

The Maoists' distortion of Lenin's theory of imperialism and abandonment of a class position in the national liberation movement

In the countries where the population is predominantly petty-bourgeois, where the prejudices of national egoism

¹ International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow, 1969, Prague, 1969, p. 27.

and exclusiveness are still very much alive due to the special character of the socio-economic structure, the activity of the Communist parties and their purposeful struggle against the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie, who harbour and encourage petty-bourgeois nationalism are especially important. It is characteristic of the latter, as Lenin noted, to proclaim as internationalism "the mere recognition of the equality of nations, and nothing more. Quite apart from the fact that this recognition is purely verbal, petty-bourgeois nationalism preserves national self-interest intact. . . ."¹

Lenin's definition is fully applicable to the present Chinese leadership, which from the early beginning of the sixties has gradually abandoned an internationalist, class standpoint, and formulated its own highly erroneous "general line" of world development.

Back in the early forties Mao Tse-tung was already reducing the concept of imperialism to "moribund capitalism" of the industrial countries and above all the United States of America, and suggesting it was "they alone" who adopt a policy of "colonial enslavement of the peoples". In 1940 Mao wrote of moribund capitalism that "just because it is moribund, it depends all the more on colonies and semi-colonies for its survival, and will never allow any colony or semi-colony to establish anything like a capitalist society under bourgeois dictatorship".² Mao's pronouncements on imperialism in 1940 show that he interpreted it very much the same way as Karl Kautsky, who separated the policy of colonial expansion of imperialism from its economic substance.³

In the sixties, Mao's view was refuted by actual events. Far from preventing the development of capitalist relations in the former colonies and dependent territories, neo-colonialism actually does its best to encourage it, as offering the best prospects for world capitalism. Nevertheless, the Maoists still persisted in reducing the process of struggle with the capitalist system to struggle for the elimination of the colonial system of imperialism, regarding this process not as an integral part of the world revolutionary struggle led by

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 148.

² *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. 3, London, 1954, p. 124 ("On New Democracy").

³ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, pp. 267-270.

the world socialist system and the international working class, but as a separate struggle by the petty-bourgeois masses, the "world countryside" against "the world town", as an isolated movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, unaffected by the socialist community and the international proletariat. Moreover, the Maoists underestimate and minimise the reactionary role of the imperialist powers which have lost their colonies since the Second World War. They have even gone so far as to declare these powers dependent on the United States, which, they allege, has enslaved practically the entire world. On this "basis" the Maoists produced the theory of "intermediate zones" and "anti-Americanism", in order to "justify" the need to draw the monopoly bourgeoisie of several countries into a united "anti-imperialist" (anti-American) front.

Pari passu with their abandonment of a class approach, the Chinese leaders gradually crystallised their platform intended to secure the hegemony and leadership of Peking in the Third World countries to further their chauvinistic ambitions. The Maoists had recourse to the theory of "superpowers", one of which was the Soviet Union, in order to "justify" their struggle against the world's first socialist state. They also advanced the theory of "self-help", requiring that the peoples who have won their freedom reject aid from the world socialist system. The Peking leaders were in fact declaring war on Lenin's idea of a non-capitalist path of development for economically backward countries, with their adventuristic appeal in the sixties for armed struggle as the sole means of achieving "proletarian domination" there. They ignored the need for a united front policy and political struggle. In foisting the Maoist pattern on the Third World countries, Peking was overlooking the fact that the socio-economic structure there was far from uniform.¹

The Maoist thesis that the chief contradiction in the world today is the contradiction between the "superpowers" on the one hand and the "small" and "medium" countries on the other, is primarily directed against the Soviet Union and

¹ See G. V. Astafyev, M. V. Fomicheva, "The Maoist Distortion of Lenin's Theory of the National Liberation Movement" in *Lenin and Problems of China Today*, Moscow, 1971, pp. 232-260 (in Russian).

the other socialist countries. Making a final break with a class evaluation of the alignment of forces in the world today, Peking politicians assert that the entire development of world history is evidence of the struggle of "the oppressed revolutionary peoples against colonialism and imperialism", without so much as a word about the existence and struggle of the world socialist system, and the international working class, against imperialism. They "demonstrate" that aggression and oppression by the two "superpowers" "call the peoples of the world to a new awakening and stimulate the widest unification of the developing countries"¹ under the aegis of Peking, in order to "consistently pursue the revolutionary line of Chairman Mao in external relations... , resolutely support the just struggle of the oppressed peoples and oppressed nations of the world".²

By playing up to the peoples of the Third World and striving to win their respect, the Maoists hope to assume leadership in this vast area of the globe.

A concrete analysis of the Maoists' practical foreign policy in Asia, Africa and Latin America at different stages clearly demonstrates that their course is reactionary, and thus futile.

§ 1. PEKING'S POLICY IN ASIA

The period 1949-1958

China's policy in Asia in the period 1949-1958 was positive on the whole, since the Chinese leaders were applying socialist principles in their foreign policy during this period. True, certain nationalistic elements could be observed. They were the result of the petty-bourgeois policy of the Mao group, whose foreign policy stand was strengthened by the triumph of the Chinese revolution, the unification of the country and the creation of a united progressive state. China's neighbours strove to take into consideration the experience of the victorious Chinese revolution, and this made it easier for the Chinese leaders to impose their experience

¹ *Hungchi*, No. 5, 1972, p. 24.

² *Hungchi*, No. 4, 1972, p. 18.

and exalt Mao Tse-tung. The Communist parties of several South-East Asian countries, enjoying the support of the CPC and its leadership and highly appreciating their influence and authority, tried to adopt at home the same methods of struggle as were employed by the CPC. This was the case particularly in the Philippines and Malaya, and also in a number of other countries, where an armed struggle was in progress that had begun under the Japanese occupation during the Second World War. It was led by the local Communist parties, largely composed of Chinese emigrants influenced by the CPC.

In examining the question of China's relations with her neighbours, even at the early stage of the existence of the PRC, one is struck by the highly negative attitude of Mao and his supporters to several governments of South and South-East Asia. The result was an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust of China.

The wary attitude of China's neighbours was due to the stand adopted by Mao Tse-tung, who as early as July 1936 in a conversation with the American journalist Edgar Snow had reiterated "the traditional Chinese point of view" that the historical relationship between China and the territories seized by foreign powers in the nineteenth century would be restored.¹ In 1939, Mao listed these territories as follows: "Japan seized Korea, the island of Taiwan, the Ryukyu islands, the Pescadores and Port Arthur. England seized Burma, Bhutan, Nepal and Hong Kong. France seized Vietnam and Kuangchouvang and even such a small country as Portugal seized our Macao."²

Although after the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic Peking ought to have been thinking in terms of self-determination for the countries Mao was regarding as former parts of the Chinese Empire, the Chinese leadership never really committed itself with a clear statement on the matter, as though continuing to regard them as lost territories. This caused the leaders of a number of liberated countries to express concern, especially after the publication in

¹ Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China*, New York, 1938, p. 88.

² Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. 2, Bureau of the CPC Central Committee of the Liberated Area of Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan, 1948, pp. 93-94 (in Chinese).

Peking of maps on which the frontiers of China ran south of the Himalayas and of a book (*A Brief History of Modern China* first published in Peking in 1954) containing a map showing "Chinese territories taken by the imperialists from 1840 to 1919". The latter included as part of China: Burma, Vietnam, Korea, Thailand, Malaya, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, the Andaman islands, the Sulu Archipelago and parts of Soviet Siberia and Soviet Kazakhstan.¹ The map reproduced what Mao Tse-tung had described in the thirties as an inalienable part of China.

As regards the territorial question, Mao can be seen to be assuming the role of heir not only of the old Chinese Empire, but also of Kuomintang China under Chiang Kai-shek's rule.²

Meanwhile the course of events in these areas of the continent called for a change in tactics by the Chinese leaders. The partisan struggle in the Philippines had been quelled, the Malayan partisans had suffered severe setbacks, an armistice had been reached in Korea and the first phase of the French war in Indochina was over with the achievement of a peaceful settlement in 1954 on the basis of the Geneva agreements.

It was now obvious that whereas in the situation that ensued from the defeat of the Japanese invaders in 1945, during the first stage in the collapse of the colonial system of imperialism, armed struggle by the Communist parties had been the natural course in view of the existing relationship of forces and the onslaught by the masses on the crumbling positions of imperialism, the following phase of the liberation movement *required different forms of struggle*.

By 1954 a number of new independent states had emerged in South and South-East Asia—the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Burma, etc.

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union which worked for the recognition of the principles of peaceful coexistence in relations between countries began to exert an ever growing influence.

¹ See Dick Wilson, *A Quarter of Mankind. An Anatomy of China Today*, London, 1966, p. 210.

² See Chiang Kai-shek, *China's Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory*, New York, 1947, pp. 38-39, et al.

During the first stage of the development of the Chinese People's Republic socialist elements in foreign policy came to the fore, outweighing nationalism of the Mao group, which was forced to reckon with the country's weak economy and military capacity, a factor militating towards stronger ties with the USSR and the socialist community.

From 1954 the principles of peaceful coexistence embodied in the Constitution of the PRC began to be reflected in the actions of the Chinese leadership, opening a new stage in relations between China and her neighbours. This was particularly evident in relations with India.

In 1954 the Indian Government not only agreed to restrict its privileges in Tibet, which it regarded as having been inherited from the British, but also made an official statement to the effect that Tibet was a region of China. In the agreement on Tibet, the principles of peaceful coexistence were proclaimed the basis for relations between the two countries.

After the Bandung Conference of 1955, China's influence in foreign affairs was greatly enhanced, which Mao did not hesitate to exploit for strengthening China's position among the Afro-Asian countries.

By the mid-fifties, China's relations with her neighbours had been more or less normalised. There began a period of protracted negotiations over the lands bordering with China.

Ultimately, talks on border questions were completed with Burma, Nepal, the Mongolian People's Republic, Pakistan and Afghanistan, i.e., with all neighbouring countries save India.

The good-neighbourly actions China demonstrated in the mid-fifties were an important milestone on the path of her growing international prestige.

China's relations were normalised not only with India and Indonesia, but also with such small countries as Cambodia, Burma and Nepal, where the persecution of local Communists, who were strongly influenced by the CPC, went hand in hand with respect for Peking and its leaders and recognition of China's important role in South and South-East Asia.

**Peking's "special" extremist line
in South and South-East Asia (1959-1965)**

The "special" course of the Chinese leadership, which began to be applied in foreign affairs at the end of the fifties, caused great alarm among China's Asian neighbours.

Its first manifestation in this area was the provocation of border conflicts with India in August and October 1959 in support of Chinese territorial claims. Reactionary forces in India used them to fan an upsurge of chauvinism at home in an effort to weaken the influence of Nehru and his supporters in the National Congress, and smash the Indian Communist Party and other Left-wing organisations. They insisted that relations should be broken off with the USSR and other socialist countries and called for an alliance with the "major Western powers" with a view to receiving from them "aid for defence from attack by China".

The domestic political situation in India was exacerbated still further in the autumn of 1962 when Chinese troops actually crossed the border in force.

The National Council of the Communist Party of India held a meeting on November 2, 1962, with Sh. A. Dange in the chair and issued a resolution "On the Emergency Situation in the Country Resulting from China's Aggression" which described China's position as a manifestation of the narrow nationalistic and chauvinistic ambitions of the Chinese leadership and called on the people to unite to defend the Motherland against aggression.

Under pressure from world public opinion, the Chinese troops were obliged to withdraw from India to their original positions. However, in September 1965, in order to justify and proceed with the implementation of its "special" course, the Mao group issued a manifesto (the article "Long Live the People's War!"), which tried to substantiate Mao's theory of "people's war".

The Mao group, distorting and falsifying the Marxist-Leninist theory of socialist revolution and reviving the petty-bourgeois theory of permanent revolution, tried to cover up with "revolutionary avant-gardism" (the thesis that "China has become the centre of the world revolutionary movement") their desire to provoke a large number of

"people's wars", especially in South and South-East Asia, which in many cases amounted to an attempt to export rebellion against progressive regimes.

The adventuristic course of the Maoists in attempting to export rebellion did tremendous damage to the development of the revolutionary process in South and South-East Asia, which, from the Marxist-Leninist point of view, presupposes objective analysis and consideration of the relationship of class forces in each individual country where a revolutionary liberation movement has developed.

§ 2. THE FAILURE OF PEKING'S FOREIGN POLICY IN INDONESIA

The Sino-Indonesian conflict of 1959-1960 over the problem of the Chinese minority

In the latter half of 1959 and the first half of 1960 the Chinese leadership provoked a conflict with Indonesia over Chinese traders who from January 1, 1960, were banned by the Indonesian authorities from engaging in retail trade in rural areas, with a view to getting them to join the village co-operatives that had been set up and to channel their entrepreneurial activity into the sphere of production.

The Chinese leadership tried to present this move as being directed against China and the provocative statements made in Right-wing circles in Indonesia, as official Indonesian hostility to China, and took to exerting heavy-handed pressure on the Indonesian Government. The Chinese leaders sent a series of protest notes to Indonesia, cancelled a proposed visit by a delegation under Kuo Mo-jo to Djakarta, and when the Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio visited Peking in October 1959, he was upbraided, according to well-informed sources, as though he were a Chinese satrap.¹

In bringing pressure to bear on Indonesia, the Chinese leaders even went as far as to directly interfere in her internal affairs. The Chinese Embassy in Djakarta issued instructions to the headmen of Chinese communities to sabo-

¹ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. XXVII, No. 26, December 24, 1959, p. 1017; *The China Quarterly*, No. 1, January-March 1960, p. 70.

tage the orders of Indonesian officials in rural areas, while several members of the Chinese Embassy staff travelled around the country with the same purpose of inciting Chinese residents to civil disobedience.¹ Chinese diplomats employed obstructive tactics later on, too, in particular, during the repatriation of Chinese residents in 1961.

In acting in defence of the bourgeois layer of the Chinese communities in Indonesia, the Chinese leadership was striving to retain a valuable source of economic benefit for itself. At the Fourth Plenum of the All-China Federation of Repatriated Overseas Chinese in December 1959, which discussed the question of the Chinese in Indonesia, it was stated that the Government of the Chinese People's Republic encouraged the emigrants to transfer money and savings to China and make investments.² Peking insisted that the Indonesian bourgeoisie of Chinese origin be allowed on returning to China "to sell their property and take with them the money received from the sale".³

Another reason for Peking bringing pressure to bear on Indonesia, apart from these economic considerations, was the general tendency in the foreign policy of the Chinese leaders at that stage to try and heighten international tension with a view to getting a number of leading neutral countries to become aligned, and to demonstrate to the socialist community and the world communist movement that a policy of peaceful coexistence was futile.

¹ *Documents on China's Relations with South and South-East Asia (1949-1962)*, Bombay, 1964, pp. 246-247.

² Hsinhua Agency Information Bulletin (henceforward abbreviated to HAIB), December 15, 1959, p. 2.

³ *Collected Documents on Foreign Relations of the Chinese People's Republic*, Vol. 6, Peking, 1961, pp. 458-459 (in Chinese). See also: *Jemin jihpao*, December 12, 1959.

Equally interesting in this respect is the account by Cheng Huang, assistant editor of *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Vol. LXXV, No. 3, January 15, 1972, p. 14) of his visit to a former trader from Surabaya, Lim Kuang-teng, who had returned to China and was living in Amoy. Although he did not work, the fifty-year-old Lim lived comfortably with his family in a modern three-storey house with five bedrooms, two bathrooms, a reception room and a cellar on the interest he received from the state on the twenty to thirty thousand yuan (between 8.9 and 13.4 thousand US dollars) he saved in Indonesia. Lim owned another house where his brother's family lived.

The attempt to make Indonesia a springboard for spreading Chinese influence in the Third World

Beginning in 1961, the Chinese leaders adopted a policy of all-round rapprochement with Indonesia. An important aspect of China's policy towards Indonesia at this time was the desire to make Indonesia a springboard for the spread of Chinese influence in Asia and in the Afro-Asian solidarity movement. With this in mind, Peking played on the aspirations of the Indonesian leaders for leadership in the Afro-Asian world, using such methods as fanning extreme nationalistic sentiments, excessive praise and undisguised flattery of President Sukarno and other Indonesian politicians. At the same time this policy was patently anti-Indian, and aimed at driving a wedge between India and Indonesia.

In order to precipitate chaos in South-East Asia and to bind Sukarno more firmly to the chariot of his policy, the leadership of the People's Republic of China unconditionally supported the Indonesian confrontation with Malaysia and became its chief instigator. In a joint communiqué of December 3, 1964, on the occasion of the visit of the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Chen Yi to Indonesia, it was stated that "the Government and people of the Chinese People's Republic fully support the struggle of the Government and people of Indonesia for the defeat of Malaysia".¹ Trying to represent the Indonesian-Malaysian conflict as one of the links in a chain of "people's wars" against American imperialism, the Chinese leaders interpreted the conflict as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the USA and pinning down the forces of imperialism far from the borders of China in order to reduce the likelihood of a direct Sino-American confrontation.

Imposing their own views on the leadership of the Communist Party of Indonesia (CPI), they claimed that the policy of confrontation with Malaysia was due to the "excellent revolutionary situation" in South-East Asia. This view was supported by the leaders of the CPI.

Propounding the Maoist view of the revolutionary process, the CPI leaders declared that armed conflict between

¹ *Collected Documents...*, Vol. 10, Peking, 1965, p. 199.

Indonesia and Anglo-American imperialism "will be favourable not only to Indonesia but for the whole of South-East Asia", since it would spark off a general revolution there, "as a result of which Britain will lose Hong Kong, Laos will be liberated, revolution will explode in Thailand, South Vietnam will be liberated and a revolutionary situation will arise in the Philippines".¹

The Chinese leaders disapproved of the talks between the two sides held in 1963-1964 with a view to finding a peaceful settlement, and insisted on the need for "revolutionary" tactics, for a struggle "at bayonet point". In order to stimulate the Indonesian policy of confrontation with Malaysia, the Maoists made active use of the Chinese community in Indonesia. The Chairman of the PRC Commission for Overseas Chinese Affairs, Liao Cheng-chih, in a speech at the 1965 spring festival, called on the Chinese residents in Indonesia "to resolutely support" the struggle with Malaysia.

On January 7, 1965, President Sukarno officially announced that Indonesia was leaving the UN as a sign of protest over the election of Malaysia as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. Despite the "Left-wing" phraseology the decision was couched in, it was clearly a rash, hasty move that came as a shock to world public opinion and was unprecedented in the history of the UN, evidence of the impasse that was becoming increasingly patent in the foreign policy of the Sukarno Government, and considerably lessening the chances of its getting out of this impasse. At the same time, unexpected though it was, this move was clearly prepared for by the whole nature of Sino-Indonesian co-operation as it had developed over the preceding years, and their joint actions in the international sphere.

The Chinese Government was practically the only, and certainly the most zealous, supporter of Indonesia's withdrawal from the UN. Even before Sukarno officially announced the decision, China had been waging an energetic campaign for the creation of a new international organisation, a so-called "revolutionary UN", and for Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations. The leading article

¹ *Harian Rakjat*, January 30, 1965.

in *Jenmin jihpao* on January 6, 1965 attacked the UN and declared that the Chinese People's Republic firmly supported the "decision" of the Indonesian Government. On the same day the Chinese Ambassador in Djakarta paid two visits to President Sukarno, and announced Chinese support for Indonesia's intended break with the UN.

Indonesia's withdrawal from the UN, which caused incalculable damage to the diplomatic prestige of Sukarno's Government and increased Indonesia's international isolation, led to a further rapprochement between Indonesia and China, and the establishment of a Peking-Djakarta "axis".

The events of September 30, 1965

After the Indonesian Government became a client of China at the beginning of 1965, the Maoists increased their pressure on the Indonesian Communist Party leadership and President Sukarno to such an extent that Indonesia became to all intents and purposes a seedbed for the "thought of Mao Tse-tung". Back in December of 1964, the Chinese leaders had made an offer to President Sukarno via the Communist Party of Indonesia to send Chinese guerrilla experts and specialists in regular weapons.¹ Chou En-lai advised President Sukarno to include Indonesian volunteers in the regular army, and during Subandrio's visit to Peking in January 1965 offered to supply 100,000 weapons to arm an Indonesian civilian militia.² At a reception in Djakarta given by the Chairman of the Indonesian parliament of co-operation on August 7, 1965, Li Hsueh-feng, head of a delegation from the National People's Congress, took the opportunity to propagate the experience of China, which, "apart from a regular army, also has a strong civilian militia".³

On the night of September 30-October 1, 1965, soldiers of President Sukarno's personal bodyguard under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Untung arrested several Right-wing generals. Six of them were subsequently found dead.

¹ *The New York Herald Tribune*, December 15, 1964.

² *The Sunday Times*, October 9, 1966, p. 6.

³ HAIB, August 12, 1965, p. 4.

Members of the Pemuda Rakjat Youth Organisation, which was guided by the CPI, took a direct part in this conspiracy. The soldiers led by Untung took over Djakarta Radio and announced that a Revolutionary Council was being set up including several of Sukarno's ministers and a number of Communist Party leaders. The supporters of the coup explained that they were acting in order to save the country and the President from a Right-wing army plot. Part of the CPI leadership publicly declared their support for the rebels. The Communist Party newspaper *Harian Rakjat* on October 2 published an announcement by the "September 30 Movement" and in a leading article gave full support to the "patriotic and revolutionary" movement.¹ By their actions, this part of the CPI jeopardised the whole Party. Most members of the rank and file of the CPI and the general public knew nothing of the events that had occurred. The soldiers led by Untung had no ties with the masses and had not enlisted their support. Members of the Communist Party of Indonesia who went underground pointed out the irresponsible adventurism of this part of the CPI leadership. They wrote that "the CPI leadership adopted an adventurist course . . . and without reflecting became involved in the September 30 Movement, which was not based on the awareness and profound conviction of the popular masses".

The Defence Minister, Nasution, who managed to escape arrest, and General Suharto, Commander of the Army's Strategic Reserve, took control of the situation in the capital with the aid of units under their command and crushed the soldiers led by Untung. The forces of reaction in the country, and primarily the Right-wing forces in the Army, used the events of September 30 as an excuse to smash the Communist Party, associated organisations and all progressive forces. "As a result of the white terror that followed the events of September 30, 1965, many Communist Party leaders perished and a large number of Party cadres and hundreds of thousands of the rank-and-file members were massacred, and organisational links were destroyed. "The Party still lacks a united central leadership," members of the underground Marxist-Leninist group of the CPI stated

¹ HAIB, October 21, 1965, p. 2.

in a document entitled "Essential Tasks of the Communist Movement in Indonesia", circulated in Djakarta in February 1969.¹

The outcome of the events in Indonesia caused considerable embarrassment to the Chinese leadership. The Chinese press maintained a complete blackout on news of the events in Indonesia for twenty days. After that there were oblique expressions of solidarity with the "September 30 Movement", as testified by the publication of the documents of the "movement" in *Jenmin jihpao*,² and clumsy attempts to blame "contemporary revisionism" for the situation. After Liu Shao-chi was removed from all his posts the Mao group accused him of "serious crimes" in Indonesia,³ thereby admitting the responsibility of the CPC leadership for the "events of September 30".

Relations between China and Indonesia were strained after the events of September 30, 1965, and following President Sukarno's removal from power in March 1966, became openly hostile, leading to the interruption of diplomatic relations and all other official ties between the two countries in the autumn of 1967.

The failure of the Maoists' policy in Indonesia not only led to a sharp deterioration in Sino-Indonesian relations but revealed a crisis in Chinese foreign policy as a whole, and was one of the reasons for the beginning of the internal political struggle within China that developed into the so-called "cultural revolution".

§ 3. US AGGRESSION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA ON THE EVE OF THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" IN CHINA, AND PEKING'S STAND

PEKING'S TACTICS IN CONNECTION WITH THE BEGINNING OF US AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM

On August 5, 1964, after the Gulf of Tongking incident, the US Air Force made a raid on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

¹ *Kommunist*, No. 8, 1969, p. 105.

² *Jenmin jihpao*, October 20, 1965.

³ See, for example, *Jenmin jihpao*, December 2, 1968.

A Chinese Government statement of August 8, while noting that "a US attack on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is also an attack on China", presented the possible Chinese reaction in extremely hazy terms.¹

The passive stand adopted by China in face of the prospect of an extension of the US imperialist war in Vietnam was clearly expressed by Mao Tse-tung in January 1965. Mao told the American journalist Edgar Snow in an interview that "China has no intention of fighting anybody unless her own territory is attacked". He also observed that "the more American weapons and troops brought into Saigon, the faster the South Vietnamese liberation forces would become armed and educated to win victory".² Subsequent statements by the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chen Yi, convinced the Americans that the Chinese preferred that the Vietnamese should continue their struggle independently "until the next generation".³ Premier Chou En-lai also gave an interview, in April 1966, when he told the Pakistan newspaper *Dawn* that China would not take any initiative that might provoke a war with the United States. The "carte blanche" from Peking was just what Washington needed to pursue its aggressive policy in South-East Asia. It was only left for US officials to assure China that she had nothing to fear from the USA. This was done by former Defence Minister McNamara in 1966, when he declared that America's "limited" aims in Vietnam in no way threatened China.⁴

In March 1965, US troops arrived in South Vietnam. In the situation that obtained it was extremely important for the American imperialists to retain the advantages they derived from the Maoists' "special" foreign policy stand, which rejected co-ordinated measures by China and the other socialist countries and the world communist movement in support of the national liberation struggle.

US ruling circles counted on China's reluctance to enter into major conflict with the USA "despite bluster and

¹ See HAIB, August 8, 1964, p. 2.

² *The New Republic*, February 27, 1965, p. 17.

³ See HAIB, June 1, 1965, pp. 1-2.

⁴ *Entreprise*, Paris, No. 574, septembre 8, 1966, p. 15.

threats"¹ when they embarked on armed aggression in Indochina. The gap between the verbal extremism of the Chinese leaders and their actual behaviour was always duly noted by the American Government.

The Maoists' constant declarations of "unremitting" struggle against American imperialism thus never served to restrain the latter in any way.

Meanwhile, the number of American troops in South Vietnam increased over twentyfold between March 1965 and the beginning of 1968.

On December 19, 1967, in connection with the Seventh Anniversary of the founding of the NLF in South Vietnam, Mao Tse-tung wrote: "seven hundred million Chinese are the firm support of the Vietnamese people, and China's extensive territory is their secure heartland."

In actual fact, however, the flow of vital military supplies from the USSR to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by rail through this "secure heartland" was being subject to systematic delays.

On June 29, 1968, *The New York Times* wrote that it was uncertain whether the interruption in the flow of Soviet arms bound for Vietnam on the Chinese railway network was caused by fighting between Hungweipings factions in provinces bordering North Vietnam or was Peking's way of disciplining Hanoi for participating in preliminary peace talks in Paris against China's advice. But it went on to say that the latter line of reasoning was given some credence because of recent reports of demonstrations against the Paris talks in front of North Vietnamese consulates in Chinese cities. Some of these demonstrations were reported to have been orderly, and well organised, indicating that they were inspired by the Government rather than spontaneous. As *The Japan Times* wrote the following day, North Vietnam had handed Peking "a bitter disappointment" by undertaking peace talks with the United States.

The Hungweipings demonstrated grossly insulting be-

¹ *U.S. News and World Report*, Vol. LXII, No. 22, May 29, 1967, p. 40.

haviour outside the North Vietnamese consulate in Nanning. A handwritten poster appeared in the streets of Hangchow, accusing the DRV leadership of a sell-out. "You have undertaken a black meeting in Paris, thereby betraying the interests of the Vietnamese people. You will answer to the Vietnamese people for your treachery!"

On July 11, 1968, Li Hsien-nien, the Deputy Premier of the Chinese State Council, made some anti-Soviet statements at a reception in Peking in honour of a Vietnamese Government delegation led by the Deputy Prime Minister of the DRV, Le Thanh Nghi. He declared that American imperialism was carrying out a "dark plan for 'peace talks' with the help and co-ordination of modern Soviet revisionism..." and insisted that the "protracted war" in Vietnam should continue.

The Maoists were opposed to Vietnam using political means in the struggle against imperialism. They rejected the need for talks in pursuit of their own selfish aim of keeping America involved for a long time in war with the Vietnamese people and the other peoples of Indochina, without concern for the terrible cost to the latter. Peking regarded it as its "main concern" to keep South-East Asia in a state of protracted tension, which was grist to the mill for US imperialism.

It became apparent that Peking's policy was largely to blame for the failure to prevent American escalation of the war in Vietnam. Washington felt "great satisfaction" very largely owing to the Peking leaders' continued refusal to co-operate with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and form a united front to oppose imperialism and strengthen joint efforts to aid the heroic people of Vietnam. At the same time, the excesses of the "cultural revolution", when the Chinese could be seen to be attempting to extend it outside China, enabled US imperialism to exploit more than ever the state of perplexity and uncertainty that reigned in the governments of a number of China's neighbours to further its aggressive ends. The "cultural revolution" in China definitely improved the "chances" of American imperialism by lending credence to its claim to be a "stabilising factor" in South-East Asia, and enabling it to justify its aggressive policy by asserting the need for its continued

presence in the area in order to defend the countries threatened by China.¹

§ 4. CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA DURING THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

China and Burma

Prior to 1965, the Chinese leaders were "sympathetic" towards Ne Win's Revolutionary Council, hoping to bring Burma in their political orbit and win her support in the international field.

When this did not work, the Maoists went over in September 1965 to the tactics of "peaceful" pressure on Burma and then "violent actions" against the Revolutionary Council using part of the Chinese community there to try and export the "cultural revolution" in June 1967.

The events of the summer of 1967 in Burma were preceded by a period of strained relations with Peking. Up to the middle of 1965, there were five Chinese language newspapers published in Burma. In January 1966, the Revolutionary Council banned them since, guided by the Chinese Embassy in Rangoon, they were trying to influence Burmese officers and officials through their correspondents with a view to changing Burma's policy. In June 1967, the Chinese Embassy stirred up anti-Burmese demonstrations by local Maoists among the Chinese community, that led to bloody rioting. The Burmese retaliated and the spontaneous violence that followed developed into a pogrom in the Chinese districts. According to the Hsinhua Agency, "from the evening of June 26 to the end of June 27, over fifty Chinese were killed in Rangoon and many more injured".²

This led to a sharp worsening of relations between Burma and China. The Burmese Ambassador was recalled from Peking. Shortly before, Yu Min-sheng, Hsinhua correspondent in Burma, was expelled from the country, after

¹ See *U.S. News and World Report*, Vol. LXIII, No. 25, December 18, 1967, p. 48.

² HAIB, June 30, 1967, p. 4.

the Hsinhua Agency Bulletin had called for open struggle with the "militaristic and reactionary" clique of Ne Win, "an accomplice of American imperialism and Soviet revisionism". It had appealed to the Burmese to "boldly take up arms and throw themselves into the stream of people's war". Insurgent groups led by the pro-Peking leadership of the Burmese Communist Party (the White Flag) began activities against the Revolutionary Council.

Supported by the majority of the people, the Revolutionary Council sent in the army to crush the rebels. In the autumn, meetings were held throughout the country in which a large part of the peasantry was involved. They mobilised the masses against elements connected with Peking.

The Mao group then set out to exploit the conflicts existing in the country between the Shan and Kachin tribes and the central government. The Maoists used the pro-Peking White Flag organisation to incite the Shan and Kachin to secede and set up "independent" states, stressing that this would only be possible provided the "reactionary" Ne Win regime was overthrown.

The Maoists were also very active in the Naga Hills area, the Chin National Territory and the Arakan district.

With the aid of the Maoists, the White Flag managed to form a client organisation representing twelve tribes, which had its supply base near the town of Kentung. According to some sources, the base was set up with the help of regular Chinese troops, which established control of the Sino-Burmese border from Laos to the Indian state of Assam.

It emerged that the Maoists' aim was to unite the Naga, Muso and Kuki-Chin tribes in the north-east of India, an area connected to China via Kachin State in Northern Burma. A constant flow of arms passed from China to the Nagas through Burmese territory. The main supply base was set up by the Maoists in East Pakistan, which was to be linked with Kachin State via the Chin National Territory.

The Maoists set up two military schools not far from the Burmese border, one, in the Puasan area for training Shan, Kachin and Burmese, and the other, in the Putao area, for training Chinese for military operations on Burmese soil. Peking planned to make Northern Burma a zone of "liberated

areas", Chinese being infiltrated to strengthen the rebel units led by the White Flag, which carried out numerous acts of sabotage (attacks on passenger and goods trains and general railway sabotage, the destruction of agricultural machinery and the disruption of rice supplies).

On August 15, 1968, the Hsinhua News Agency announced: "Adhering to a proletarian revolutionary line, 'to win the war and seize power', the Communist Party of Burma under Comrade Thakin Than Tun has led the Burmese people to great victories during the last year by thwarting large counter-revolutionary 'punitive operations' by the reactionary Burmese Government."¹

There followed an enumeration of these "victories", which, Hsinhua reported, amounted to the systematic sabotage of railway communications on the Rangoon-Mandalay and Rangoon-Prome lines. There were no less than four such "operations" in the last ten days of May 1968.² At the same time, while launching military operations against the Ne Win Government, Peking was continually insisting in its propaganda to Burma that there was a conspiracy between Ne Win and "the reactionary Indian Government of Indira Gandhi" to seize a "large sector of the Chinese border".

Peking's adventurist course, which hindered progressive measures by the Ne Win Government in Burma, and its incitement of the Burmese Communist Party leaders (the White Flag) led by Thakin Than Tun to rebel against the Government, led in 1967 to the emergence of a strong opposition group headed by Goshal (Ba Tin), one of the founders of the Communist Party of Burma. Thakin Than Tun responded with a "purge". Without the knowledge of the Central Committee, Goshal and Ko Htay, both members of the Political Bureau, were arrested, and on orders from Thakin Than Tun, executed on June 18. On December 27, 1967, Bo Yan Aung of the Central Committee was also "purged". Shortly after Thakin Tan Myaing of the Political Bureau was also murdered.

The ruthless suppression of the opposition aroused violent indignation among Burmese Communists, and in the autumn

¹ HAIB, August 19, 1968, p. 5.

² Ibid., p. 6.

of 1968 Thakin Than Tun was murdered by his own body-guard.

The disastrous course imposed by the Maoists was extremely costly to the Communist Party of Burma. In the spring and summer of 1968, Burmese government troops struck at the White Flag rebels in Central Burma, and Thakin Than Tun's diaries for 1966-1968 fell into the hands of the authorities. They clearly showed that the Maoists had directly interfered in the internal affairs of the Burmese Communist Party.

The pro-Peking elements in Burma found themselves completely isolated and distrusted by the masses, since their activities conflicted with the genuine national interests of Burma.

China and Cambodia

Prince Sihanouk established a regime of "controlled democracy" in Cambodia and propagated "royal socialism" based on the development of a "Popular Socialist Community", with a view to making the country a "flourishing state", a "model of neutrality" and preventing wars like the ones raging at her borders from occurring on Cambodian soil.¹

The sympathies of the people of Cambodia for the liberation movement in Vietnam caused a reaction in Washington and Saigon, which were carrying out a campaign of provocation against Cambodia on its frontiers. The American imperialists attempted to prepare and justify the "legality" of the incursion by their own troops and those of the Vietnam puppets into certain frontier zones of Cambodia, attributing this measure to the necessity for pursuing units of the people's liberation forces of Vietnam. In 1966 and 1967, the Cambodian Government in its notes to the Saigon authorities and to the US Government repeatedly demanded an end to violations of Cambodian sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Although placed in a difficult position, the Sihanouk

Government was able to rely on the support of the Soviet Government, which had declared that Cambodia's policy of peace and neutrality was worthy of the highest esteem and that nobody had the right to violate the territorial integrity of Cambodia within its present frontiers.¹

Towards the end of 1967, twenty-five countries, including France, Britain, Italy, the FRG, Japan, India, the PRC, the DRV, and also the NLF, declared their recognition of the existing frontiers of Cambodia.

But the situation was complicated by the activities of the Mao group, possessed by the "idea" of creating "many Vietnams" in South-East Asia to "defeat American imperialism in numerous conflicts of people's war". In order to demonstrate the correctness of the revolutionary "thoughts" of Mao Tse-tung, and show that they "triumph everywhere", the Maoists tried to turn Cambodia into a new hotbed of war without involving the Chinese People's Republic.

The tension in Cambodia's relations with the South Vietnamese authorities in Saigon and with the Thai Government, which were both relying on US support, was used by Peking as a demonstration of its friendship with Pnom-Penh.

In his turn, the head of the Cambodian Government, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, repeatedly affirmed his "sincere friendship of many years' standing" with China, also pointing out that the Khmers had never experienced any "historical" mistrust of their "great neighbour". However, the events of April 1967—a "Left-wing" rebellion in the inaccessible highlands of Battambang Province in which the Maoists turned out to be involved—followed by an attempt by the latter to transfer the "cultural revolution" to Cambodia in the same year, cast a shadow on Sino-Cambodian relations. Prince Sihanouk declared the Khmer-Chinese Friendship Association to be a subversive organisation and outlawed it on September 1, 1967. At the same time the Prince dismissed two pro-Chinese members of his Government, shut down all Chinese newspapers and banned the publication of the daily Hsinhua Bulletin in Pnom-Penh. On

¹ In 1963 Cambodia rejected American aid, afraid of becoming a US protectorate and military base like Thailand, whose government was making insistent claims to areas of Cambodia.

¹ See TASS Communiqué, December 11, 1967, and the Soviet Government Statement published in the Soviet press on January 18, 1968.

September 13, following anti-Chinese demonstrations in Pnom-Penh, Prince Sihanouk announced the withdrawal of all the Cambodian Embassy staff from Peking.

Thus, in September 1967, Pnom-Penh demonstrated to the world that China as well as the United States represented a threat to Cambodia. It was in that month that *The Washington Post* remarked that Prince Sihanouk regarded China and the USA as two whales squabbling over a small fish, Cambodia.¹

Sihanouk's energetic measures taken at a time when it had become evident that the Mao group's attempts to export the "cultural revolution" to neighbouring countries had failed forced Peking to beat a retreat. Chou En-lai sent Prince Sihanouk a letter stressing Chinese readiness to respect Cambodia's sovereignty "as before". This demarche led Sihanouk to revoke his decision to withdraw the Embassy staff from Peking. However, the events of 1967 were used by the Right-wing forces of Cambodia, which supported closer relations with the USA. They were relying on the Khmer Serei organisation (Free Khmers), a Right-wing opposition to Prince Sihanouk's regime, which had bases in South Vietnam and more especially in Thailand.

With the connivance of the Thai authorities, members of the organisation, trained by US military advisors, systematically violated the Cambodian frontier. They carried out terrorist acts and laid minefields in the border areas.

Peking and Laos

From May 17, 1964, the US Air Force began savage air raids over the zone controlled by Neo Lao Haksat (Patriotic Front of Laos), using all kinds of aircraft including B-52 bombers.

In the part of Laos controlled by Prince Souvanna Phouma's Government numerous American "civilians" were concentrated, relying on supporting bases in Thailand and South Vietnam. Thus, the USA was violating the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos, which guaranteed its neutrality.

¹ See the section "Sihanoukism", *The Washington Post*, September 27, 1967, p. A 20.

The United States was trying to make the Souvanna Phouma Government totally subservient to the interests of the war in Vietnam. The Pentagon hatched a plan to send American troops to Laos to set up a "cordon sanitaire" against Vietnam there.

The Chinese leaders also began to exert pressure on the Souvanna Phouma Government, thereby greatly exacerbating the already tense situation in Laos. Peking's pressure threatened to totally undermine the Geneva Agreement on Laos and transform the country into a vast war zone, creating a "new Vietnam" there. All these actions had the objective result of promoting Washington's policy.

The Pentagon was trying to expand its imperialist intervention and inflict a decisive blow on the Laotian liberation movement, which was headed by the Patriotic Front of Laos (PFL) and was supported by the socialist countries and progressive forces all over the world. The patriotic forces of Laos, which were headed by Prince Souphanouvong, Chairman of the Neo Lao Haksat Party, were struggling against foreign interference, American imperialism and internal reaction, for a peaceful political settlement in the country, for the achievement of national concord, for the formation of a government of national unity with a view to achieving the independent, democratic and peaceful development of Laos.

This path was obstructed by the reactionary elements in Laos which were banking on the continuation of American interference.

Difficulties in Laos were aggravated by the Mao Tsetung group which, prompted by selfish great-power motives, virtually opposed a peaceful political settlement in Laos and the relaxation of tension in South-East Asia. Peking, although not intending to be involved in a war with the USA, was not against war being conducted by "other hands" under the banner of a "people's war", with the aim of driving the Americans out of Laos and establishing unlimited Chinese influence in that country.

By openly opposing the unity of the peoples' anti-imperialist front and joint action by the socialist countries in South-East Asia, the Maoists rendered invaluable services to imperialism.

In his speech at a Soviet-Mongolian friendship meeting in Ulan Bator on January 15, 1966, L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CC of the CPSU, emphasised: "... There can be no avoiding the fact that there is a danger of the imperialist interventionists expanding the zone of military operations in South-East Asia on Laotian and Cambodian territory.

"The recent events in Asia are, naturally, due to a number of causes. But it is not difficult to see in them the work of reactionary forces, and above all, of American imperialism. Imperialism is counting on a split in the unity of the liberation movement and on the strengthening of internal reaction in each country. These are cunning tactics. If they are not duly rebuffed, serious damage will be done to the liberation struggle of the peoples and to the entire revolutionary movement."

In 1970, American land forces began to operate in Laos along with Saigon troops and the US Air Force, which subjected the areas controlled by the Pathet Lao to further savage bombings. However, they did not risk "taking on the Chinese" by bombing the area where the Chinese were building a road near the border with Thailand.¹

Washington's cautious attitude with regard to China was also reflected in the American press, which noted "restraint" in any military action that might be interpreted by the Chinese leaders as "ambiguous or suspect". The American press drew attention to the fact that Peking was clearly anxious to "avoid a major conflict" on China's southern border, and was only interested in a "protracted war" in Laos, because the "chronic disorder" there could be an opportunity for China to build up its own influence in certain parts of the country adjacent to its frontiers.²

§ 5. EXTENSION OF THE SCALE OF THE WAR IN INDOCHINA AND PEKING'S POLICY

The Guam Doctrine (the Nixon Doctrine), announced in 1969, reflected the desire of the USA—the chief capitalist

¹ *The Times*, March 9, 1970, p. 8.

² *The Washington Post*, March 16, 1970, p. A10.

country—to adapt to the new alignment of the forces of socialism and the forces of the national liberation movement.

This doctrine was a virtual admission by the USA that it could not continue following a course which had resulted in the overstraining of its manpower and material resources. At the same time, the USA counted on maintaining its leadership in the imperialist world.

President Nixon, explaining the meaning of this doctrine which he had formulated, declared that America could not and would not draw up all the plans and all the programmes, make all the decisions, and shoulder the full responsibility for defence of states bound to the USA by ties of alliance.

For Asia, this meant that the Asians must be responsible for defending themselves, and that the USA would give military and economic aid to its Asian allies when they asked for it and when the USA considered it necessary.

The USA tried to shift the main burden of the struggle for American domination in South-East Asia onto the American allies, to make the fullest possible use of the armed forces of the "allied" Asian states themselves so as to suppress the liberation movement. This was the real essence of the "new course" proclaimed by the Guam Doctrine. As one Indian newspaper put it, it merely represented an attempt "to pour old wine into a new bottle". As the Vietnamese newspaper *Nhan Dan* remarked on August 7, 1969, "the pivot of the so-called 'new policy' is the old idea of using Asians to fight Asians and forcing the satellites to provide troops to replace American soldiers".

After the Guam Doctrine was proclaimed, the American press was full of reports of an imminent US withdrawal from South-East Asia. US politicians needed this "story" to goad America's Asian allies to a new wave of "activity", and force them to reflect on their future in view of the fact that they were to be left to face the Chinese threat by themselves.

The Thai Minister for Foreign Affairs, Thanat Khoman, expressed his Government's view of the situation in South-East Asia while on a visit to the United States in 1970. He said that the Guam Doctrine was acceptable, but expressed

the apprehension that it might in fact lead to a policy of US "disengagement" from South-East Asia, and that the Asians should therefore make efforts to reach agreements on joint defence and regional co-operation, and hold a conference in order to try and force China to adopt a softer line towards her neighbours.¹

The coup in Cambodia

In March 1970, taking advantage of the fact that Prince Sihanouk was abroad, Right-wing forces headed by General Lon Nol seized power and deposed him.

The US and Saigon troops with air support, tanks and artillery, entered Cambodia and advanced deep into the country to back up the Right-wing coup.

The US Government hoped that following the coup in Cambodia the war in South Vietnam could be swiftly brought to a victorious conclusion.² In fact, the war in Indochina became even more stubborn: the resistance of the patriots of Cambodia and Laos stiffened and there was a new upsurge in NLF operations in South Vietnam.

Speaking in Prague on May 7, 1970, L. I. Brezhnev declared: "The expansion of American aggression will undoubtedly meet with a decisive rebuff from the peoples of Indochina, who have on their side all fighters against imperialism, and forces of peace, democracy and socialism throughout the world. And there can be no doubt that the new crime of the American aggressors will bring them as many inglorious and ignominious failures as the dirty war against the Vietnamese people."³

The deposing of Prince Sihanouk and the invasion of Cambodia by US and Saigon troops went hand in hand with a new drive by US imperialism in Laos. The US Administration tried to use its "supplementary" operations in Laos to "prove" that it was endeavouring to create conditions for the "Vietnamisation" of the war, insisting that Laos

¹ *Foreign Report*, March 5, 1970.

² *The Daily Telegraph*, April 3, 1970, p. 18.

³ L. I. Brezhnev, *On the Foreign Policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State*. Speeches and Articles, Moscow, 1973, p. 272 (in Russian).

was "even more important" for the United States than Vietnam.

The struggle of the people of Vietnam, as well as that of the peoples of Cambodia and Laos, for their freedom and independence was greatly complicated by the extension of the war zone to comprise the whole of Indochina.

On April 24-25, 1970, a Summit Conference of "Indo-Chinese Peoples" was held, which decided to strengthen their united anti-imperialist front.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, A. N. Kosygin, sent a telegram to the conference in which he conveyed warm wishes to the "representatives of the peoples of Indochina, who express the will and sentiments of millions of Vietnamese, Laotians and Khmers". "The experience of the last few years," he said, "clearly shows that where there is firm unity and cohesion imperialism inevitably suffers defeat."¹

A TASS communiqué published in the Soviet press said that the Soviet Union had always respected the neutrality and independence of Cambodia, her sovereignty and territorial integrity. The responsibility for the new act of aggression, the gross violation of the generally accepted principles of international law, and the effects of such actions, "rests solely with the United States".²

Meanwhile, the steps taken by the socialist countries were once more opposed by the Peking leaders. The Chinese leaders again rejected a proposal for joint action with the USSR and all the socialist countries in South-East Asia, thereby implicitly helping further American aggression in Indochina.

Peking's verbal brinkmanship caused Washington little concern, for the chauvinistic policy of the Chinese leaders had acquired a patently anti-socialist and anti-Soviet trend.

Meanwhile the invasion of Cambodia by US and Saigon troops continued, and they adopted a "scorched earth" policy there. At the same time the US Air Force renewed large-scale raids on several areas of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Thus, in the spring of 1970, the US Govern-

¹ *Pravda*, April 30, 1970.

² *Pravda*, May 2, 1970.

ment grossly violated the obligations the USA had assumed as a condition for the quadripartite negotiations in Paris.

A statement in the American press clearly showed that government circles in Washington did not take very seriously the possibility that China might rush to the aid of Hanoi at this stage of the war.¹

On July 9, 1970, the Secretary of State Rogers said during an interview in Japan that China was "the key to the future of Indochina". He addressed an appeal to China to play "a sensible role in the international community".² The following day an ABC commentator described a conversation he had had with President Nixon. In answer to his question whether the United States should establish diplomatic relations with China, the President replied in the affirmative.³

By the time of this curious flirtation with Peking, the Paris peace talks had entered an impasse, due to the Americans' refusal to discuss the matter of the withdrawal of US and allied troops from Vietnam and their rejection of the proposal for the formation of a provisional coalition government in South Vietnam.

In carrying out their policy of "Vietnamisation" of the war, the US Administration incited the Asian anti-communist regimes to declare their "solidarity" with the USA and support the extension of its aggression in Indochina.

In May 1970, a conference of the Asian and Pacific Nations on the situation in Cambodia was held in Djakarta, attended by representatives of the Saigon and Seoul regimes, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Burma refused to attend.

Although the USA did not attend the conference, its interests were represented by the Right-wing reactionary forces of South-East Asia, so that US neo-colonialism continued to pose as the champion of the "essential interests" of the Asian peoples, by exploiting the growing feeling of "regional solidarity" and trying to preserve regional associations as an important base of neo-colonialism.

¹ *The New York Times*, April 30, 1970, p. 2.

² *The New York Times*, July 10, 1970, p. 3.

³ *The New York Times*, July 10, 1970.

The invasion of Laos
by US and Saigon troops

At the end of January 1971, the situation in Indochina took a new sharp turn for the worse. Hundreds of US aircraft began to make daily bombing and missile raids on roads and villages in the Boloven Plateau and the Plain of Jars in Laos. This was followed at the beginning of February by a full-scale invasion of Laos by 20,000 Saigon troops and 9,000 Americans, with US air support. Together with Cambodian and Thai units and "special forces" of the Vientiane regime, they launched attacks on the Laotian patriotic forces. Washington's aim in mounting this major offensive in Laos was to cut Indochina in two along highway 9, which would sever all road communications between North and South. With the complete occupation of Southern Laos all the theatres of military operations of the forces of the United States and her satellites in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos would be joined up. The operation in Laos was regarded as the decisive test for the policy of "Vietnamisation" pursued by US imperialism for the previous eighteen months. The invasion of Laos was the second step in putting the Guam Doctrine into practice, the first having been the invasion of Cambodia in March 1970.

The American aggressors met with stiff resistance from the patriotic forces of Indochina. The invasion of Laos developed into a major rout for the Saigon forces, with the interventionists fleeing in panic by the fourth week of March 1971.

On February 16, 1971, *Jenmin jihpao* published a lead article on the US intervention in Laos which reported a Chinese Government statement on "the determination of the Chinese people to support the peoples of the three countries of Indochina in their struggle against American aggression". The article said that the Nixon Government was deliberately spreading the rumour that the actions in Laos "do not create a threat to China". China and Laos were close neighbours, and the new adventure of US imperialism in Laos was also a serious threat to China. The Chinese people would not allow American imperialism to spread the flame of war in Laos and the whole of Indochina as it wished.

One might have expected some serious moves to prevent a further growth of the American threat to follow such words. However, this statement of February 16 was only a propagandist "anti-imperialist" gesture.

On March 27, 1971, the Secretary of State Rogers in his Report to Congress on "United States Foreign Policy—1969-1970" said that the Administration sought "to bring about a more normal pattern of relations with the People's Republic of China", although it would not withdraw its support from the Chiang Kai-shek regime in Taiwan.

By the spring of 1972 it had become even more apparent that the real essence of the "anti-imperialist course" of the Chinese leaders was to achieve their great-power goals, by playing an "anti-Soviet, anti-socialist card". Peking was clearly moving towards accommodation with the imperialist countries and above all the USA. By the spring of 1972 there was no longer any doubt in the USA that Maoist China no longer represented a threat and that it would be possible to reach an agreement with Peking and retain a foothold in South-East Asia.

Progressive forces throughout the world noted the conspicuous absence of a Chinese delegation at the Paris World Assembly in February 1972 convened in support of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and attended by eighty-four countries. The Peking leaders' betrayal of the principles of Marxism-Leninism, their hostility to the Soviet Union and their attempts to split the socialist community and the world communist and national liberation movements enabled the USA to set about "bridge-building" with a view to reaching an understanding with Peking despite the serious contradictions that remained, and still remain, between the USA and China.

China's role in South-East Asia following US President's visit to Peking

The NLF offensive in South Vietnam in the spring of 1972 was reported in extremely restrained tones by the Chinese press. The Chinese were annoyed because it had been mounted very largely relying on the heavy weapons supplied by the Soviet Union. Foreign diplomats in Peking

noted that in private conversations with them the Chinese officials were describing the offensive as "a Soviet enterprise".¹

Peking's attitude was duly appreciated in Washington. It is significant that American officials refrained from condemning China for aiding Vietnam, blaming only the Soviet Union for supplying arms to Vietnam, which they regarded as having made the launching of a major offensive in South Vietnam possible.

For their part, the Chinese leaders were afraid that large-scale operations in South Vietnam might jeopardise the chances for improving Sino-American relations, both in bilateral questions and in securing a "détente in Asia" which had been raised during President Nixon's visit to Peking, since growing tension in Vietnam might delay further US troops withdrawals from South-East Asia and also a possible US "disengagement" from Taiwan, which had been used as a major springboard for the aggression in Indochina.

The mining of the ports of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and intensification of air raids over the country in 1972 led to increased pressure on China by the DRV and other socialist countries to increase the transit of Soviet supplies through Chinese territory. Peking was worried at the same time over the growing tension on China's southern border and the US air raids in the direct vicinity of her frontier, as well as cases of Chinese ships being bombed in the Gulf of Tongking (viz. the Chinese Foreign Office Statement of June 12, 1972). After considerable delay China was obliged to open her ports to Soviet ships bound for Vietnam and also to authorise an increase in the passage of supplies through her territory.

The US Government, as usual in such situations, hastened to assure China that its actions against the DRV were of a limited nature and in no way intended to threaten the security of China.² It was again announced that a "buffer zone" 25 miles wide was to be created for the US Air Force along the border between the DRV and China to avoid the possi-

¹ *The Washington Post*, April 19, 1972.

² See: the press conference held by Charles Bray of the State Department on June 13, 1972.

bility of a violation of China's air space by bombers operating against targets in the DRV.¹

The official Chinese reaction to the mining of North Vietnamese ports and the bombing of the DRV was extremely mild. A Chinese Government statement of May 11, 1972, merely expressed in stereotype formulae China's continuing support for the struggle of the Vietnamese people and criticism of Washington's actions.² As American China experts noted, the Chinese statements contained no indication of a change of attitude by Peking towards the Nixon Administration.³

Congressmen and other Americans who visited China in the summer of 1972 noted that the Chinese leaders made practically no mention of the blockade of North Vietnamese ports in their conversations with them.⁴ At the same time there were plenty of signs that the Chinese leaders wanted a rapid conclusion to the war in Vietnam and no longer insisted on a settlement on the basis of an NLF victory or a complete US withdrawal from South Vietnam.

The statements by Boggs and Ford, leaders of the Democratic and Republican Parties in the House of Representatives on their return from a visit to China that China was not interested in the US withdrawal from the Pacific⁵ lend support to the view that China was prepared to accept an American presence in South Vietnam.

The Chinese leaders were endeavouring to achieve a settlement in South-East Asia through a bilateral Sino-American agreement, believing that a settlement in Vietnam would do much to clear the way for rapprochement.

In a conversation with a group of American Sinologists in June 1972, Chou En-lai cited former President Eisenhower's conduct in the Korean war as a good example for Washington to follow in ending the Vietnam war.⁶ It will be remembered that the 1953 settlement in Korea restored the *status quo ante* (of 1950, the start of the war) and preserved the partition of the country.

¹ *The New York Times*, June 17, 1972.

² HAIB, May 12, 1972, pp. 1a-2a.

³ *The Washington Post*, May 10, 1972.

⁴ *The Washington Post*, July 28, 1972.

⁵ *The New York Times*, July 18, 1972, p. 3.

⁶ *The New York Times*, June 17, 1972, p. 4.

Thus, basic points of contact between China and the USA in the matter of solving the Vietnam issue began to emerge. The Chinese leaders were not going to raise any fundamental objections to a "limited" American presence in South Vietnam and the restoration of the *status quo* that existed at the end of the fifties (i.e., preserving the partition of the country).

Meanwhile, China hesitated to withdraw her support for the struggle of the peoples of Indochina entirely. Thus, on June 28, an agreement on additional economic and military assistance to Vietnam was signed in Peking, and the Chinese Government continued to publicly condemn US aggression in Indochina and formally support the proposals of the DRV and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam at the peace talks in Paris.

In October 1972 a draft agreement on Vietnam was prepared by the Vietnamese and American parties at the peace talks in Paris. Despite the progress made during the negotiations the Americans did their utmost to delay the signing of the agreement in the hope of getting the Vietnamese to make concessions on a number of fundamental issues. In order to bring pressure to bear on the DRV and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, in December 1972 the USA launched the most savage bombing raids of the entire war on densely populated areas of the DRV, including Hanoi, producing world-wide protest. The Chinese reaction to the raids was purely formal and contained nothing new. Chinese statements on the subject primarily emphasised the need for the Paris agreements to be signed as quickly as possible (the Chinese Foreign Office Statement of December 20, 1972).

The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, L. I. Brezhnev, speaking at a meeting to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the USSR on December 21, 1972, said on the subject of the development of Soviet-American relations: "It must be clearly stressed that a great deal will depend on events in the immediate future and, in particular, on what happens over the question of ending the war in Vietnam."¹ The Chinese made no such reservations.

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *On the Foreign Policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State. Speeches and Articles*, p. 474.

Peking clearly did not wish to create any obstacles to the development of its contacts with Washington.

Speaking at a dinner in the Kremlin Great Palace on January 30, 1973, in honour of a North Vietnamese delegation returning from the quadripartite talks in Paris including members of the Political Bureau, Le Duc Tho, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers' Party, and Nguyen Duy Trinh, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the DRV, Leonid Brezhnev said of the signing of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam (January 27): "This is a great victory for the Vietnamese people united around the Vietnamese Workers' Party, a great victory for the forces of peace, a victory for realism and reason in international affairs. . . .

"Vietnam's victory is clear evidence of the effectiveness of the internationalism of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. . . . Striving for a lasting peace, we attach decisive importance to further strengthening the unity, solidarity and co-ordination between the socialist countries. This was important yesterday, in the conditions of the Vietnam war, and it is no less important today when it is necessary to enforce the peace that has been achieved and go on further in accomplishing the peoples' aspirations."¹

Considerable importance has been attached to the fact that in September 1973, the representatives of the Patriotic Front of Laos (PFL) and the Vientiane government initialled the protocols for an agreement on the restoration of peace and the achievement of national concord in Laos. These documents reflect the general understanding, as outlined in the agreement, concerning the formation of an interim national unity government and a national consultative political council.

This act, in conjunction with the Paris Agreement on the cessation of war and the restoration of peace in Vietnam, thus indicates significant progress towards the creation of a durable and just peace in South-East Asia.

"We are convinced," stated L. I. Brezhnev at the World Peace Congress on October 26, 1973, "that peace and

security in South-East Asia can only be finally consolidated on a basis of respect for the freedom, independence and sovereignty of all the peoples in this area."¹

Despite the genuine desire of progressives for united action by all peace-loving forces and the promotion of peace in Vietnam, Peking continues its splitting activity, doing its utmost to counter the growing influence of the forces of socialism, and showing no interest at all in ensuring that the Paris agreements on Vietnam lead to the establishment of a strong united Vietnam and in consolidating the independence of the other states on the Indochinese peninsula, since this runs counter to the Chinese leaders' ambitions for hegemony in South-East Asia.

The policy of the Chinese leaders in South Asia

The Indo-Pakistani conflict of December 1971 and the establishment of the independent republic of Bangladesh clearly revealed the perniciousness of Peking's policy in South Asia. China joined the USA in the United Nations in opposing the inalienable right of the people of Bangladesh to exist as a free, independent state.

The US and Chinese representatives in the UN joined in justifying the savage repressive measures taken by the military regime of Yahya Khan that led to the flight to India of over ten million refugees from East Pakistan.

It is common knowledge that after Yahya Khan's military government commenced its repression of the East Bengalis, the Chinese leaders announced on April 11, 1971, that India was "threatening the security of Pakistan" and that China would "firmly support" Yahya Khan in his struggle against the "Indian expansionists". China was clearly fanning the flames of war in the subcontinent. Yahya Khan was offered an interest-free loan of 20 million dollars and arms to equip new Pakistani divisions. China sent military advisors to

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *For a Just and Democratic Peace, for the Security of the Nations, and for International Co-operation*, Moscow, 1973, p. 13 (in Russian).

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *On the Foreign Policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State*. Speeches and Articles, pp. 478-480.

Pakistan and the whole world saw how as a result of the Chinese aid and after the anti-Indian outbursts of the Chinese representative in the UN the Pakistani generals, in December 1971, launched military operations in the sub-continent.

Peking's aim in supporting the Yahya Khan dictatorial regime was clearly revealed by the Chinese representative Huang Hua in the Security Council on December 21, 1971, when he said: "The military occupation of East Pakistan will lead to even further disturbance and unrest in the South Asian subcontinent. The Pakistani people will on no account cease their heroic resistance and the Indian people will not allow social-imperialism and Indian expansionism to drive them like sheep." The Chinese representative thus used the Security Council floor for violent attacks against the Soviet Union and India. Nevertheless, despite this violent outburst everybody knows the outcome of the military operations launched by Yahya Khan's army: it was smashed and made prisoner and the new independent state of Bangladesh appeared on the world political map.

The establishment of Bangladesh was the result of the liberation struggle of the East Bengali people, the support it received from the socialist countries and the international communist and workers' movement, and all the progressive forces of the world national liberation movement, including the Indian people, despite the intrigues of imperialism and its new-found ally in Peking.

The establishment of a civilian government in Pakistan under president Bhutto and the subsequent agreement signed in July 1972 in the Indian town of Simla, which marked the beginning of a new stage in peaceful, good-neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan, and the talks in Delhi in August, at the end of which India and Pakistan issued a statement confirming the Simla agreement, all gave rise to bitter disappointment in Peking which was interested in preserving the state of conflict on the Indian subcontinent. The hegemonic plans of China's leaders with respect to South Asia and the Indian Ocean, their desire to obstruct the peaceful development of India and her friendly neighbour, Bangladesh, had been revealed with particular clarity.

Peking diplomacy had once again discredited itself in the eyes of all progressive forces, obstructing the admission of the sovereign republic of Bangladesh, which was recognised by almost ninety countries, to UN membership by using its veto. The Chinese representatives accused the Republic of Bangladesh of "failing to adhere" to the UN decisions of December 7 and 21, 1971, calling for a cease-fire between India and Pakistan. Their "argument" was that there were Indian troops and over 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war in Bangladesh.

This argument was clearly untenable, since the UN resolutions of December 7 and 21 had applied not to the Republic of Bangladesh but to the Governments of India and Pakistan. Moreover, the Governments of India and Bangladesh had confirmed in several official statements that Indian troops had been withdrawn from Bangladesh. As for the prisoners-of-war, the Government of Bangladesh had stated long since that after the conclusion of investigations into war crimes committed by the Pakistani forces, the innocent would be returned to Pakistan while justice would be meted out to those found guilty.¹

The real reason for the Chinese objection to the admission of Bangladesh to the UN was Peking's desire to prevent a normalisation of relations between India and Pakistan and to keep the subcontinent in a state of tension.

China's alliance with Yahya Khan's military dictatorship and opposition to the admission of Bangladesh to the UN was a clear case of betrayal of the national liberation struggle and belied the Maoists' claim to be the "champion of the oppressed nations". Peking's hostile attitude towards Bangladesh is yet another proof that the Chinese leaders set themselves in open opposition to national liberation movement in order to achieve their great-power aims.

The most aggressive political and military leaders in the

¹ In August 1973, Indo-Pakistani negotiations were concluded in Delhi on tripartite repatriation—that of Pakistani prisoners of war from India, of Bangladesh citizens from Pakistan, and of Pakistani citizens from Bangladesh. Thus, in conformity with the agreement signed in Delhi in 1973, 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war are to return to their home country, and the future of 260,000 Pakistani citizens and over 200,000 citizens of Bangladesh is to be decided.

USA get inspiration and hope from Peking's anti-Indian position, its desire to push ahead its anti-Soviet and anti-socialist policy to gain far-reaching results, especially in the Third World, where the Chinese leaders like to pose as its "defenders" against "social-imperialism". They do not conceal their intentions to use the Chinese leaders' anti-Soviet and anti-socialist positions to establish US hold on the Indian Ocean. Taking advantage of the Indo-Pakistani conflict, US warships have been plying the Indian Ocean since January 1972, and Pentagon spokesmen declared the ocean to be included in the sphere of the US Pacific command. Admiral McCain, former US Pacific Fleet Commander, made no bones about Peking and Washington striking "an alliance" in this region. He spoke of the possibility of US-Chinese co-operation in the Indian Ocean in future.¹

§ 6. THE NATIONALISTIC AIMS OF CHINESE POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Chinese leaders began to try and find ways of working towards a rapprochement with the Arab countries after the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic. Great use was made of Islam, the idea of a "common religion". In the 1950s Moslem delegations from China visited Mecca, Egypt, Syria and Yemen to establish and promote contacts with Arab leaders. Peking's activity in this field was further stepped up after the Bandung Conference, attended by some Arab leaders and representatives of national liberation movements. Official ties were set up soon afterwards.

In 1956 China established diplomatic relations with Egypt and Syria, and in 1958 with Sudan, Yemen and Morocco.

In the sixties, the Maoists tried to make use of the Palestinian issue to strengthen their influence in the Arab world and acquire leading positions in the Arab national liberation movement.

Frequent calls for only a military solution to the Palest-

¹ See V. F. Davydov and V. A. Kremenyuk, "US Strategy in the Indian Ocean", in *USA: Economy, Politics, Ideology*, No. 5, May 1973, pp. 13, 17, quoting from *U.S. News and World Report*, October 23, 1972, p. 32.

inian question continued to appear in the Chinese press in 1964-1965. Indeed, China promised to support "any actions by the Arab countries against Israel".¹

In 1966 and 1967, as the situation in the Middle East deteriorated, Peking became increasingly vociferous in its adventurist appeals, which were intended to aggravate the tensions in this "explosive" part of the world.

The Maoist position fully coincided with that of the reactionary circles in certain Arab countries and with the imperialist policy of the Western countries. Israel, which had unleashed the 1967 aggressive war against a number of Arab countries (the UAR, Syria and Jordan), promptly tried to "prove" its "right", referring to speeches made by representatives of the reactionary forces. After military operations in the Middle East had been stopped, Peking devoted considerable effort to stirring up a new conflict. At this time, the Chinese leadership was making direct use of the Middle East crisis for anti-Soviet purposes, and was counting on the exacerbation of Soviet-American disagreement in the hopes of provoking a military clash between the USSR and the USA.² Rejecting the possibility of a political solution on the basis of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, Peking repeatedly made the slanderous charge of "a Soviet-American deal", a "Middle East Munich" between the two "superpowers".³ The Maoists' chief aim at this period was to sow mistrust of the Soviet Union among the Arab countries, besmirch the effective economic and military assistance the Soviet Union was rendering the Arab countries, especially the Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE). At the same time Peking tried to exploit disagreements among the Arab countries and their different approach to a solution to the Middle East crisis, contrasting the Syrian position to that of Egypt, Egypt to Algeria and Syria with Iraq, etc.

¹ *Jenmin jihpao*, March 13, 1964.

² Thus, the Maoists sought to provoke a clash between Soviet and American warships in the Mediterranean in June-August of 1967, accusing the Soviet Union of being "scared" of the USA and not intervening militarily in the Arab-Israeli conflict. See *Jenmin jihpao*, July 18, August 23, 1967.

³ *Jenmin jihpao*, July 30, September 6, 1970.

A change of tactics by Peking at the beginning of the seventies, a toning down of the extremist slogans and the pursuance of a more flexible line with respect to the Arab countries led to the establishment of diplomatic relations with many Middle East countries, including Kuwait, Lebanon, Turkey and Iran. Peking activated economic relations with Middle East countries.

But the Chinese leaders did not abandon their efforts to use the Palestinian Resistance Movement in their own great-power interests. At the end of the sixties, beginning of the seventies, the Maoists mainly supported the extremist currents in the PRM with a view to wrecking the peace initiative of the Egyptian Government and hotting up the situation in Jordan in 1970, and so on. In 1971-1972, the Peking leaders transferred their attention from the extremist groups to the more moderate forces, but continued to urge the Palestinians to seek a purely "military solution", posing as "the most reliable friend" of the Palestinian people. But Peking did not offer any effective assistance to the Palestinian Resistance, propagating the principle of "self-reliance" which was quite unrealistic in the situation that obtained and which in fact meant the Palestine Liberation Organisation divorcing itself from the progressive forces of the world, the support and assistance of the socialist community, disarming the Palestinians in the face of imperialist aggression. Peking's chief aim was to make the PLO the main instrument of its own subversive policy in the Middle East.

In an attempt to unite the Arab world under their own leadership for the struggle against "the monopoly of the two superpowers", the Maoists took up the patently false thesis that the Soviet Union was interested in preserving a situation of "neither war nor peace" in the Middle East. Peking's aim here is to discredit Soviet policy in the Middle East, equate Soviet and imperialist actions.

Yet the constructive approach of the USSR to the Middle East crisis is common knowledge. The Soviet Government has been strengthening and developing friendship with progressive regimes of the Arab countries and doing everything in its power to ensure a just solution on the basis of the well-known Security Council resolution. The Soviet

Union has been actively supporting the efforts of Egypt and other Arab states to bring about the liberation of the territories occupied by Israel, consistently working to ensure the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine and offering moral, material and political support to the Palestinian Resistance Movement in its just anti-imperialist liberation struggle.

The Soviet Government has continually condemned the aggressive actions of Tel Aviv against Egypt, Syria and Lebanon and supported a peaceful settlement of the dangerous situation in the Middle East, and is constantly making practical proposals for a solution to the issue in the interests of the Arab countries.

The Chinese leaders, on the other hand, are trying to preserve tension in the Middle East and are trying to stir up fresh conflicts there.

Everybody knows that China did not observe the UN resolution on the Middle East situation which was proposed by the developing countries and passed by a majority of votes in the General Assembly in December 1972. It is significant that in abstaining from voting on the resolution which condemned Israel for continuing a policy of aggression and expansion and confirmed the Security Council resolution No. 242 of November 22, 1967, and also demanded an embargo on all aid to Israel, China was taking the same line as the USA and the South African racists.¹

Instead of taking effective measures against Israel, which is violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Arab states and undertaking terrorist acts against them and the Palestinian movement, Peking has taken to attacking Soviet-Arab friendship. The Maoists are particularly keen to develop relations with Egypt at the expense of Soviet-Egyptian co-operation.² After the Treaty of Friendship was signed between the USSR and Egypt, Peking's anti-Soviet propaganda assumed a colossal scale. Peking was especially

¹ See HAIB, December 12, 1972, p. 5. Eighty-six countries voted in favour of the resolution, seven against, and thirty-one, including China, the USA and South Africa, abstained.

² See *Al-Gomhouriya*, January 4, 1973.

jubilant over the departure of Soviet military personnel from Egypt in the middle of 1972, trying to present it as an indication that Egypt was giving up friendship and co-operation with the USSR.¹ On this matter the Chinese leaders were solidly aligned with Israel and world imperialism.

Progressives in the Arab countries are highly critical of Peking's double dealing and provocative policy in the Middle East. The Egyptian newspaper *Al-Gomhouriya* wrote in the summer of 1972 denouncing the schemes of the imperialists and the Maoists, and said that relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union "have nothing at all in common with or similar to our relations with the imperialist powers in the past.... It was we Egyptians who asked the Russians for aid in the construction of the Aswan High Dam when the USA refused us credits. It was on our request that the Russians agreed to help us restore our Armed Forces after the defeat of June 1967...."²

The Lebanese press criticised China's Middle East policy as a whole and in particular a statement by the Chinese Ambassador, Hsiu Min, in Lebanon in January 1973 that the interests of the Arab countries and the Soviet Union were incompatible. The Arab peoples expected from China condemnation of the aggressive actions of Israel against Syria and Lebanon that had taken place on the eve, instead of which Peking was criticising "the two superpowers", equating those who were waging a dirty war in Vietnam and whose monopolies were robbing other countries' oil wealth with the socialist countries who support the struggle of the peoples of Indochina and the Middle East.³ A Beirut newspaper described Min's statement as "interference in the internal affairs of the Arab countries".⁴

Nor did Peking's negative attitude in the UN over measures to end the arms race pass unnoticed in the Arab world. The Arab press remarked that China "while professing friendship" is in fact carrying out "activities hostile to the devel-

¹ HAIB, July 27, 29, August 30, 1972, pp. 6, 9.

² *Pravda*, August 19, 1972.

³ *Al-Nahar*, January 27, 1973.

⁴ *Al-Shaab*, January 19, 1973.

oping countries" and damaging the national liberation struggle in the Middle East.¹

The Arab peoples also express their bewilderment over the stand taken by the Chinese Government in the Security Council during the debate in April 1973 on Israel's pirate raid on Lebanon, during which three leaders of the Palestinian Resistance Movement were killed.

Once again the position of the Chinese leaders coincided almost perfectly with US designs to shield the aggressor and thwart a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

The Chinese representative, while formally declaring support for the Lebanese appeal, avoided the question of the need for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem and made no practical proposals for measures to be taken against the Israeli aggressors. Instead, he once more attacked the Soviet Union and the General Assembly resolution on the renunciation of force in international relations. All this was clearly detrimental to the interests of the Arab countries and strengthened the position of Israeli ruling circles, who with US connivance and encouragement have raised terror and provocation to the level of state policy.

The Chinese leaders are the "most faithful friends" of the Arab peoples only in word, their declarations being clearly contradicted by their deeds. Even members of formerly pro-China organisations stress that there are "serious contradictions between the principles the Maoists are ostensibly supporting and the reality".² The Arab peoples are becoming more and more convinced through their own experience that the present policy of the Chinese leaders serves the interests of the enemies of peace in the Middle East.

This has been demonstrated once again by the events connected with the new Israeli aggression in October 1973.

¹ Ibid.; *Al-Dunia*, January 11, 1973.

² From a letter written by J. Shatila, former leader of a pro-China faction in Lebanon. See *Al-Shaab*, April 20, 1973.

§ 7. CHINA AND AFRICA

China's first contacts with the African countries (1950-1957)

In the first years after the Chinese revolution, the African countries, which were either colonial dependencies of the imperialist powers or under their political influence, had no diplomatic relations with China, although China maintained various ties with many countries and progressive parties in Africa.

The political situation in Africa at the end of the forties and in the early fifties was not favourable for any extensive development of normal relations between the peoples of Africa and the socialist countries. Imperialist circles in the USA and Europe, having had their positions in Asia seriously eroded during the Second World War, now turned their attention to Africa, ascribing it a special importance in their anti-communist strategy.

In the fifties, however, the anti-colonial, anti-imperialist struggle began to gather momentum, and national revolutionary political forces consolidated. In 1952, revolution triumphed in Egypt, and shortly after the war of liberation began in Algeria, Kenya and Cameroon. Sudan and Tunisia achieved independence in 1956, and the independent republic of Ghana emerged in 1957.

The change in the relationship of forces and the political situation in Africa promoted the development of active contacts between the young African nations and the socialist countries, including China. By the mid-fifties China not only had trade and economic links with many African countries (Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Nigeria, Algeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Tanganyika, Madagascar, South Africa, and others), but had established official diplomatic and political relations with some of them. The Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian Countries (April 1955), where the Chinese leaders met heads of state and leading politicians from these countries, greatly stimulated the development of these ties.

The Chinese leaders were already trying to find special ways towards a rapprochement with the Afro-Asian countries, laying great stress on the traditional ties between the

Arab, African and Chinese peoples "from earliest times", their "common lot" and exploiting the upsurge of nationalism in the African continent and tenuous connections with the Islamic community, and also playing on the racial prejudices of certain African leaders. By mid-fifties efforts had been made for a rapprochement with countries of Tropical Africa. A number of high-ranking Chinese delegations were sent to Ghana, Ethiopia and other countries. Later on the Chinese leaders stepped up their activities through the Standing Committee of Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation founded in Cairo in 1958.

Peking steps up its foreign policy activity in Africa

In 1960 seventeen African countries acquired independence and by 1961 two-thirds of the continent and three-quarters of its population had been liberated from colonial rule. A number of the emergent states announced their intention to adopt a non-capitalist path of development.

With the increasing effectiveness of the liberation struggle of the African peoples and the growing role of Africa in international affairs, Peking stepped up its political activity in an effort to acquire a dominant position in the African national liberation movement and subject it to its own ambitions for hegemony. Whereas in 1958 China had diplomatic relations with only three independent countries in Africa (Egypt, Morocco and Sudan), by the end of 1962 the number had grown to ten, and by 1965 to seventeen.¹ This was very important in strengthening China's influence in the continent.

Stressing that Africa had become the "centre of the East-West struggle",² the Maoist leaders insisted on the special

¹ With Guinea in 1959; with Ghana, Mali and Somalia in 1960; with Tanganyika in 1961; with Uganda and Algeria in 1962 (China had established official relations with the Algerian Provisional Government in 1958); with Kenya and Burundi in 1963, and with Tunisia, the Congo (Brazzaville), the Central African Republic, Dahomey and Zambia in 1964.

² See Harold C. Hinton, *Communist China in World Politics*, Boston, 1966, p. 190.

nature of the socio-economic structure of African society, with its overwhelmingly peasant population, which, according to the Chinese view, was the motive force of the revolutionary struggle. The Maoists were especially active in Africa in promoting the experience of the spontaneous peasant insurrections, like the Taiping and the Boxer Rebellions, and the 1911 bourgeois-democratic revolution in China, etc.¹

Peking called on the peoples of Africa to adopt violent armed struggle as the only effective revolutionary method, spreading the idea that a quick and easy victory over imperialism was possible, since "imperialism is a paper tiger", and one should always fight it "at bayonet point".² At the same time much was made of the fact that China, like the African countries, had herself experienced racial discrimination from the "Whites".

The Maoists concentrated their attention primarily on those African countries whose peoples were waging an armed liberation struggle, like Algeria, the Congo (Kinshasa), Cameroon, and the Portuguese colonies, and those independent countries that had established diplomatic relations with China, e.g., Ghana, Guinea, Mali, the Congo (Brazzaville) and Tanzania.

Peking attached a special importance to the struggle of the Algerian people in its plans for hegemony in Africa. As early as 1958, the Chinese leaders recognised the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic and established diplomatic relations with it. The Maoists made extensive use of the Algerian people's armed revolutionary struggle to promote the Chinese revolutionary experience, drawing parallels between the conditions of struggle and the alignment of forces as a basis for stressing the "universality" of the "thought of Mao" and the leading role of China in the development of the national liberation movement throughout the African continent.

Presenting the struggle of the Algerian people as a "model" of revolutionary struggle for the whole of Africa, allegedly according to the Chinese pattern, the Chinese leaders great-

¹ Volker Matthies, *China und Afrika*, Hamburg, 1969; *China News Analysis*, January 24, 1964.

² HAIB, April 16, 1960, p. 13; *Kuangming jihpao*, July 4, 1962.

ly publicised the aid China was giving to the Algerian National Liberation Front, while deliberately ignoring and denigrating the really effective aid and support (including military) that Algeria was receiving from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.¹

Peking always adopted an extremist and inflexible attitude towards a solution of the Algerian question, insisting on armed struggle irrespective of changes in the internal political and international situation, and trying to discredit the internationalist stand of the USSR.²

Subsequently, after the declaration of Algerian independence in June 1962, the Maoists tried to strengthen their position in Algeria by fanning anti-Soviet sentiments and undermining friendly ties between the USSR and Algeria.

Having established contacts with the Left-wing opposition party in Cameroon, the Union of the Peoples of Cameroon (UPC), at the end of the fifties, Peking tried to incite it to armed rebellion against the government even after Cameroon had achieved independence and become the Federal Republic of Cameroon in 1961.

By 1962 the erroneous extremist tactics adopted by the UPC under Chinese influence had severely undermined the Union, leading to the emergence of a number of factions, which the Maoists used not so much in the interests of the anti-imperialist struggle as for attacking the CPSU and for the propagation of leftist nationalistic views.³ Ultimately this led to the complete destruction of the UPC revolutionary organisation.

The Peking leadership made use of the events in the Congo in 1960-1961 and the subsequent struggle of the revolutionary democratic forces to shore up its positions in the African national liberation movement.

While giving plenty of verbal support to the struggle of the people of the Congo, the Chinese leaders gave no

¹ Yet the latter is known to have exceeded Chinese aid in quantity and quality, a fact that was noted by some Western commentators, too. See, for example, Neuhauser, *The Third World Politics*, Cambridge, 1968, p. 62.

² See *Jenmin jihpao*, July 4, 1962, July 5, 1963, October 22, 1963, November 22, 1964.

³ *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 6, No. 12, 1963, p. 38.

practical help whatsoever to Patrice Lumumba and his followers. They condemned all UN actions in the Congo, without drawing any distinction between the position of the imperialist and socialist countries. When the situation in the Congo deteriorated Peking launched direct attacks on the Soviet Union, thereby helping strengthen the forces of imperialism in their aggression against the Congo. The main aim of the Chinese leaders was to improve their own position in the Congo at the expense of a weakening of the ties between the local patriots and the socialist world, including the Soviet Union. The Maoists regarded the struggle in the Congo as a "key point" in the national liberation movement in Africa, and tried to encourage the Congolese people to wage a protracted "people's war" (for ten to twenty years). According to the Maoist scheme of things, the Congo was to play the role of a "second Vietnam" in Africa, and the adoption of Chinese experience and Maoist methods of armed struggle was supposed to help spread the "thought of Mao" and the influence of Peking in the national liberation movement throughout the continent.¹

In actual fact, the Maoist tactics in the Congo, as in Cameroon, merely led to a split in the united front of patriotic forces combating imperialism, and was partly responsible for their weakening and defeat.

Similar pseudo-revolutionary tactics were adopted by Peking with respect to the Portuguese colonies and southern Africa. The Maoists split the revolutionary party of Angola, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), creating a pro-Chinese faction, UNITA (National Union for the Complete Independence of Angola founded in 1966). In Mozambique, several groups broke away from FRELIMO, a party that was really fighting imperialism, to form the pro-Maoist COREMO (the Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique), and several parties in southern Africa fell under Chinese influence.

Peking encouraged the progressive parties and groups to undertake adventurist actions, inciting them to oppose African governments and leaders who refused to accept

¹ See *Jenmin jihpao*, December 14, 1964, January 17, June 30, July 24, 1965.

Maoist ideas. These actions sometimes led to the defeat of the progressive forces, as was the case with the Sawaba Party in Niger, which came under Maoist influence and in 1964 made a call for an armed uprising against the government, which ended in its total suppression.

Peking devoted a great deal of attention to the independent countries of Africa. In 1958-1960 the Chinese leaders tried to gain a foothold in Egypt, Guinea and Ghana,¹ later (1962-1963) in Mali, Algeria, and later still, from 1964, also in the Congo (Brazzaville), Tanzania and other countries.

Peking offered a number of liberated countries economic and technical assistance on extremely reasonable terms, sometimes free, and signed various agreements on economic and technical co-operation, etc. Credits were offered to Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Egypt, Algeria and Tanzania. By the end of 1965 China had promised African countries credits totalling some 430 million dollars. It must be stressed, however, that China did not meet her aid commitments fully and there were often considerable delays. In fact she only met one-third of her total commitments.

The Chinese leaders attached great importance to Chou En-lai's visit to ten African countries in 1963-1964.² The visit was openly anti-Soviet, its aim being to gather all the independent African countries around China by calling a second conference of heads of state of the Afro-Asian countries in Algeria (the Second Bandung) without the participation of the Soviet Union. It was hoped to use this conference to organise an Afro-Asian bloc under Peking's leadership. In order to draw the African countries into this bloc, five "special" principles of relations between China and the Arab and African countries were declared, and eight "special" principles for economic co-operation with the Afro-Asian countries, based on the theory of "rich and poor nations". Chou En-lai had proclaimed the slogan of "Africa for the

¹ China established diplomatic relations with Guinea in October 1959, and with Ghana on July 6, 1960.

² To Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. The planned visits to Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika did not take place. Chou En-lai made two more visits to Africa in 1965, in March and June.

Africans" in early 1964, and Mao, in a conversation with the head of the Organisation of Palestine Liberation in 1965, had called the Arabs to join an alliance with the Chinese people to wage a struggle against "all representatives of the West, including Europe and America".¹ In 1964 Peking began to promote its theory of "self-reliance" in support of its bid for domination in Africa.

The sabotaging of the Algiers conference in October 1965 was a clear indication of the frankly chauvinistic aims of Peking. When the anti-Soviet designs failed to receive support from the majority of African countries, the Maoists preferred not to take part at all. They felt it was better to sabotage the conference than to hold it with the Soviet Union participating, as most of the Afro-Asian countries (including Egypt and Algeria) wished, since this inevitably meant a firm rejection of Peking's bid for leadership in the national liberation movement.

**Intensifying chauvinistic tendencies
in China's Africa policy during the "cultural revolution"**

As early as the beginning of 1965 the Chinese leaders began to try to interfere in the internal affairs of African countries, conducting subversive activities there, which naturally led to a deterioration of relations with a number of countries. Burundi, the Central African Republic, Dahomey and Ghana broke off diplomatic relations with Peking in 1965-1966 and relations with Tunisia, Kenya, Uganda, and later Morocco, Sudan, Somalia and others, took a sharp turn for the worse.²

Attempts by the Chinese leaders to plant the experience of the "cultural revolution" in African soil had even more dire results. The Maoists declared the "cultural revolution" to be "a great new epoch of world revolution, led by China", the age of the "triumph of the thought of Mao Tse-tung". It was constantly impressed upon the African peoples that the "thought of Mao" (in particular, the theory that "power

¹ *Jenmin jihpao*, February 18, 1964; *Al-Anwar*, April 6, 1965.

² See *Jenmin jihpao*, November 20, 1965, October 30, 1966.

grows out of the barrel of a gun") "lights the path of the oppressed African peoples to victory".¹

Peking tried to implant the experience of the "cultural revolution" through various organisations in the independent countries. Thus, in Tanzania, Guinea, Mali and Sudan, among other places, units of "African Hungweipings", youth organisations like the League of East African Friends of China and other organisations were set up with the help of Maoists, proclaiming the ambitious aim of "clearing the path for revolution in Africa". A Chinese chargé d'affaires in Tanzania warned in 1967 that "if the African leaders do not find in themselves the courage to lead a cultural revolution, the people will find new leaders...".² Peking was also active at this period in creating pro-Peking groups in the Tanganyika African National Union and the Afro-Shirazi Party (Tanzania), and trying to turn the Left-wing opposition party of the Union of the Peoples of Cameroon into a pro-China group, creating similar groups in Somalia (led by Hercy),³ the Malagasy Republic, the Congo (Kinshasa), Mauritius and other countries.⁴ In Kenya, the Maoists ran a smear campaign against the President, and even instigated murderous assaults on Kenyan diplomats in Peking.⁵ Peking tried to carry out similar activities in Tunisia, Morocco and other countries. Relations with Egypt were strained in 1968, after the Maoists had fanned student revolts there. At the same time the Chinese leaders tried to stir up political, territorial, ethnic and other conflicts between different countries and nations in Africa.⁶ The Chinese leaders played a particularly pernicious role when the Nigerian conflict came to a head in 1968. The Maoists were not at all concerned about the

¹ *Jenmin jihpao*, October 1, 1966. Africa was inundated with propaganda literature calling on countries to follow the example of the "cultural revolution" in 1966-1967. See *Afrique nouvelle*, July 29, 1967.

² *New Africa*, London, No. 3/4, 1968, p. 5.

³ Formerly a member of the Central Committee of the Somali Democratic Union.

⁴ See *Africa in International Relations*, Moscow, 1970, p. 155 (in Russian).

⁵ See *Daily Nation*, Vol. VI, No. 178, August 24, 1967, p. 10.

⁶ Thus, Peking stirred up the disagreements between the Bahutu and Batutsi tribes (in Burundi and Rwanda), the territorial quarrels between Somalia and Ethiopia, and Somalia and Kenya, and supported the Eritrean and South Sudan separatists.

fate of Nigeria as a united state and supported the Biafran separatist bid purely as an excuse for accusing the Soviet Union and other socialist countries of "betraying" the cause of national liberation of the peoples of Africa.¹

At the same time, for all its calls for struggle with colonialism and imperialism, Peking covertly extended its economic ties with the racialist regimes of South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal.

Reactionary circles in the West took advantage of Peking's unprincipled policy to crush the progressive forces in Africa and especially in the young independent countries. Military coups directed against the "Chinese threat" took place in several countries in 1966-1968 (Ghana, Mali). As the magazine *The African Communist* pointed out, Peking's policy emboldened and encouraged the imperialists to intensify their counter-revolutionary offensive "from Vietnam and Indonesia to the Congo and Ghana".²

Despite attempts to bolster her position in Africa (for example, through offers of economic assistance), China clearly compromised herself in Africa during the "cultural revolution". Whereas in 1965 China had diplomatic relations with seventeen African countries, by 1968 the number had dropped to thirteen. And by 1968 China had lost several African votes in the UN.³

The tactics of the Chinese leadership in Africa during the period of the "cultural revolution" slowed down the development of Sino-African relations and produced serious distrust of China and the Maoist doctrines. The magazine *Afrique nouvelle* described the "cultural revolution" as a "Peking brand of neo-colonialism".⁴

Peking's strategy in Africa from the late sixties to the present

Since 1968 the more extreme notes in Peking's Africa policy have gradually been subsiding and the Peking leaders

¹ See HAIB, September 19, 1968, pp. 13, 15; October 22, 1968, pp. 8-11; *Die Welt*, September 30, 1968.

² *The African Communist*, No. 29, second quarter 1967, pp. 16-17

³ In 1968 twenty African countries voted against China's admission to the UN, as against only nine in 1965.

⁴ *Afrique nouvelle*, No. 1039, 1967, p. 10.

have turned to manoeuvring and pursuing an ostensibly "soft" line in an attempt to return official relations with the African countries to normal. After the Ninth Party Congress in 1969, a more flexible foreign policy strategy combined with a strident anti-Soviet campaign has been pursued by the Maoists in international affairs in general. By 1970 Chinese embassies in Africa were working normally again and in that year diplomatic relations were established with Ethiopia and Equatorial Guinea and relations with Kenya had been satisfactorily settled.¹ For Peking 1971 was a particularly busy year in Africa. The Maoists made every effort to bring China out of international isolation, to restore trust in her as a "reliable partner" and ensure a maximum number of allies in the UN in order to gain admittance to the Organisation. In this connection, Africa again acquired prime importance for Peking, since it could provide the largest number of votes in favour of Chinese membership. For this reason, the formulae of "peaceful coexistence" and "the spirit of Bandung" again acquired wide currency in Chinese foreign policy and there were no longer calls for "people's war" in Africa. The basis of China's Africa policy at the beginning of the seventies, as indeed of her foreign policy in general, was the idea of contrasting "small and medium countries" to the two "superpowers"—the USSR and the USA—formulated in Mao Tse-tung's statement of May 20, 1970.² After China had joined the UN in 1971 and had begun to push the thesis that China belonged to the Third World, Peking made an open bid for the role of "champion" and "faithful friend" of all nations and countries of the Third World³ in order to make them its main strategic reserve in the struggle for world hegemony. In pursuit of purely nationalistic aims, the Maoists changed their attitude to non-alignment which they had energetically opposed until only recently. In their greetings to the conference of non-aligned countries in Lusaka, Zambia, in September 1970, the Chinese

¹ *Jenmin jihpao*, October 20, 1970.

² *Jenmin jihpao*, May 21, 1970.

³ *Jenmin jihpao*, December 27, 1971; January 2, 1972; HAIB, December 28, 1971, p. 5.

leaders stressed the importance of the struggle of the African countries against "the rule of the superpowers".¹

In 1971-1972, the Maoists began to call on the countries of Africa and the entire Third World to wage a determined struggle against the USSR, since "social-imperialism", as they put it, is more treacherous and dangerous than the imperialist countries.²

In a lead article in *Jenmin jihpao* on May 25, 1972, the Maoists declared that the Soviet Union was seizing "spheres of influence" in Africa and that by opposing the USSR the African countries would win "an ever more important role in international affairs".

A characteristic feature of China's Africa policy at the present time is the attempt to exploit the sharpest contradictions between the developing countries and imperialism and pretend that these contradictions apply to the USSR too, as a "social-imperialist" country.

At the same time, the Chinese leaders are themselves moving towards a rapprochement with the capitalist West and the USA, and merely pay lip service to the anti-imperialist struggle of the African countries. While declaring support for the struggle of the peoples of southern Africa, the Maoists are in fact trying to direct it not against the imperialists and the South African racialists but against the anti-imperialist forces, against so-called "social-imperialism", while continuing to trade with South Africa and Rhodesia.³

The Maoists are constantly trying to discredit the effective aid the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are offering to the peoples of Africa, and actively propagate the slogan of "self-reliance", which is simply a cover for China's economic impotence, trying to persuade the African countries to refuse all Soviet aid. In fact, the only result of this policy is to strengthen the position of imperialism in the Third World.

The development of contacts with the USA helped Peking establish diplomatic relations in 1971-1972 with a

¹ *Jenmin jihpao*, September 8, 1970.

² *Hungchi*, No. 10, 1972. See also Huang Hua's speech at the special meeting of the UN Security Council in Addis Ababa in January 1972.

³ Reports of Chinese trade with the racialist regimes appeared in both the African and Western press in 1972.

number of African countries which had formerly refused to have anything to do with China and had maintained official relations with the Taiwan regime.¹ By the beginning of 1973 China had diplomatic relations with twenty-nine African countries in all. The Chinese leaders have stepped up their propaganda activities in Africa and are making a new drive to develop economic ties, arrange exchange visits, etc. During 1972 about twenty government delegations from Africa visited Peking, including President Siad Barre of Somalia, Prime Minister Ramgoolam, of Mauritius, and President Mobutu of Zaire (1973),² and numerous Chinese delegations visited Africa.

Today China has aid commitments to more than twenty African countries,³ and her total aid to Africa in 1972, according to Western estimates, amounted to 1,200 million dollars, almost half the credits (about 500 million) being for Tanzania and Zambia, largely for the construction of the Tanzam rail link, a scheme to which China attaches tremendous political, economic and strategic importance as a model of "disinterested assistance".

The East African countries receive about 70 per cent of Chinese aid to Africa and it is there that China's aid commitments are being most fully realised.

It is interesting to note that in aiding Tanzania and Zambia on the railway project, China is in fact co-operating with the USA and Italy.⁴

¹ In 1971 China established relations with Cameroon, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Rwanda, Burundi and Nigeria, and re-opened her Embassy in Tunis. In 1972 China re-established diplomatic relations with Ghana and Dahomey and established them with Togo, Mauritius, Madagascar, Chad and Zaire.

² Apart from the above-mentioned visits, there were also delegations from Burundi, Rwanda, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Zambia, Guinea, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia and other countries.

³ In January 1973, during President Mobutu's visit to China, a trade agreement on economic and technical co-operation between China and Zaire was concluded. (*Jenmin jihpao*, January 16, 1973.)

⁴ The Italian press reported in May 1972 that parallel to the railway and not far away from it an American and an Italian firm were building a road which the Chinese were using to deliver materials and equipment for the railway, which was helping considerably speed up the construction work. Twenty thousand Chinese workers are engaged on the Tanzam construction project.

In economic terms Chinese aid is by no means always beneficial to the recipient countries. Thus, Chinese credits are often in the form of shoddy goods or goods that are simply not needed, which is why many Zambian importers, for example, are refusing to "buy Chinese". Industrial and commercial circles in Zambia are afraid that large imports of Chinese textiles would threaten Zambia's own textile industry.

In offering credits and undertaking construction schemes mainly in light industry or "prestige" projects, Peking is primarily interested in the political and commercial benefits to be reaped rather than the interests of the recipient countries.

Peking's present policy is having an extremely detrimental effect on the anti-imperialist struggle in Africa, hindering the solution of the intricate socio-economic problems some of the independent countries of the continent are facing.

§ 8. PEKING AND LATIN AMERICA

China's contacts with Latin America, which were rather limited in the initial period after the proclamation of the Chinese People's Republic, began to expand considerably by the mid-fifties. China's policy at that time, based on the principle of peaceful coexistence, was directed towards the development of friendly relations and mutually advantageous trade with all countries, including Latin America, and expressed solidarity with the struggle of the peoples of Latin America for economic independence. This policy bore fruit. Despite pressure from the United States, which forced the Latin American countries to maintain relations with the Taiwan regime and obstructed the establishment of relations with the People's Republic of China, there was a growing tendency throughout the period for a rapprochement between China and the Latin American countries in the cultural, economic and political spheres. However, as the Chinese leadership developed its own "special" foreign policy course in relations with Latin American countries at the end of the fifties there was a marked tendency for China to use the existing links more and more in her own selfish

interests to promote her great-power ambitions. The Maoists declared Latin America "the front line of the anti-imperialist struggle" and the Chinese leaders began to show a great interest in it.

The failure of the Maoist policy in Latin America on the eve of, and during, the "cultural revolution"

This period was marked by attempts to exert pressure on the Latin American Communist parties and get them to adopt Maoist views and recognise China as leader of the revolutionary liberation movement combined with efforts to coax the ruling circles in the Latin American countries with a view to gaining diplomatic recognition and approval for Maoist penetration of the revolutionary movement there.

In 1963-1964 the Chinese leaders began to make open attempts to split the ranks of the Latin American Communist parties. They tried to undermine the influence of those parties that were in favour of strengthening the unity and cohesion of the international communist movement and developing fraternal relations with all other Communist parties, above all those of the socialist countries.

The Maoists failed to achieve their aims by the time the "cultural revolution" began in China and subsequent attempts by the Peking leaders to export the "cultural revolution" and impose Maoism on the Latin American Communist parties did serious damage to the revolutionary movement in Latin America and also to China's ties with the Latin American countries.

The cultural ties that had developed to some extent in the preceding period were almost entirely disrupted during the "cultural revolution". The societies and organisations for Sino-Latin American friendship that had been founded in several countries ceased to function practically everywhere, with the exception of Chile. Trade came almost to a complete standstill.

In 1966-1969 the policy of the Chinese leaders underwent a severe crisis, and the Maoists were obliged to review their activities in Latin America without, however, abandoning their global great-power ambitions.

The policy of the Peking leaders
in Latin America after the Ninth Party Congress

Peking's policy after the Ninth Party Congress was basically directed towards improving relations with the capitalist countries in general, including Latin America. The abandonment of the former "hard line" was reflected first and foremost in the nature of Chinese propaganda. In the place of the extremism of the preceding years and the appeals for global "people's war" during the period of the "cultural revolution", the Chinese leaders adopted a more flexible course, designed to rehabilitate their policy in the eyes of official circles in Latin America and give their foreign policy activity a more "respectable" appearance.

Chinese propaganda toned down its campaign to "explain" the activity of the small pro-Peking organisations in Latin America. A succession of articles appeared in the Chinese press containing more or less serious attempts to explain the political and economic situation in the countries of the area, in an attempt to convince people in Latin America that the Chinese leadership had completely revised its old policy and was renouncing its interference in the Latin American revolutionary movement. The succession of assurances by Peking, which became more and more emphatic as the Twenty-Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly approached (which was to examine the question of China's admission to the UN), was crowned by an interview given by Chou En-lai published in the Mexican newspaper *Excelsior* on September 5, 1971, in which he insisted that the policy of exporting revolution was quite unacceptable to the Chinese leadership and also tried to disassociate Peking from its former claims to be the "revolutionary vanguard".

The Chinese efforts in their campaign to improve their international relations, if they did not convince the ruling circles in Latin America of China's good intentions, at least appear to have persuaded them that the plans of the Chinese leaders did not represent a threat to the existing political regimes. There was general approval of China's return to the "international community of nations". The Twenty-Sixth Session of the General Assembly, at which a number of Latin American countries voted in favour of restoring

China's rights in the UN, was an important step on the way to a whole series of diplomatic recognitions of China.

At the same time, in an attempt to restore its ideological influence in Latin America which had been severely undermined during the "cultural revolution", and strengthen the social support for Maoism in the form of pro-Peking organisations, which were in a state of extreme disarray at the end of the sixties, Peking set out to create single united Maoist parties out of the fragmented and often rival groups.

In Venezuela, for example, efforts were made to create the Bandera Roja (Red Banner) organisation and in Colombia, after the local elections in April 1972, a constituent congress of Maoists was convened with the aim of establishing a Labour Party on the basis of the Left Workers' and Revolutionary Movement, a Maoist organisation, while attempts were made to unite the various groupings in the Dominican Republic.

Basic features of the Maoist
Latin America policy at the present time

Today Latin America is assuming ever greater importance as a field for struggle by China to achieve her great-power ambitions, and Chinese political activity is therefore taking on new forms. Whereas the main emphasis in Chinese strategy was at one time on the communist movement, and attempts to split it, today international relations take pride of place, with the Chinese leaders setting themselves reasonably "constructive" aims, trying to unite the Latin American countries with China for a struggle against the "super-powers", make them accept Chinese leadership and enter the orbit of Chinese foreign policy. The Chinese leaders count a great deal on the new complicated trends in Latin American political life for the realisation of these aims.

Today a very special situation obtains in Latin America, involving an upsurge of patriotic sentiments, a growth of nationalism among the ruling circles of Latin American countries, increasing attempts to conduct a more independent foreign policy, opposition to the USA, and joint action to safeguard national independence and sovereignty assuming a markedly anti-imperialist flavour. After the excesses of

the "cultural revolution", Peking's attempts to establish normal relations with the countries of Latin America have been received sympathetically. The first Latin American countries (after Cuba) to establish diplomatic relations with China were Chile and Peru.

Other countries, too, have shown an interest in developing trade relations with China. By the end of 1972, China had diplomatic relations with seven Central and South American countries: Cuba, Chile, Peru, Mexico, Argentina, Guyana and Jamaica.

The new trends in the political life of Latin America are also behind the peculiarities of present-day Chinese tactics in that part of the world. The Chinese leaders are attempting to create a semblance of support for the demands of the Latin American states. At the same time, they are trying to hook them with Peking's declared opposition to the "hegemonism" of the great powers and to use them in the struggle against the USSR and other countries of the socialist community.

Playing on any of the problems in the Latin American countries is a distinguishing feature of contemporary Maoist tactics.

The question of returning the Panama Canal zone, as raised by the Panamanian government; the general measures adopted in January 1971 by the members of the Andean Development Corporation¹ on the limitation of foreign capital investments; the criticism levelled by the Latin American countries against the trade policy of the USA, and many other urgent local problems—all these are being handled by Peking in such a way as to make them seem part of the struggle against what Peking describes as the "superpowers".

In order to worm its way into the confidence of the Latin American countries, Peking is playing up to the demands of several of them regarding the 200-mile zone of territorial waters. The Chinese leaders are proceeding

¹ A regional trade and economic organisation of the Andes countries, it was founded in 1969 and included Chile, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador and Bolivia. In February 1973, the organisation was joined by Venezuela.

from the fact that the interests of China, which has officially set a 12-mile zone on its own territorial waters, will not suffer, since the demands for a 200-mile zone are virtually impracticable in any case. But the Chinese leaders can behave as if they are amicably disposed towards certain countries and can at the same time poison the international atmosphere by encouraging arbitrariness and anarchy in the delimitation of sea areas, and this could lead to clashes between states.

The desire to win the sympathies of Latin America and at the same time to complicate its relations with third countries, especially the Soviet Union and the other socialist states, is also integral to Peking's policy in the sphere of economic contacts with the Latin American countries.

In November 1971, in conformity with an agreement signed in Peking on economic and technical co-operation, the People's Republic of China offered Peru a 20-year interest-free loan of about 42 million dollars for the development of the country's metallurgical and mining industries. According to a statement made in April 1972 by Forbes Burnham, Prime Minister of Guyana, that country had received from the People's Republic of China a 20-year interest-free loan of 26 million dollars. It is typical that all these credit and aid agreements are accompanied with the imposition by Peking of the "superpowers" thesis.

In its attempts to obstruct the growth of economic co-operation between the Latin American countries and the USSR and to fence them off from the socialist community, Peking does not draw the line even at direct interference in the affairs of the Latin American countries.

In a letter of February 23, 1973, to Salvador Allende, President of Chile, Chou En-lai warned him about the danger of relying on external aid, especially on "loans offered by the great powers". Unerringly noting the anti-Soviet bias of this pronouncement, the Chilean reactionary press did not miss the opportunity of using it in its propaganda campaign against the USSR.

The way the Chinese press presents sharp regional issues, such as the question of the return of the Panama Canal zone to Panama, the joint measures to limit foreign investment adopted by the members of the Andes Pact early in

January 1971, criticism of US trade policy in Latin America and the treaty on the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America clearly reflects the attempts by the Chinese leadership to exploit the tensions between various Latin American countries and the USA in order to cast a shadow on the Soviet stand.

It is a well-known fact that the Soviet Union, with its consistent policy in favour of a total ban on the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and the liquidation of existing stockpiles, has always supported the creation of nuclear-free zones. The Chinese leaders cannot fail to be aware of this. Yet Peking launched a provocative anti-Soviet campaign, associating the Soviet objections to the Treaty on a Latin American nuclear-free zone (the Tlatelolco Treaty) on the grounds that the boundaries of the proposed zone were insufficiently defined with Soviet reluctance to recognise the right of some Latin American countries to extend the limit of their territorial waters to 200 miles. At the same time Chinese propaganda constantly reiterates the Peking leaders' approval of the stand of the Latin American countries on a nuclear-free zone, and the "sympathetic attitude" they are alleged to have always taken on this matter.

The Chinese leaders gave an extremely hostile reception to the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty and at the end of 1971 the Chinese representative declined to vote on the issue in the UN. Peking also delayed for a long time over signing supplementary protocol two of the Treaty, despite the proposal of the Mexican Government contained in a Note to the Chinese Government of October 5, 1972.

The reason Peking gave was that the preambles to the Treaty itself and its supplementary protocol two contained a confirmation of the General Assembly resolution on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and partial nuclear test ban treaty, to which the Chinese Government is opposed.

Only in April 1973 China announced that the necessary preparations had begun for signing supplementary protocol two.

The Chinese leaders are trying to make use of the thesis that has gained wide currency in bourgeois propaganda recently that China by virtue of her special historical develop-

ment is closer to the developing countries in general, and the Latin American countries in particular, than, for example, the USSR and the other socialist countries (which as highly developed industrial countries are allegedly far from understanding the special needs of the Third World), and are capitalising on this to cultivate the good will of several Latin American governments.

As the Chinese leaders went over to a policy of direct opposition to the USSR, so anti-Soviet elements began to dominate China's policy in Latin America. This has been recognised by bourgeois Sinologists, too. The anti-American slogan that is so important in the policy of the Latin American countries became a mere formality for Peking. There can be no doubt but that the struggle against "superpowers' hegemony" conducted by the Chinese leaders plays into the hands of the USA, which, as the Peruvian Communist Party weekly *Unidad* remarked in its report on the third UNCTAD session, is eager "at least not to be the only one to blame" for the distressing position of the developing countries and to "present the socialist countries as their accomplices" in exploitation.¹

Presenting the Soviet Union as an aggressive "superpower", as a kind of "new despot" in Latin America who has taken over from the USA, the Chinese leaders are trying to pass themselves off as the best friends of the Latin American countries, as the "consistent" defenders of their peoples' interests.

Peking's open betrayal of the interests of the democratic and revolutionary forces came to the fore not long ago in connection with events in Chile, when no less than a month after the fascist military coup the Chinese leadership granted *de facto* recognition to the Chilean junta. On October 10, 1973 the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chi Peng-fei, informed the Chilean Ambassador in China, Armando Uribe, that the Government of the People's Republic of China no longer considered him ambassador of the Chilean Republic in China.

Peking published no official condemnation of the junta's crimes and their murder of President Salvador Allende, and

¹ *Unidad*, 17de Abril de 1972.

the Chinese leaders refused to participate in the international campaign to save the lives of Luis Corvalan, General Secretary of the Chilean Communist Party, and other political prisoners. The Chinese leaders preferred to use the Chilean events for their subsequent political manoeuvres and intrigues. In his speech at the plenary meeting of the 28th session of the UN General Assembly (October 2, 1973) the representative of the Chinese People's Republic, Chiao Kuan-hua, attempted to present the events in Chile as the result of competition between the "two superpowers", and Salvador Allende he referred to as the victim of the "harmful theory" of "peaceful transition".

CHAPTER THREE

**PEKING'S POLICY TOWARDS THE USA,
JAPAN AND WESTERN EUROPE**

The United States, Japan and the capitalist countries of Western Europe have assumed a special importance in the foreign policy strategy of the Chinese leaders in the last few years.

In examining China's relations with the capitalist countries it is easy to see that Peking's interest in them has increased along with the intensification of the anti-Soviet and anti-socialist tendencies in its foreign policy.

The development of relations between China and the USA has been particularly instructive in this respect.

**§ 1. THE ATTITUDES OF MAO AND HIS FOLLOWERS
TO THE USA PRIOR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC**

**Mao's contacts with American
representatives in 1944-1945**

The US Government's first contacts with the CPC leadership were towards the end of the Second World War when Mao and his followers launched a campaign "for the correction of style" in Party work. This campaign was directed primarily against the internationalist elements in the Party and its close links with the CPSU and the USSR, and aimed to ensure the adoption of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung", which at that time involved a programme of "new democracy", envisaging the establishment in China of an inter-

mediate system, that was essentially capitalist, and the creation of a coalition government with the Kuomintang.

Leading liberals in the Roosevelt Administration at the time regarded this programme for "new democracy" as an acceptable basis for post-war co-operation with the Chinese Communists should the Kuomintang be defeated or refuse to expand its social base.

Mao Tse-tung was at that time counting on US support for carrying out his political plans for China's post-war development. In a conversation with John Service, a US Embassy official in the US Army Observer Section at Yanyan, on August 23, 1944, Mao made a number of statements that confirm this. He said that the hope of preventing civil war in China rested to a very large extent on the influence of foreign countries, among which the United States was by far the most important. "Its growing power in China and in the Far East is already so great that it can be decisive."¹ Mao expressed the hope that the United States would assist the triumph of democracy in China and actually appealed for US interference in China's internal affairs: "'Interference,'" he said, "...to further the true interests of the people of China is not interference. It will be welcomed by the great mass of the people of China because they want democracy."² "After all," he went on, "we Chinese consider you Americans the ideal of democracy."³

Mao Tse-tung appealed to the American Government to land troops in China during the war with Japan. "We think the Americans must land in China.... If the Americans do not land in China, it will be most unfortunate for China."⁴

But Mao did not confine himself to such appeals to the US Government to take part in the war in China, appoint their own commander-in-chief of all the forces engaged on the Chinese front, including the 4th and 8th armies, and intervene in China's political affairs to promote the "introduction" of democracy on the American model. He also

¹ *The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China*, Vol. 1, Washington, 1970, p. 790.

² *Ibid.*, p. 793.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 794.

⁴ *Ibid.*

called for American help in China's post-war reconstruction, and, in particular, for US investment to help China industrialise. He did not expect the USSR to enter the war against Japan or help restore the Chinese economy. "The Russians have suffered greatly in the war and will have their hands full with their own job of rebuilding. We do not expect Russian help."¹ Mao was prepared to consign the task of post-war industrialisation entirely to American capital: "China *must* industrialise," he said. "This can be done—in China—only by free enterprise and with the aid of foreign capital. Chinese and American interests are correlated and similar. They *fit* together, economically and politically. We can and must work together."² He promised that the Communists would be better partners for the USA than the Kuomintang. "The United States would find us *more co-operative* than the Kuomintang. We will not be afraid of democratic American influence—we will welcome it."³ "America does not need to fear that we will not be co-operative. We must co-operate and we must have American help."⁴ Mao declared the Communist Party of China to be a liberal organisation. "The policies of the Chinese Communist Party are merely liberal.... Even the most conservative American business man can find nothing in our program to take exception to."⁵ These statements by Mao Tse-tung led Service to draw the following conclusion: "This orientation toward the United States is clear. The Communists do not, for very practical reasons, expect that Soviet Russia will be able to play a large part in China. And they believe, for the sake of China's unity on a democratic basis, that this Russian participation should be secondary to that of the United States."⁶

Mao's faith in the liberal policy of the USA continued to influence the Communist Party's policy in 1945.

In January 1945, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai sent a

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 796.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 797.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 796.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 788.

secret message to Roosevelt requesting a meeting with him in Washington to discuss the situation in China.¹

In a conversation with an American diplomat Mao once more declared that America was not only the most suitable country to help in the economic development of China, but was also the only country really able to undertake it.²

However, events took a different course to that planned by Mao and his associates. The support of US ruling circles for Chiang Kai-shek and the Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan on August 8, 1945, (the purpose of which was not only to protect the Soviet Union from Japanese imperialism but also to bring liberation to the peoples of the Far East) radically altered the whole situation in the Far East. The Chinese people, with Soviet support, was able to bring its struggle to a victorious conclusion and crush the Kuomintang regime, despite the generous support the latter received from the USA.

The struggle in the Party leadership over the question of China's social development and international orientation

In 1948-1949 a tense struggle developed in the CPC leadership between nationalistic and internationalist forces over the question of what path of social development China should adopt for the immediate future and what its international orientation should be. Despite the attempts of the Mao group to impose their "new democracy" programme on the Party, the Second Plenum of the CPC Central Committee in March 1949 decided to create the preconditions for socialist development by ensuring the leading role of the working class and close alliance with the Soviet Union and the people's democracies.

Speaking at the Second Plenum in 1949, Mao Tse-tung announced a readiness to establish diplomatic and trade

¹ Statement on U.S.-China Relations Delivered before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 28, 1971, by Allen S. Whiting, Professor of Political Science and Associate, Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan.

² Ibid.

relations with all countries, despite the fact that he had previously considered it would be better for China to have no diplomatic relations with either the United States or the Soviet Union.¹

This point of view was entirely in accordance with the Maoist view of the need to adopt an intermediate position between imperialism and socialism, as expounded in the theory of "new democracy".

Following the decisions of the Second Plenum, an article by Mao Tse-tung entitled *On People's Democratic Dictatorship* was published on June 30, 1949, which contained an implicit admission that a struggle was going on in the Party over which side China should turn to. "Internationally we belong to the side of the anti-imperialist front, headed by the Soviet Union. We can only turn to this side for genuine and friendly assistance, not to the side of the imperialist front."

Having lost hope of being able to rely on the nationalistic elements in the Party and convinced that after the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic in 1949 its leadership had set a course for socialist development and China had become a part of the socialist camp, ruling circles in the USA adopted a hard line with respect to China.

The openly hostile policy of the USA characteristic of Truman's Democratic Administration and Eisenhower's Republican Administration, was an expression of the anti-socialist essence of the foreign policy of the two US parties, their policy of cold war against the socialist camp, to which China firmly belonged. In accordance with the general cold-war policy and the strategies of "rolling back" communism and "containment" of communism that characterised its various stages, in 1950 the US Government refused to recognise the Chinese People's Republic and gave its support instead to the Chiang Kai-shek regime, which had entrenched itself on the island of Taiwan and was making aggressive attempts to return to power on the mainland through blockade and subversive activities in China.

¹ See O. B. Borisov, B. T. Koloskov, *Sino-Soviet Relations. 1945-1970*. Moscow, 1971, p. 42 (in Russian).

§ 2. THE TAIWAN QUESTION

The Taiwan question in
Sino-American relations

The Taiwan issue was the outcome of American intervention in the civil war in China and US support for the Chiang Kai-shek group which had taken refuge on the island in 1949.

The Chinese Communist Party declared the liberation of Taiwan and the elimination of the last stronghold of the Kuomintang clique, thereby bringing the civil war to an end, to be a national task.¹ In September 1949, *Jenmin jihpao*, the newspaper of the CPC Central Committee, published a lead article entitled "Into Battle for Taiwan, for the Liberation of Our Taiwanese Compatriots!", which spoke of the reunification of the island with China as the main aim of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.² Immediately after completing operations on the mainland, the latter began to make intensive preparations to force the Strait and liberate Taiwan. Large forces were concentrated in the coastal areas of Fukien Province.

However, this was strongly opposed by the USA, although to begin with US ruling circles tried to avoid any firm commitment to support the Kuomintang. They hoped to make use of the strong nationalistic sentiments of Mao Tse-tung and his associates to prevent a close rapprochement between China and the socialist camp and China's development along the socialist path. In the first few months after the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic, therefore, the United States repeatedly announced that it accepted that Taiwan

¹ It is interesting to note that prior to the triumph of the Chinese revolution, Mao supported not the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland but the creation of an independent state. In a conversation with the American journalist Edgar Snow in 1936 he said: "...Manchuria must be regained. We do not, however, include Korea, ... if the Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese imperialism, we will extend them our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same thing applies for Taiwan (Formosa)." (Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China*, London, 1968, p. 110.)

² See *Jenmin jihpao*, September 4, 1949.

belonged to China, endeavouring to make the island a useful pawn for trading with the Peking Government.

On January 5, 1950, President Truman even called for "international respect for the territorial integrity of China". He said: "The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa or on any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time.... The United States Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China."¹

Referring to the Cairo (1943) and Potsdam (1945) declarations on the return of Taiwan to China, Truman pointed out that they had been accepted by Japan. According to these documents Taiwan was returned to China and in 1945-1949 the United States and other allied powers agreed that China would administrate the island. Thus, in January 1950 the United States did not openly dispute China's sovereignty over this part of her territory.

Before the outbreak of the Korean war, US officials preparing the American strategic "defence" line in the Pacific included the Aleutian Islands, Japan, the Ryukyu Islands and the Philippines, but not Taiwan.

The triumph of the internationalist course in the Chinese Communist Party, China's alliance with the USSR and the establishment of close all-round relations between the two countries on the basis of the treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual aid of February 1950, all put paid to America's hopes of establishing ties with the CPC on a nationalistic basis.

In these circumstances, influential circles in the USA, and above all the Pentagon, took steps to prevent the liberation of Taiwan by the People's Liberation Army. On May 28, 1950, *The New York Times* wrote that Washington was gravely concerned over the fact that the USA's strategic borders in the Far East were weakened by the insecure position of Formosa.

Thus, in the summer of 1950, the United States embarked on an openly anti-Chinese policy and announced opposition to China over the Taiwan issue. The outbreak of the Korean

¹ *The New York Times*, January 6, 1950, p. 3.

war served as an excuse for open US expansion in Taiwan. In his statement on Korea on June 27 President Truman said that he had ordered the Seventh Fleet "to prevent any attack on Formosa". The statement also contained a refusal by the US Government to recognise Taiwan as Chinese territory. "The determination of the future status of Formosa," President Truman said, "must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations."¹ At the San Francisco Conference convened in September 1951 to conclude a peace treaty with Japan the United States only achieved a renunciation by Japan of "all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores", leaving open the question of whom they belonged to.² The American version of the paragraph on Taiwan was included in the peace treaty between Japan and the Kuomintang signed in April 1952.³

US aggression against Taiwan produced a sharp upsurge of anti-American feeling in China. On June 28, a statement by Chou En-lai, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was issued, in which he described Truman's statement and the actions of the US Navy as "aggression against China and a gross violation of the principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations Organisation".

China's stand on the Taiwan issue was firmly supported by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. In a statement on US aggression in Korea, the Soviet Government expressly mentioned the interference by the United States in the struggle of the Chinese people to liberate Taiwan. Noting that President Truman's order to the Seventh Fleet "to prevent any attack on Formosa" meant the occupation by US forces of part of the territory of China, the USSR declared "this step by the Government of the USA represents direct aggression against China". The Soviet Government demanded an immediate end to armed intervention and the withdrawal of American troops from Korea and Taiwan.⁴

¹ *The New York Times*, June 28, 1950, p. 1.

² *U.N. Treaty Series*, Vol. 136, Geneva-New York, 1952, p. 48.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 138, 1952, pp. 38-55.

⁴ *Pravda*, July 4, 1950.

After sending the Seventh Fleet to the Formosa Strait the United States carried out a series of measures to strengthen the international position of the Chiang Kai-shek clique and also their economic and military capacity.

The restoration of the military-political alliance between America and the Kuomintang led to a sharp deterioration in Sino-American relations. When the Korean war was over, America, far from ceasing her intervention in Taiwan, continued to recognise the Kuomintang as the only lawful Chinese government and connived at acts of provocation by Chiang Kai-shek's forces against the People's Republic.

The policy of refusal to recognise the Chinese People's Republic, the introduction of an embargo on trade with her, and opposition to her admission to the United Nations was backed up with support for the revanchist plans of the Kuomintang to "liberate the mainland".

In December 1954, the USA concluded a mutual defence treaty with the Government of Taiwan, thereby providing a "legal basis" for its commitments to Taiwan. The content of the treaty, which was concluded for an indefinite period, was evidence that the United States aspired to reinforce its dominant position in Taiwan and the Pescadores in order to use the islands as a springboard for its aggressive designs in South-East Asia (described in Article II of the treaty as resistance to "armed attack and communist subversive activities directed from without").¹ According to Article V, the United States engaged to come to the aid of the Kuomintang in the event of operations by the People's Liberation Army to free Taiwan. The Americans gained the right to dispose such land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores "as may be required for their defense" (Article VII). Article VI stated that the provisions of the treaty would be applicable "to such other territories" (i.e., apart from Taiwan and the Pescadores) "as may be determined by mutual agreement". This term clearly demonstrated the aggressive nature of the US-Kuomintang alliance with respect to the People's Republic of China. The US Secretary of State Dulles referred to the treaty as relating to a country "which claims rightful sovereignty over more

¹ *U.N. Treaty Series*, Vol. 248, p. 214.

territory than it actually controls".¹ At the same time, the USA reserved for itself control over military operations by the Kuomintang army, which were to be co-ordinated with Washington.

The 1954 treaty, the strengthening of Chiang Kai-shek's armed forces and the continuation of the policy of embargo was all designed to counter the consolidation of the people's democracy system in China and reflected attempts to overthrow it. The ideological basis of this policy was anti-communism.

The treaty between the USA and the Kuomintang was described in China as an attempt by the USA "to legalise its armed seizure of Chinese territory, Taiwan, and, using Taiwan as a base, extend its aggression against China and prepare for a new war". "This act," said the Chinese Government in a statement of December 8, 1954, "is a grave military provocation against the Chinese People's Republic and the Chinese people".²

The Soviet Union expressed solidarity with this assessment. A statement issued by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on December 15, 1954, said that the purpose of the treaty was to wrest the island of Taiwan and the Pescadores from China, and that "since Taiwan is historically a Chinese territory, the task of liberating Taiwan is naturally the internal affair of China and the sovereign right of the Chinese people".³

On the basis of the Mutual Defence Treaty, the United States threatened China with nuclear retaliation if she should threaten Taiwan. In January 1955, the US President was authorised by Congress to employ the Armed Forces as he deemed necessary for the purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores. This authority extended to "the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores".⁴

¹ *The Department of State Bulletin*, December 13, 1954, Vol. XXXI, No. 807, p. 896.

² *Jenmin jihpao*, December 8, 1954.

³ *Pravda*, December 16, 1954.

⁴ *The Department of State Bulletin*, February 7, 1955, Vol. XXXII, No. 815, p. 213.

By the mid-fifties the Chinese Government began to adopt a more flexible attitude towards the USA and its stand on the Taiwan issue and no longer insisted on an exclusively military solution. Speaking at the Bandung Conference in April 1955, Premier Chou En-lai said that "the Chinese people are friendly to the American people" and "do not want to have a war with the United States of America", and invited the US Government sit down at the conference table "to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Far East, and especially . . . in the Taiwan area".¹

However, nothing came of the Chinese attempt to force the USA to climb down over the Taiwan issue at bilateral talks. At the meetings between the Chinese and American ambassadors that began in Geneva on August 1, 1955 (where the Taiwan issue was the main point under discussion), the American representative used the formula of "renunciation of force" in the Formosa Strait in an attempt to legitimise the separation of Taiwan from China.

Almost simultaneously with the proposal for Sino-American contacts, China took another initiative, this time addressed to the Kuomintang leaders. In March 1955, the Chinese Government launched a strong political campaign to convince the Kuomintang leaders of the need to liberate Taiwan by peaceful means. "If only we put the interests of the nation and our country before all else," said Chou En-lai addressing the Kuomintang in a speech at the third session of the National People's Congress in June 1956, "we shall again be able to join hands and unite".² This policy developed to involve guarantees to the Kuomintang for an amnesty for past crimes against the Chinese people, and a promise of a part in the Government (including a place of honour for Chiang Kai-shek) and even hints of autonomy for Taiwan once it had formally joined China.

The Chinese Government makes use of the Taiwan issue to further its great-power chauvinistic ambitions

The adoption by the Chinese Government of a special course in home and foreign policy at the end of the fifties

¹ *China and the Asian-African Conference (Documents)*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1955, p. 28.

² *Jenmin jihpao*, June 29, 1956.

was clearly reflected in its attitude to the Taiwan question, which was now used more than ever to promote China's great-power chauvinistic ambitions.

It was used as an important means of mobilising the masses to carry out Maoist political and economic programmes. Thus, the slogan of struggle for the liberation of Taiwan was used during the "great leap forward", when Mao had to charge the situation to the pre-war level, depriving the Chinese people of the basic material and cultural values. The Taiwan question played a similar role during the "cultural revolution", which the Maoists presented for political purposes as a continuation of the struggle with the Kuomintang, dubbing many of Mao's opponents "Kuomintang agents".

The Taiwan issue became an essential element of many of the actions of the Peking leadership in international affairs. Its "anti-Americanism" and "anti-imperialism", playing up to the countries of the Third World, attacks on the UN, opposition to a nuclear test ban and disarmament programmes, were partly "justified" by reference to the American aggression in Taiwan.

The Taiwan issue also occupied an important place in the Sino-American talks at ambassadorial level. The Chinese leaders were clearly using the issue to "regulate" progress in Sino-American relations, the pace being set by Peking. The solution of the Taiwan question, that is, a US withdrawal from Taiwan and the Strait, a withdrawal of American support from the Chiang Kai-shek regime, and the expulsion of Taiwan from the United Nations, were made the preliminary condition for talks on practically any aspect of Sino-American relations. Thus, the Taiwan issue became a means of exerting political and diplomatic pressure on the US Government on the path to a genuine settlement.

The Chinese Government periodically resorted to limited military actions designed to keep up the pressure in the Formosa Strait, in order to keep the Taiwan issue acute, as the Chinese Party leaders declared.

Many commentators on the Taiwan issue have stressed that in provoking periodical crises in the Formosa Strait Peking has also been trying to increase international tension in general, and in particular, damage relations, and even

perhaps produce a conflict, between the USA and the Soviet Union. Such a course of events would suit the Maoists' foreign policy. This was certainly the aim during the Taiwan crisis of 1958.

§ 3. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USA AND CHINA BECOME CRITICALLY STRAINED

The Taiwan crisis of 1958

In 1958 the desire of the Chinese leaders to oppose the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence and economic competition with the capitalist countries, adopted by the Twentieth CPSU Congress, by provoking a nuclear conflict between the USSR and the USA was patently manifest.

On August 9, 1958, the State Department issued a memorandum reaffirming the policy of not recognising the Chinese People's Republic. The Kuomintang garrison on the island of Quemoy was increased from fifty thousand to a hundred thousand, supposedly against US advice. On August 23, Mao gave the order to begin intensive bombardment of the island of Quemoy and the surrounding waters. On September 4, to prevent the landing of arms, supplies and reinforcements by Taiwanese ships under the protection of the US Seventh Fleet, the Chinese Government passed a law increasing its territorial waters from three to twelve miles, thereby including Quemoy and Matsu. The US Government refused to recognise the new limit, and American warships and aircraft continued to escort the Taiwanese ships up to the three-mile zone. Eisenhower and Dulles reaffirmed the principle established by the 1955 Formosa Resolution that the United States would defend the offshore islands related to the defence of Taiwan and the Pescadores, and said that the Nationalists had now deployed about a third of their forces on these islands which made for a closer interlocking between the defence systems with Formosa than was the case before.¹ They reiterated their willingness to use nuclear weapons for the defence of the islands on the grounds that

¹ William M. Bueler, *U.S. China Policy and the Problem of Taiwan*, Boulder, Colorado, 1971, pp. 30-31.

their loss would be disastrous for the position of the USA in the Far East and South-East Asia.¹

There was thus a real danger of military conflict between China and the USA. According to the Sino-Soviet treaty, this would have involved the Soviet Union in the conflict and made possible a thermonuclear war, which Mao actually called for at the Moscow Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1957.²

On September 7, 1958, the Soviet Government sent a serious warning to the US Government, which stated that it would regard an attack on China as an attack on the USSR.

At the same time the Soviet Government proposed to help organise China's coastal defence and took steps to try and restrain Maoist bellicosity, for the Chinese had begun to bombard the offshore islands without consulting the USSR, although obliged to do so by the terms of the treaty of February 14, 1950. Moreover, on the eve of the conflict Chinese Communist Party leaders had signed a communiqué on their meeting with CPSU leaders, which affirmed unity of views on "questions of joint struggle for the peaceful solution of international problems and the defence of world peace".³ China's double dealing was determined by a desire to oppose and even undermine the peaceful policy of the USSR, whose aim was to ease international tension. She hoped to use Soviet commitments under the Sino-Soviet treaty to provoke a conflict between the USSR and the USA.

Taking due note of the peaceful policy of the USSR and the CPSU's disapproval of Maoist adventuristic actions in domestic policy ("the great leap forward" and the people's communes) and in foreign policy (provoking a conflict in the Formosa Strait), the US Government, in its turn, was trying to take advantage of the Taiwan crisis to provoke a rift between the USSR and China and thereby accelerate a nationalistic metamorphosis of the CPC leadership.

These designs were reflected in Eisenhower's statement of 1953 on the question of recognition of the Chinese Peo-

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

² *Pravda*, September 9, 1958.

³ O. B. Borisov, B. T. Koloskov, *Sino-Soviet Relations. 1945-1970*, Moscow, 1971, p. 173.

ple's Republic, when he said that "a break between Russia and China or some other unexpected development [which] might make recognition of China a desirable strategic move in the best interests of the United States".¹ Secretary of State Dulles had similar hopes. At a press conference on September 30, 1958, he adopted a moderate line, saying that the renunciation of force in the Formosa Strait, which the United States was supposedly insisting on, should be observed by both China and the Chiang Kai-shek regime and that the Kuomintang could abandon the offshore islands without damage to the "defence" of Taiwan. Dulles also spoke of the impossibility of Chiang Kai-shek returning to the mainland. Disputes should be resolved through talks at meetings between ambassadors. At the same time, Dulles denied that the Taiwan issue was a Chinese domestic affair. He suggested that certain important changes in US China policy were possible, provided Peking reciprocated.² This statement, which was in sharp contrast to his former uncompromising statements on China and its stand on the question of liberating the offshore islands and Taiwan, also testified to US attempts to reach an agreement with Peking, given the signs of a change in the CPC leaders' policy towards the USSR and the socialist community as a whole.

The carefully considered policy of the Soviet Government foiled Peking and Washington's plans and helped ease the conflict.

The Soviet Union warned the USA that it would not permit a US attack on China, but at the same time refused to interfere in the conflict between the Chinese People's Republic and the Chiang Kai-shek clique over the offshore islands, since it regarded it as a continuation of the civil war.

The new round of talks on Taiwan between the Chinese and US ambassadors that began on September 15 in Warsaw was unproductive. Whereas at the previous round of talks, in Geneva, it was the US representatives who adopted an uncompromising stand, this time it was the turn of the

¹ William M. Bueler, *op. cit.*, p. 34. The author is quoting Sherman Adams, *Firsthand Report*, New York, 1961, pp. 127-128.

² HAIB, October 6, 1958.

Chinese representatives. China was clearly out to produce a stalemate and preserve the tension in the Formosa Strait with a view to exerting constant pressure on the internal situation in China (with the threat of war) and also on the USA and the USSR, to prevent a thaw in relations between them and to be able to blame the USSR of selling out to the United States in the event of such a thaw occurring.

On October 6, Peng Te-huai, the Chinese Defence Minister, addressed his "compatriots" in Taiwan and the islands over the radio with an appeal for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question on the basis of common national interests and negotiations without US interference. This was a further attempt to establish direct contact with the Chiang Kai-shek clique, based on the desire of both sides not to have the Taiwan question treated as an international issue, as the USA had tried to make it during the Taiwan crisis. At the same time he stressed the need to resolve the conflict with the USA over the Formosa Strait and the occupation of Taiwan through the talks in Warsaw and not by using force. Peng Te-huai also announced a seven-day cease-fire, during which the garrison of the islands could receive supplies provided there was no American escort.

His appeal contained such expressions as "We are all Chinese.... There is only one China, not two", and "Peace is the best possible solution".

With the unilateral cease-fire, although temporary, under way, insistence on renunciation of the "two Chinas" slogan and the demand for the withdrawal of US troops became the basis of the Chinese stand in the Warsaw talks. The Chinese Government clearly realised that this would take a long time, but, as Foreign Minister Chen Yi announced on November 1, 1958, time was on the side of China, not the USA.

Secretary Dulles had talks with Chiang Kai-shek during a visit to Taiwan in mid-October at which they discussed the renunciation of force. A communiqué was issued at the end of the talks which stated that the aims of Chiang Kai-shek and Taiwan's mission, which were allegedly to implement Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles, did not necessarily involve the use of force.

The 1958 Formosa Strait crisis was thus resolved, although this did not lead to any sort of settlement in Sino-American relations. On the contrary, the Taiwan question had come to the fore as the chief issue dividing China and the United States.

**The first signs of preparations
for a normalisation of Sino-American relations**

After the Taiwan crisis of 1958, the Warsaw talks between ambassadors ceased to be an instrument for a solution to various problems in Sino-American relations. The Chinese Government adopted a demonstratively "hard line" towards the United States, making use of anti-Americanism in its bid for leadership of the world revolutionary movement, as evidence of their "leading role" in the anti-imperialist struggle, and, in particular, to suggest a contrast with the allegedly "revisionist" policy of the Soviet Union. The domestic situation in China after the disastrous failure of the "great leap forward" was also unfavourable for normal diplomacy. The grave economic situation again led the Chinese leaders to try to divert the attention of the people from internal problems by adventures abroad. All initiatives by US representatives at the Warsaw talks in an attempt to reach an agreement over the exchange of correspondents and a guarantee of renunciation of force were met with categoric demands for the withdrawal of American troops from Taiwan and the Formosa Strait as a preliminary condition for a settlement. At the same time the Chinese Army periodically resumed an artillery duel with the offshore islands.

Prior to the "cultural revolution", the Chinese leaders continued a fierce anti-American propaganda campaign for the benefit of the socialist and developing countries of Asia and the coloured population of the United States. Viewed in the light of Sino-American relations, this campaign was clearly a means of bringing pressure to bear on the USA to show more willingness to settle relations with China.

Numerous statements by Chinese foreign affairs officials testified to the fact that the Chinese Government was eager to reach such a settlement.

§ 4. THE MOTIVES THAT LED THE USA
TO REVISE ITS BASIC POLICY TOWARDS CHINA

China's aims in joining
the nuclear arms race

The anti-socialist trend of the "cultural revolution" apparently explains why a basic revision of US China policy occurred in the years 1966-1967, involving the abandonment of the Dulles doctrine of "containment and isolation" for the principle of "containment without isolation". This change occurred despite the increased Chinese nuclear drive, which had initially produced a stormy reaction in the United States. US public opinion reacted to China's new role as a nuclear power as a direct threat to America's security, despite the reassurances by Mao and Chou En-lai that China would never be the first to use nuclear weapons and was willing to renounce them should there be a universal ban on their manufacture and use. The Chinese A- and H-bomb tests were used by the Americans as an excuse to go ahead immediately with the development of ABM systems (Sentinel and later Safeguard) against the threat of Chinese nuclear attack on America's Pacific seaboard. They thus served to encourage the nuclear arms race. Peking believed that by possessing the H-bomb China could get the United States to normalise relations with her at the expense of the USSR more rapidly. Indeed, in US military circles the general opinion was that, given the level of scientific and technological sophistication necessary to produce an inter-continental missile (American strategists calculated that it would take China until 1975-1980 to produce one) for the next ten to fifteen years China's nuclear weapons would only represent a threat to the countries directly bordering on her and within the reach of medium-range missiles. This meant that China's nuclear arsenal was primarily a threat to the USSR and India, not the United States.

The anti-Soviet essence of the search
for understanding between China and the USA

A clear sign of the anti-Soviet essence of the search for understanding with China during President Johnson's term

of office was the fact that it took place against the background of the "cultural revolution" (1966-1969) which was spearheaded against the supporters of the internationalist course in the Chinese political and Party leadership, against those in favour of a settlement of relations with the USSR and the socialist community, against people who supported, albeit inconsistently, the country's development according to socialist principles.

It may be assumed that the campaign for the recognition of China and her admission to the UN in the USA, like the steps taken by the American Administration to ease the confrontation with China, were intended to show that the USA duly approved of the "cultural revolution". US ruling circles approached the "cultural revolution" from an anti-Soviet, anti-socialist standpoint, and were prepared to encourage its development in this direction and support the Maoists' attempts to destroy the Party and government system and undermine the foundations of socialism in China. This is the only explanation of the way the US Government began to exert pressure on the Chiang Kai-shek clique to prevent it from carrying out its plans to use the internece struggle in China to invade the mainland and also to bomb China's nuclear centres.

In 1966—i.e., during the first year of the "cultural revolution"—the Johnson Administration took a number of unilateral steps, despite the hard line adopted by Peking, to show China that the USA was prepared to reach an agreement with her. Numerous statements by President Johnson himself and members of his Administration—Hubert Humphrey, Robert McNamara and Arthur Goldberg—asserted the need to "build bridges" and embark on an era of "co-operation" with China. In May and June 1966 alone, US Government officials issued about thirty official statements which spoke of the desire to improve relations with China. Meanwhile, practical measures were taken to establish cultural contacts with China (permission for American scholars and journalists to visit China, invitations for Chinese scholars and scientists to lecture at American universities). At the same time China received an unofficial promise that the embargo would be lifted on Sino-American trade, that a meeting would be organised between ministers for foreign affairs, that China

would be admitted to the United Nations on certain conditions (that Taiwan would preserve a seat in the Organisation, and China would renounce her demand for the expulsion of Chiang Kai-shek from the UN).

The Senate and House committees had several hearings on China in 1966, at which numerous China experts spoke. Of special interest was the session of March 1966 in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with Senator Fulbright in the chair, at which the new formula of "containment without isolation" was put forward, which was soon to be taken up by US official circles. The Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, speaking before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific on March 16, 1966, cited ten elements in US future China policy, which included reassurance that the US did not intend to attack the mainland, avoidance of the assumption that hostility between the USA and China was "unending and inevitable", enlargement of possibilities for unofficial contacts, continued direct diplomatic contacts at ambassadorial level, willingness to discuss with China and other countries the problems of disarmament and non-proliferation, and exploration and analysis of all available information on China. Secretary Rusk also proposed firmness in assisting allied nations against Chinese aggression, continued assistance to the nation-building process in Asia, honouring commitments for the defence of Taiwan, opposition to China's UN membership and continued efforts to prevent the expulsion of the Chiang Kai-shek regime from the UN.

As can be seen from these points, US official policy towards China had not altered fundamentally.

Thus, the far-reaching proposals by various members of the US Administration and Congress and US private citizens were intended to feel out China's position with a view to encouraging her to step up her anti-socialist, anti-Soviet course. These aspects of the American proposals were duly noted in Peking, where a disgraceful campaign of violence was organised, involving laying siege to embassies and the harassment of embassy officials of the USSR and other socialist countries, and provocations on the Soviet border and inside Soviet territory.

Peking's policy towards the USA after
the Ninth Party Congress

In 1968, pending the US Presidential elections, China counted on the election of the Republican Nixon, who had promised in his election campaign, like Eisenhower, to end the war in Vietnam and take steps to reach a settlement with China, in place of the Democrat Johnson who had compromised himself by escalation of the war in Vietnam. On November 28, 1968, after Nixon was duly elected, the Chinese Government proposed that the talks between ambassadors in Warsaw be renewed on February 20, 1969. This was one of the Maoists' first moves in foreign policy as China began to take steps to emerge from her isolation of the period of the "cultural revolution", which was drawing to a close. It is significant that it was addressed to the United States, the leading power in the capitalist world. Even before the Ninth Congress, it showed that the Peking leadership was moving in the direction of stepping up its anti-Soviet policy and improving relations with the capitalist world. Peking's initiative immediately produced favourable reactions in Washington. The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Fulbright, suggested that the talks be raised to the level of negotiations between foreign ministers. The new Secretary of State, William P. Rodgers, also reacted favourably to the Peking initiative. But apparently Peking was expecting more important concessions from the American Government that would have helped pave the way for its foreign policy *volte face* planned for the Ninth Congress. When it failed to receive them, the Chinese leadership resorted to the tactics of bringing pressure to bear on the USA: on February 18, two days before the Warsaw talks were due to begin, Peking backed out of them on the grounds that the United States had committed an unfriendly act in granting political asylum to the Chinese Charge d'Affaires in the Netherlands, Liao Ho-shy. China also made use of the talks that were in progress on the establishment of diplomatic relations with Canada and Italy, during which China adopted the new tactic of making agreements over the Taiwan question on the basis of the formula of recognition of the People's Republic as the only

lawful government of China and taking note of the Chinese declaration that Taiwan was an inalienable part of China's territory.

The USA also took steps to influence China, threatening to set up an ABM system, although taking care to point out that it was not directed against China.

In December 1969, the US Government, through the President's assistant, Doctor Kissinger, issued a lengthy statement on its China policy. One of the main points stated that since the USA had no eternal enemies, its policy towards the communist countries and China in particular would be determined not by the ideology of these countries but by their actions. This principle was already being employed with respect to China as permitting the development of more serious relations over the years. While expressing its willingness to undertake serious, practical and constructive talks, the US Government was not trying to force the issue, preferring talks between ambassadors and other channels of communication to intricate, protracted talks.

Assessing the role of China, the US Government came to the conclusion that it would be impossible in the long run to ignore it and its influence on international events, particularly in the neighbouring countries of Asia, irrespective of the actions and policy of the United States.

Through Dr. Kissinger President Nixon was trying to convey to the Chinese leaders not only his desire to normalise relations with China but also his willingness to accept Chinese influence in Asia. Presumably having received a favourable response, President Nixon repeated this condition in his official message to Congress on February 18, 1970, in which he expounded his programme for improving relations with China in practical terms, for the time being on a unilateral basis.

In June 1970, the US State Department issued a statement announcing US willingness to adopt new measures to promote a détente with China. One of them involved exploring the possibility of an official visit to China by President Nixon himself.

Although the meetings between ambassadors were broken off, 1970 was to be a decisive year in the preliminary un-

official dialogue between the USA and China on improving relations between the two countries.

According to Edgar Snow, the Nixon Government informed Peking through mediators and special envoys of a "new US approach" to the problems of Asia, of the US determination to withdraw from Vietnam as soon as possible, and to overcome the stalemate in Sino-American relations through a settlement of the Taiwan question, China's admission to the UN and the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the USA.

The Chinese Government was equally active in the field of foreign affairs in 1970. Premier Chou En-lai throughout the year gave a number of interviews, hinting at the possibility of improving relations with the USA. The most important of these was an interview given by Chou En-lai and later Mao Tse-tung, to the American journalist Edgar Snow, a permanent go-between in the Sino-American dialogue.

Having been assured by Mao that China was considering the question of allowing Americans to enter China, whatever their political views, including the most Right-wing, Edgar Snow asked about the possibility of a personal visit by the President to Peking. Mao is said to have answered that he would welcome such a visit, since President Nixon was not responsible for the difficulties created by Truman and Acheson over the Taiwan question and it was necessary to resolve with him the problems outstanding between the two countries.

Edgar Snow emphasised that Mao was full of admiration for America's achievements in industry, science and technology and higher education, and spoke of the need to learn from the way America was developing.

If 1970 was a year of preliminary exploration and sounding of the attitudes of the other side in the process of rapprochement, 1971 was to be a year of direct contacts and preparation for President Nixon's visit to China. In April 1971 an American table tennis team was invited to China by Mao Tse-tung, after which the subsequent process of settling Sino-American relations became known as "ping-pong diplomacy". The American team was received at government level. After this, various delegations of Amer-

ican scientists and scholars, reporters and businessmen visited China. The majority of these delegations had personal audiences with Chou En-lai, in the course of which he made at least ten important statements with regard to Sino-American relations and international relations in the Far East and throughout the world. These statements expressed China's preliminary stand for the coming talks with US officials, the basis for the new relations between China and the USA.

The most interesting of such comments were made during a conversation with the US journalist James Reston, in which Chou En-lai insisted on an alleged Soviet threat to China's security.

Through Reston, the USA raised the question of containing a supposed Soviet threat in the Mediterranean and the Middle East and the possibility of it spreading through the Suez Canal to the Indian Ocean. China veiled her own position in a demagogical criticism of US aggression in Indochina and Korea, and the need to struggle against the dictates of the "two superpowers", etc.

In the course of his conversations with American reporters and other foreign visitors, Chou En-lai, apart from the question of Sino-American relations, discussed a wide range of international questions which China would like to see solved through talks with the USA. They concerned Taiwan, Indochina, Korea and Japan, and the admission of China to the UN. These questions were presented in aspects that were radically different both from the way China had approached them in the past and attitude current in Chinese propaganda at the time, evidence of China's desire to achieve a *modus vivendi* with the USA.

Thus, in reiterating the demand for the withdrawal of American troops from Taiwan, Chou En-lai made no mention of any time limit for such a withdrawal, and only raised the question in principle. He stressed that China would strive for the reunification of Taiwan with China by gradual peaceful means through an agreement with the Government of Taiwan, and made no mention of the defence treaty between the USA and Chiang Kai-shek, let alone demanding its rescindment. On the subject of China's admission to the UN, he renounced all China's previous conditions (including

the demand for the annulment of the resolution declaring China an aggressor), except for the expulsion of Taiwan.

As regards the war in Indochina, Chou En-lai stressed that it was an even more important problem than Taiwan. But he made no practical proposals concerning the Seven Points of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, the course of the Paris talks, the cessation of air raids against the DRV and of military operations by the Saigon puppet regime.

Chou En-lai spoke of the danger of a revival of Japanese militarism and of Japan becoming a nuclear power, but made no demands for the liquidation of American bases in Japan or an end to the American-Japanese security treaty. He did call, however, for the rescindment of the treaty between Japan and Taiwan. The demands with respect to Japan betrayed a desire to blackmail the Americans with the threat of a revival of Japanese military power and thereby ensure the retention of US bases as a guarantee that Japan would not rearm and produce nuclear weapons. In demanding the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea and the revocation of the Korean-American treaty, Chou En-lai was trying to secure China's northern flank. A basic contradiction characterised all these Chinese approaches to international problems in the Far East and South-East Asia. On the one hand there was the declared desire to achieve the withdrawal of US forces from the mainland of Asia and Taiwan, from territories adjacent to China, and on the other, the desire for a continued American military presence in the Pacific to counterbalance the USSR, prevent the growth of the influence of the socialist countries, and partly to offset Japan (more precisely as a means of preventing her militarisation). The Guam Doctrine and policy of "Vietnamisation" and the anti-Soviet policy of the Chinese leaders formed the basis of these attitudes.

As Chou En-lai's statements show, the Chinese welcomed the Guam Doctrine, which provided a basis for the Nixon visit to Peking and talks to settle relations between the USA and China.

**Nixon's visit to Peking.
Sino-American talks (February 1972)**

During Dr. Kissinger's first visit to Peking in July 1971, the Chinese leaders gave him an official invitation for President Nixon to visit China some time before May the following year. The final date for the visit and the programme for the talks were agreed on during Kissinger's second visit to Peking in December. The presidential visit lasted from February 21 to 28, 1972. A significant point that predetermined the atmosphere and course of the talks was that Mao Tse-tung received President Nixon immediately after his arrival in Peking. The meeting lasted an hour and was only attended by Mao himself and Chou En-lai, President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger. Mao thereby ensured an extremely favourable situation for the talks. Nixon had six personal meetings with Chou En-lai. There were only two meetings attended by the full delegations, both extremely brief. At the farewell banquet in Shanghai on February 28, President Nixon described the talks as the "week that changed the world". Thus the official communiqué on the talks can hardly be regarded as properly reflecting all the results of the visit, although it does enable one to gain an idea of certain aspects and the issues on which China and the USA remained divided.

The communiqué starts not with common standpoints, but with the view of each side on certain major current issues. The Americans stressed détente and the achievement of a just "free" world, while the Chinese emphasised the inevitability of revolution and the struggle by the small and weak countries against the large and strong. China declared she would never become a "superpower" and would always "continue to support the struggle of the oppressed nations for freedom and independence".

Having co-ordinated their positions on several international questions, the USA and China made a number of mutual concessions that went a long way towards settling the issues that divide them, and above all the Taiwan question. The United States considerably modified its attitude, admitting that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of it. This formulation might be regarded as a recognition

of the rights of the People's Republic of China to Taiwan. The only reservation made by the United States is to show her interest in a peaceful settlement on Taiwan by the Chinese themselves. China is not averse to this, having frequently reiterated her willingness to achieve a peaceful "liberation" of Taiwan. The logical consequence of this compromise was the declaration by the USA, clearly expressed in the communiqué, to ensure a gradual troop reduction and the winding up of military installations on Taiwan as tensions ease in South-East Asia and a peaceful settlement is achieved in Indochina.

The communiqué made no mention of the security treaty between the USA and Taiwan. Apparently the Peking leaders tacitly agreed that pending the peaceful settlement of the question of the liberation of Taiwan the USA would continue to give military aid to Chiang Kai-shek. Subsequently, this was confirmed in a number of statements by US officials, and the arrangements for the transference of two US submarines to Chiang Kai-shek and training for members of the Taiwanese armed forces in the USA.

The February communiqué of 1972 as a whole shows that in the cause of reaching an understanding with China on Asian problems, the USA accepted three basic demands on which China had always insisted in the talks between ambassadors in Warsaw and in numerous statements by the Peking leaders: recognition of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, recognition of the Chinese People's Republic as the only Chinese state, and the solution of the Taiwan question at some unspecified time in the future.

Although official recognition of China and the establishment of normal diplomatic relations did not immediately follow the President's visit, the two sides agreed to work to develop and expand communication between the two governments through various channels, including meetings between ambassadors in Ottawa or some other capital and visits to Peking by leading US officials.

On February 28, 1972, President Nixon said in his speech to Congress and members of the Cabinet that the purpose of his visit had been to re-establish communication with China to prevent war.

President Nixon pointed out that he had not come back

with any written or unwritten agreements that would guarantee peace in our time, and did not bring home any magic formula that would make unnecessary "the efforts of the American people" to continue to maintain the strength so that they could "continue to be free", but that nevertheless some necessary and important beginnings had been made in several areas.

He mentioned agreements to expand cultural, educational, and journalistic contacts, to develop and expand trade and likewise the communications that had now been established between the two governments.

He regarded as most important the fact that agreement had been reached on some rules of international conduct that would reduce the risk of confrontation and war in Asia and in the Pacific.

Sino-American relations after President Nixon's visit to Peking

After President Nixon's visit to Peking, there was some thaw in Sino-American relations, mainly in the areas of cultural exchanges and trade. In 1972, a Chinese table tennis team and a team of acrobats visited the USA, and were given a cordial welcome, which even included a meeting and exchange of speeches with President Nixon. Groups of Chinese nuclear physicists, cybernetics experts and medics also visited the USA. The groups were specially chosen to include scientists who had studied and worked in the USA and had friends and acquaintances there.

Apart from the leaders of both the Republican and Democratic parties and Dr. Kissinger, US visitors to China were mainly Sinologists, reporters and Americans of Chinese origin (there were over 2,000 of the latter). The most eminent and respected visitors, who earned an audience with Chou En-lai, were the two China experts Fairbank and Lattimore, representatives of the Federation of American Scientists, the journalists Salisbury and Joseph Alsop and leaders of the Council of Directors of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. The members of the American groups that visited China on the invitation of the Chinese Government were

chosen so as to include mainly people who had absolutely no knowledge whatsoever of the course of socialist construction in China in the period 1950-1957, so that they were only able to compare the present position with the Kuo-mintang period, and were frequently "full of admiration" for China's progress.

Trade between the two countries in 1972 was largely restricted to a few areas. So far there were no signs of the hopes of the US corporations for a great boom in trade with China being justified. The Chinese only bought ten Boeing 707s for about 150 million dollars, spare parts for jet engines for 60 million and grain. They also purchased the station for broadcasting via satellites and the satellites themselves that had been used to transmit television programmes to the USA during the President's visit. Two hundred Chinese pilots and mechanics were sent to the USA for special training with Boeings. Imports of other American commodities to China remain slight due to the retention of embargoes on the export of strategic goods to China, and the fact that China has still not been accorded most favoured nation status. As a result, Chinese goods are in a very unfavourable position on the US market, since they carry the maximum import duties, and Chinese exports to the USA are therefore developing slower still. Although Chinese trade organisations invited a large number of US businessmen to the Canton spring and autumn trade fairs for export goods in 1972, very few deals were concluded. The companies set up in the USA for the purpose of exploiting the "China boom" have so far proved disappointing ventures.

Other reasons are to be sought in the little China has to offer for export, which is largely sent to Japan and the West European countries where the prices for the goods China herself needs are considerably lower than in the USA, and also the fact that an agreement on US credits has yet to be reached.

The signing of the Paris agreements on Vietnam removes some of the political obstacles to the development of Sino-American relations.

The Taiwan issue has now come to the fore, the question of the gradual inclusion of Taiwan in the political and economic system of China. Evidence of this is the frequent

repetition in the Chinese press of the slogan "We are determined to liberate Taiwan".

Chou En-lai, speaking for the Chinese Government, has already given several official assurances to Taiwanese and foreign capitalists that their investments would be guaranteed, and has assured the local population that reforms would be carried out only gradually and that Taiwan would preserve a special status after union with China.

No doubt the Peking leadership is in no particular hurry to reinforce the normalisation with the USA with official diplomatic relations, and is attempting to use this question to achieve a final re-alignment with the USA in Asia in accordance with its own great-power ambitions. Instead of the imaginary confrontation between China and the "two superpowers" with which Peking propaganda tries to disguise China's anti-socialist, anti-Soviet policy, the Chinese leaders would like to create a real axis between two powers in Asia, the USA and China, the intended purpose being to resolve all Asian problems by mutual agreement without the participation of other powers, as was suggested by the communique of February 28, 1972. The Maoists hope to use this axis as a step on the way to world hegemony for China and the final eviction of the United States from Asia by artificially provoking conflicts between American and Japanese interests there and setting them both off against the peaceful policy of the USSR.

§ 5. SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

Chinese policy towards Japan in the years 1949-1957

In the period 1949-1957 the Chinese Government worked for the achievement of normal relations with Japan, relying extensively on the support of Japanese democratic forces, despite the policy of monopoly capital and Japanese-American reaction. Contacts were strengthened with the Japanese Communist and Socialist parties, the General Trade Union Council and other progressive organisations, which played an important role in promoting friendship between the two peoples.

Some forty different agreements to increase trade and cultural exchanges were signed between public organisations and private enterprises of the two countries, including three private trade agreements, in 1952, 1953 and 1955. Despite the fact that Japan zealously implemented the embargo on trade with China imposed by the USA, so that these agreements were only partially fulfilled, trade between the two countries increased significantly between 1952 and 1957. In 1956 Japan moved into first place among China's capitalist trade partners, with total trade between the two countries reaching 150 million dollars for the year.¹ The prospects seemed good for a further expansion of trade in 1957-1958.

However, even in these years certain elements of the future great-power platform of the Maoist leadership were already discernible in China's Japan policy. There was already a clear tendency in the Chinese Communist Party leadership to insist on the absolute value of China's revolutionary experience. The Chinese leaders made use of the sharp post-war contradictions to impose the strategy and tactics of armed struggle according to the Chinese model on the democratic forces in Asia, Japan included, without taking into consideration the special historical conditions in a particular country. The attempt to make China a model for Asian development was also an important component of China's policy towards Japan.

The formulae for Japan were presented in detail in *Jenmin jihpao*. "The history of the anti-Japanese struggle of the Chinese people" was declared to be an "inspiring example" for Japan, and an analogy was suggested not only between the alignment of class forces but in the actual forms and methods of struggle. Japan had the task of "creating an anti-American united patriotic national front", in which Japanese workers, farmers and the "national bourgeoisie, unrelated or little related to American imperialism" should unite to struggle against "the biggest enemies of the Japanese nation", the American imperialists, and their stooges among the "small numbers of Japanese comprador bourgeoisie and the reactionary groups that represent them in the political sphere". Japan, it was predicted, would take the same path

¹ *Tsukan Tokei*, 1967.

as China. Whatever the American imperialists and the Japanese monopolists faithful to them undertook in Japan, *Jenmin jihpao* wrote, it would be *merely a repetition* of what the Japanese aggressors, the American aggressors and Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang had done in China.¹

The US occupation authorities used the tactics of armed uprising and anti-American guerrilla activities in mountain areas, the setting up of supply bases, etc.,² as an excuse for launching extensive repressive measures against Japanese democratic forces, of which the Communists were the number one victims.

It must be noted that America's occupation policy towards Japan had an important influence in forming the views of the Chinese leaders. The US Government transformed the policy of the American occupation authorities from a combined international action by the allies who contributed to the defeat of Japan into an unlawful unilateral military occupation, subordinated to the aims and tasks of the United States' aggressive policy in the Far East. The Chinese leaders began to take an oversimplified view of Japan as a colony of US imperialism, placing it in the same category as the oppressed and dependent nations of Asia, for whom struggle for national liberation was the primary task.

**Peking strives to coax the Japanese ruling clique
on a nationalistic, racialist and anti-Soviet basis**

Peking's departure from the accepted principles of the international communist movement and its promotion of a "special" Chinese course at the end of the fifties, was clearly reflected in China's policy towards Japan. The Chinese leaders now devoted the main attention to the ruling clique in Japan, and attempts were made to achieve a rapprochement with them on a nationalistic, racialist and anti-Soviet basis. The distinctive features of the Maoists' "special course" as far as Japan was concerned were the abandoning of class positions in assessing events in Japan in favour of a highly

¹ *Jenmin jihpao*, July 7, 1950.

² See the letter from the CPSU Central Committee to the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party of April 18, 1964.

nationalistic platform, efforts to dictate to the democratic forces and impose the Chinese experience on them, and attempts to split them in the pursuit of China's own great-power ambitions where they resisted.

At the end of 1962, Chou En-lai invited two Japanese Liberal Democratic Party leaders to visit Peking, Matsumura and Takasaki, both of them known for their close ties with monopoly circles. During talks with them the Maoist leaders frankly expressed their desire to reach an understanding with the ruling clique in Japan on what was essentially a geopolitical basis. "It is often said that East is East and West is West," Chou En-lai said. "And we, as two Eastern powers, should go peacefully hand in hand from generation to generation on the basis of coexistence and coproduction."¹

As a result of the talks, Sino-Japanese relations, as Matsumura put it, were brought onto a "highway" of co-operation on the basis of cultural and racial community. "In numerous talks with us Premier Chou En-lai and his deputy Chen Yi declared that Asia is still Asia, and it is the Asians who are destined to change the history of the world. We should strengthen the bonds based on a common culture and racial unity in the closest interaction with one another."² Thus Matsumura described the essence of the understanding reached with Peking as a result of his talks with Chinese leaders.

These talks also opened the way for trade between China and Japanese big business on the basis of the long-term Takasaki-Liao Cheng-chih agreement. Sino-Japanese trade grew considerably in these years. By 1962 it was double the preceding year, at 84.5 million dollars, and it increased to 137 million dollars in 1963, 310.5 million in 1964 and 470 million in 1965. By the beginning of the "cultural revolution" Japan was already China's leading trade partner in the capitalist world.

In the process of Peking's reorientation towards the capitalist world, Japan was assigned the role of major eco-

¹ From Chou En-lai's speech at a reception in honour of Matsumura in Peking on September 19, 1962 (see: *Chuo Koron*, No. 11, 1962).

² *Collected Material on Sino-Japanese Relations*, Tokyo, 1967, p. 107 (in Japanese).

nomic and political partner. With the aid of a deal with Japanese monopoly capital, the Chinese leaders hoped to provide their great-power platform with a firm material, technical and military basis.

The Chinese leaders juggled with various theories as they pleased in order to justify their highly unprincipled policy of playing up to the Japanese monopoly bourgeoisie and give it revolutionary appearance. At the end of the fifties they turned to propagating their "intermediate zone" theory among the Japanese democratic forces, defining Japan's role and place as that of a country which had ceased to be imperialist, had lost its national independence and was in a position similar to that of the Afro-Asian countries waging a struggle for national liberation, and sharing their tasks. China's policy towards Japan essentially involved the Maoist principle of provoking national liberation struggle in countries of the "first intermediate zone", and the corresponding pattern of alignment of class forces was mechanically applied to Japan.

American imperialism now figured as the only enemy, and Peking preferred to remain silent on the question of the struggle of the Japanese democratic forces against their own monopoly bourgeoisie. The task placed before the Japanese democratic forces was to create a united patriotic anti-American front comprising all classes and social layers. The Maoist leaders began to ascribe the features of a national bourgeoisie to Japanese big capital, and place it in the one category with the working class and the peasants as a patriotic force oppressed by American imperialism. According to Mao Tse-tung's message to the Japanese people in January 1964, the working people and the capitalists in Japan, far from being opposed to one another at the given stage, participated as part of a "united popular front of all classes and strata" in the struggle against the most inveterate enemy of the Japanese nation, American imperialism.¹ The Chinese leaders included in this front, along with the monopoly bourgeoisie, the organs of coercion of the masses in the form of the self-defence force and the police.²

¹ See *Akahata*, January 30, 1964.

² Nakashima, *On Present-Day China*, Tokyo, 1964, p. 272 (in Japanese).

The slogan of struggle against American imperialism was used more and more demagogically by Peking to camouflage its attempts to make a deal with the Japanese ruling clique.

The Maoist leaders demonstrated their usefulness to the Japanese monopoly bourgeoisie by betraying the class interests of the Japanese working people and the interests of the developing countries of the Third World and by their willingness to ally with them on an anti-Soviet basis. In their efforts to please the Japanese ruling clique they even went as far as to sabotage a general strike in Japan, planned for April 17, 1964, and offered Japanese capitalism bright prospects for development in extensive areas of Asia, Africa and even Latin America on the condition of "understanding" and "co-operation" with China.¹ The efforts to reach an "understanding" with Japan on an anti-Soviet basis culminated in Mao Tse-tung's speech of July 13, 1964, in which he acted as spokesman for joint Chinese and Japanese territorial claims against the USSR.²

The Chinese leaders' policy towards Japan during the "cultural revolution" (1966-1969)

The influence of the "cultural revolution" with its ultra-Left phraseology on relations with Japan heralded in practical terms an intensification of the assault on the progressive forces. In 1966-1969 China greatly stepped up not only the basic anti-Soviet aspect of her Japan policy. After the failure of Mao's attempts to take control of the Japanese Communist Party and forcibly introduce the theory of an "anti-American, anti-Soviet united front", the theory of "violent revolution only" and the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" as a guide to action³ the Japanese Communists became the main target of fierce attacks, political struggle and subversive activities by Peking.

The Maoists began to insist on the democratic forces in Japan adopting their new "revolutionary" thesis of struggle

¹ See, for example, Chen Yi's statement to Tokuma Utsunomiya, *Asahi Shimbun*, January 18, 1965.

² See *Pravda*, September 2, 1964.

³ See *Akahata*, July 17, 1967; October 10, 1967.

against the "four enemies", which along with US imperialism and Japanese reaction now came to include the Soviet Union and the Japanese Communist Party, declared "enemies" of the Japanese and Chinese peoples, the peoples of Asia and the whole world.

The result of Peking's "revolutionary" activity in Japan during the "cultural revolution" was the fragmentation of the democratic forces in Japan, seriously weakening the various factions, which naturally strengthened the power of the conservative camp in the country. It would be hard to overestimate the importance of this service to the Japanese ruling clique at a time when the Japanese-American security treaty was about to lapse (July 1970) and a fierce struggle raged between reactionary and progressive forces over the question of its renewal.

Apart from concentrating on attacking the Japanese Communist Party and trying to replace it with a "Left-wing" communist organisation obedient to Peking, and endeavouring to rouse anti-Soviet feeling and provoke anti-Soviet activities in Japan, the Maoist leaders did not alter China's "flexible" approach to the Japanese ruling clique, despite the fact that the Sato Government had not responded to Peking's far-reaching proposals.

The Peking propaganda racket against the Sato Government and Japanese militarism increased noticeably after the Sato-Nixon joint communiqué of November 1969, and served as a smoke screen to conceal the rapprochement with Japan's ruling circles on a nationalistic, racialist, anti-Soviet basis. Ties were strengthened with the so-called pro-China opposition in the Liberal Democratic Party, which reflected the growing desire of Japanese monopoly capital to be guided primarily by its own imperialist interests, and pay less attention to the United States. Peking cultivated such ties with a view to preparing forces which, it was hoped, would replace Sato and adopt a "flexible" policy over the China issue. To this end the Maoist leaders began using all kinds of demagogic, portraying these influential representatives of monopoly capital as a progressive, anti-imperialist force, an understanding with whom would be tantamount to uniting the Asian peoples against American and Japanese reaction.

**The restoration of diplomatic relations
between China and Japan and Peking's intentions**

After Peking had made it quite clear that China was intent on a rapprochement with the USA, relations with Japan continued to occupy a major place in Chinese foreign policy. Although the Sino-American rapprochement that was under way had clearly anti-Japanese implications, the Maoists lost no time in taking advantage of the long-awaited cabinet change in Japan when Tanaka's cabinet came to power. A joint statement on the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Japan was signed in Peking on September 29, 1972, in an atmosphere of stressed cordiality.

The joint statement demonstrated Peking's remarkable "flexibility" in interpreting its own "immutable" principles. It was well known that the Chinese leaders had for a long time been demanding of various political forces in Japan the recognition of the so-called three principles for a normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations. First, that the Government of the People's Republic of China was the only lawful Chinese Government, second, that Taiwan was an inalienable part of China, and third, that the Japanese-Taiwanese "peace treaty" of 1952 was unlawful and should be annulled. The same unequivocal and timely recognition of the three principles was demanded of the Japanese Government, too. In practice, however, the Chinese leaders turned out to be far more compliant. The joint statement did not contain a clear and unambiguous statement of the second principle, and completely passed over the third. By not insisting on a clear declaration by Japan in an official document denouncing the treaty with Taiwan and being satisfied with its "automatic" elimination, Peking was showing its willingness to help Tanaka avoid discussion of the matter in the Japanese parliament. Parliament would no doubt have approved of this step by the Government despite opposition from the pro-Taiwan lobby, but in that case it could hardly have avoided raising the question of relations with the USA, the question of the "defence treaty", which both Tanaka and the Chinese leaders were anxious to avoid.

The facts show that Peking is no longer interested in

fanning Japanese passions over the "defence treaty", and indeed the Maoists' attitude to the treaty has changed considerably. Yet for almost twenty years hardly a single Chinese publication concerning Japan had failed to harshly criticise the alliance and demand its discontinuation. At the same time Chou En-lai stressed Peking's anti-Soviet policy, assuring Prime Minister Tanaka that the Sino-Soviet treaty was purely nominal.

China's renunciation of reparations in the joint statement is doubtless to be regarded as a token of China's desire for very special relations with Japan, to clear the way for far-ranging economic co-operation with her. There is considerable practical evidence to show that in devoting increasing attention to the military-economic means to ensure the achievement of their great-power aims, the Chinese leaders are counting more and more on Japan as a major factor to help speed up China's economic development. They have undoubtedly been impressed by the fact that while they have been busily engaged in various political campaigns Japan has transformed herself into the world's third industrial power and reached a level of economic development that might well jeopardise all their political ambitions in Asia. The Chinese gesture over reparations is intended to encourage a generous response from Japan in the form of large deliveries on favourable terms of complete plant (especially for electronics, engineering and petrochemicals), technical assistance with opening factories, and developing mining and oil production.

Sino-Japanese trade, after a slight decline in 1967 and 1968 due to economic dislocation in China caused by the "cultural revolution", began to pick up again. In 1969 it amounted to 625 million dollars, and reached 825 million in 1970, 900 million in 1971, passing the 1,000 million mark in 1972.

Everything would seem to indicate that the Maoists have been pressing for the development of economic, scientific and technological ties with Japan, and purchases of complete industrial plant from her.

An extremely eloquent statement by Chou En-lai gave some idea of the "key" in which the Maoist leaders intend to present their new round of attempts to achieve a

rapprochement with Japan, provided the ruling circles in Japan showed sufficient "sympathy" for Peking's far-reaching ambitions. At a reception given in honour of a Yemeni delegation, Chou En-lai felt it was necessary to make some reference to the forming of a new government in Japan which had announced its intention to normalise relations with China, and spoke of it as one of the international events which he felt showed the irresistible struggle of the peoples of various countries "against the control and interference of the superpowers".

§ 6. CHINA AND WESTERN EUROPE

China's economic ties with West European countries prior to 1969

China first showed an interest in a dialogue with the West European countries in the first half of the sixties, at the time when, having failed to gain the support of the socialist countries in their bid for leadership of the socialist camp, the Chinese leaders embarked on extensive anti-Soviet activities. It was at this time that China began to make energetic efforts to develop trade and economic ties with Western Europe, regarding this as a means of preparing for political contacts. In 1963, a Chinese Government delegation led by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Lu Hsü-chang visited Britain, West Germany, France, Holland and Switzerland, and concluded a number of trade agreements and made several far-reaching promises for the future. Later, China exchanged "liaison offices" with Italy and Austria. Chinese foreign trade organisations placed large orders for complete plant and industrial raw materials with West European firms, making every effort to interest West European industrial and business circles in the Chinese market. China's trade with Western Europe more than doubled in the five years 1963-1967, reaching 900 million dollars.¹

However considerable the growth in trade with Western Europe, it was not significant enough to ensure the establish-

¹ See Jerome Alan Cohen, Robert F. Dernberger, John R. Garson, *China Trade Prospects and U.S. Policy*, New York, 1971, pp. 301-02.

ment of diplomatic and political relations. Clear evidence of this was the absence of diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, despite the fact that she had become China's chief West European trading partner. It was quite clear that the USA was exerting considerable influence on the position of the FRG and several other West European countries over the question of recognising China. Western imperialist circles were awaiting for convincing proof of China's anti-Soviet stand.

The development of China's policy towards Western Europe since 1969

After the Ninth Party Congress in 1969, Peking began to attach greater importance to both trading and political partnership with Western Europe. To suit their own interests and scheme of things the Maoists once more began to insist on the idea that the West European capitalist countries belonged to the "second intermediate zone", now declared to be "a force in the struggle against one or two of the superpowers".¹ In this artificial Maoist scheme of things, reflecting the total rejection by the Chinese leaders of a class analysis of the international alignment of forces, Western Europe was ascribed the role of tactical ally in a struggle on two fronts—primarily with the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community, and also with the USA—to pressure the latter into accepting a settlement of Sino-American relations in the interest of Peking.

China's current West European policy has largely taken shape in the last three years. The aims, priorities and tactics used to achieve them developed under the influence of major changes in the situation in Europe, above all the move towards international détente and the increasing economic integration of Western Europe.

In view of the measure of détente achieved in Europe thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the Chinese leadership has tried to achieve a normalisation of relations with the West European countries as quickly as possible. China was recognised by Italy in 1970,

¹ *Hungchi*, No. 11, 1972.

by Austria, Belgium, Iceland and San Marino in 1971, and the FRG, Malta and Luxemburg in 1972. Also in 1972, Britain and the Netherlands exchanged ambassadors with China.¹ Thus, in three years China had exchanged ambassadors with eleven West European countries, as compared with five throughout the fifties,² and only one, France, in the sixties. The campaign for diplomatic recognition of China was thus nearing completion. Only two West European countries remained in 1973 that had not established diplomatic relations with China—Portugal and Ireland.

Parallel with the campaign to achieve official diplomatic recognition, Peking took several steps to establish more extensive political ties with the European capitalist countries. A whole series of mutual visits by statesmen and politicians have taken place or are planned. Suffice it to note that only recently the foreign ministers of the FRG, Britain, France and Italy have all visited Peking on the invitation of the Chinese Government, for the first time since the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic. In 1972, the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister, Chiao Kuan-hua, visited London and Paris. In 1973, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chi Peng-fei, travelled to Britain and France. At the invitation of the Chinese Government, the President of France, Georges Pompidou, paid a visit to Peking, and a visit to China by the then British Prime Minister, Edward Heath, was planned for the beginning of 1974.

Equally significant in terms of development of political contacts between China and Western Europe is the actual programme of talks between the Chinese leaders and West European politicians and statesmen, which includes a wide range of international problems, from East-West relations to various regional questions and bilateral relations.

Peking's view of the basic questions of a détente in Europe

While stepping up political ties with the West European countries, Peking has taken a negative attitude from the start to questions of preserving peace and the creation of a

¹ Between 1954 and 1972, Britain and the Netherlands had relations with China at the level of charges d'affaires.

² Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Norway and Denmark.

system of collective security and reduction of tension in Europe. The Chinese leaders have entirely renounced their former support for the idea of collective security,¹ and have attacked the programme for European security proposed by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The Chinese press assessed this initiative as an attempt to "forge a counter-revolutionary Holy Alliance, crush the revolutionary movement in Europe and stabilise order in the capitalist world".² The proposal by the socialist countries for an all-European conference on security and co-operation produced similar reactions. This conference was described as a "conference on non-security".³

Since this negative assessment found no support with West European governments, and especially with the public, Peking has latterly ceased its open criticism of the actual idea of the conference, which is popular in Europe, and has altered its tactics, concentrating its main propaganda drive on the difficulties of organising and holding such a conference and insisting on its "futility". Particularly significant in this respect were the comments in the Chinese press during the multilateral consultations and the first stage of the conference in Helsinki, and also the second stage—in Geneva.⁴ At the same time, trying to disrupt the conference, Peking did everything possible to convince the governments and the public in Western Europe of the "intractability" of the Soviet Union in negotiations and her "aggressive" ambitions. This, in particular, was the key-note Chou En-lai, Chi Peng-fei and other Chinese statesmen struck in their talks with West European foreign ministers in Peking in 1972. They even went as far as to offer risible advice to Western Europe to follow the example of China in building underground shelters, as Kuo Mo-jo did in a conversation with a French delegation led by the Mayor of Marseilles, Deferre.⁵ He also

¹ Chou En-lai, *Report on the Government's Work at the First Session of the National People's Congress, of the Second Convocation, September 18, 1959*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1959, p. 73.

² *Jenmin jihpao*, September 11, 1969.

³ *Jenmin jihpao*, October 5, 1972.

⁴ *Jenmin jihpao*, July 14, 1973; September 4, 1973.

⁵ *France Presse*, December 8, 1972.

warned the French of the danger of "Finlandisation" by the Soviet Union. The fanciful inventions about "Finlandisation" are intended to undermine the due respect for Finland's peaceful, independent policy in Europe, and to discredit the equal mutually advantageous nature of relations between countries with different social systems that can well serve as a model for co-operation on a continental scale.

Nor does China refrain from attempts to fan feelings over the territorial problems of post-war Europe and trying to encourage the West European countries to review the existing territorial and political realities. Mao Tse-tung spoke of the need to revise Europe's post-war frontiers back in 1964,¹ and the Maoists still hold the same attitude to this fundamental problem of a peaceful settlement in Europe. Peking was hostile to the treaties between the FRG and the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia which confirmed the inviolability of the western border of Poland and the frontiers between the GDR and the FRG.² Equally, the Chinese leaders are also inconvenienced by the conclusion of the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin.

Peking's negative stand on the question of troop and arms reductions in Europe

The Chinese leaders gave a hostile reception to the proposal of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries for troop and arms reductions in Central Europe. They were worried that the achievement of this might lead to an easing of tension in the confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries. In order to detract from the importance of the peace initiative taken by the Soviet Government, and provoke suspicion towards it in the West, the thesis was launched that it was simply an opportunist move by the Soviet Union, designed to free some of its armed forces in the West to transfer them to the Sino-Soviet border. This fabrication was subsequently seized upon by reaction-

¹ *International Affairs*, Moscow, No. 2, 1972.

² *Jenmin jihpao*, September 13, 1970.

ary, pro-imperialist propaganda. Peking, in turn, advertises the view of NATO strategists that the Warsaw Treaty countries represent a growing threat to Western Europe.

All criticism of the aggressive nature of the NATO bloc has long since disappeared from the Chinese press. Quite recently, Chou En-lai, in a talk with S. Sulzberger, an observer from *The New York Times*, admitted that if he had previously been opposed to NATO, he was now in favour of strengthening this military organisation. The Chinese leaders are quite happy to see the arms race continue, and troop numbers maintained at their present level in Central Europe, including American troops, since both help preserve the division of the continent.

Peking's attitude to the problems of security and disarmament in Europe suits the interests of reactionary imperialist forces in the West perfectly. Franz J. Strauss, the leader of the West German revanchists, declared as early as in 1968 in the newspaper *Bayern-Kurier* that the views of the Right wing of the Christian Democrats on many major world problems coincide with those of Peking even more than with those of Germany's NATO allies.

**Peking's flirtation with
the West German "ultras"**

Revanchist circles in the FRG were delighted at Peking's hostile reaction to events connected with a détente in Europe, such as the signing of the treaties between West Germany and the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia, the talks and agreements between the GDR, the FRG and West Berlin, and the preparations for talks on collective security and troop reductions. The evolution of China's policy on the German question suits the West German revanchists to a T.

The affinity between the policy of the Chinese leaders and the revanchist ambitions of the West German "ultras", based on common interests, produced a mutual desire for political contacts. Such contacts were established back in the mid-sixties with the leadership of the Right-wing parties, the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union,

which were then in power. The anti-communism of the governments of Adenauer and his successors, with their anti-Soviet policy, impressed Peking, which was not averse to establishing relations with the FRG. However, official circles in Bonn, heeding advice from the other side of the Atlantic, decided not to hurry the matter of recognising China. Imperialist circles in the West were still not sure how far the Chinese leaders were prepared to go in widening the split with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. After 1969, when the Maoists provided clear evidence that their policy was firmly anti-Soviet by the provocation of incidents on the Sino-Soviet border the last remaining obstacles to a development of contacts between the Bonn "ultras" and the Peking leaders were removed. In 1972, Hans Schroeder, one of the most energetic CDU leaders, was invited to Peking. The fact that it was he who was invited, and also the reception given him by Chou En-lai and other Chinese leaders, showed towards what forces the Maoists are gravitating in their policy towards the FRG. This was undoubtedly to some extent a challenge to the Brandt-Scheel Government and its realistic course with regard to settling a number of European problems.

**Peking and the policy of the British
Conservatives**

The growing contacts between Peking and London over the last few years testify to the fact that in the policy of the British Conservatives, the leaders of the People's Republic of China saw a whole series of aspects which could be used to delay the process of détente in Europe.

After diplomatic relations were fully established in 1972, Peking began a whole round of talks with the Tory Government on a wide range of European and world questions.

According to the British press, the talks showed that the Chinese particularly appreciated the Conservatives' policy, and particularly their efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union from "positions of strength". Peking also found to its liking the spirit of "scepticism" with which the British Government regarded the proposed conferences on security

and troop reductions. In this light, it is clear what the Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei meant when he expressed the wish that Britain should play a greater role in Europe.

For their part, the British Conservatives, in calling on the West European countries to make use of the Chinese factor in their relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community, make no secret of the fact that their interest in developing contacts with Peking is dictated by their desire to keep the British crown colony of Hong Kong and preserve their influence in South-East Asia.

Encountering new difficulties as a result of the reduction of tension in Europe, the Chinese leaders are no longer content with cultivating ties with the most reactionary, Right-wing forces in the FRG and Britain and other West European countries in conducting their splitting policy. As was shown by the visit to Paris of Chi Peng-fei, the Chinese leadership had not given up hope of weakening Franco-Soviet co-operation, or of using France's influence, and especially her foreign policy course, for solving its own problems in Europe. Persistent efforts are also known to have been made by Chinese diplomats to influence France's approach to the conference on security and co-operation. It is typical that such attempts, undertaken, for instance, during the visit to China by French President Georges Pompidou in September 1973, were not successful. In a joint Franco-Chinese communiqué, it was made clear that France is pursuing in Europe a "policy of détente, concord and co-operation with all the peoples on that continent".¹

Peking and the EEC

Peking regards the process of economic integration of Western Europe as an alternative to pan-European economic co-operation and an improvement in East-West relations, and this is what determines Chinese policy towards the EEC.

¹ *Jenmin jihpao*, September 18, 1973.

The Chinese leaders have completely revised their attitude to the Common Market expressed in the fifties and the early sixties,⁴ and now stress that "the development and enlargement of this economic community reflects the tendency of the countries of Western Europe to strengthen unity to protect their interests".² They are quite unconcerned by the fact that the EEC is a state-monopoly association, participating in the struggle for the re-division of the world capitalist market and defending the interests of the world capitalist system as a whole. Deliberately closing their eyes to the true nature of the community, Chinese "theoreticians" try to present it as a union of West European countries to oppose "the hegemony of the two superpowers".³

Peking welcomed Britain's entry into the Common Market⁴ and also the agreement on a Free Trade Area between the EEC and EFTA.⁵ But it would like to see more than economic integration. As Chou En-lai told the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Medici, while the latter was on a visit to Peking in January 1973, integration should extend to the spheres of politics and defence.

China's interest in the Common Market is also dictated by her plans to draw extensively on West European technology and science to develop her own industrial base and military industry. According to reports in the West European press, China is sounding out the possibilities of establishing economic and diplomatic ties with the EEC.

One-seventh of China's foreign trade over the last few years has been with the EEC. With the entry of Britain and other EFTA countries to the EEC, the latter's trade with China is to increase by 50 per cent. It is significant that China has greatly activised her trade relations with the EEC countries recently. There has been a sharp increase in the

¹ At that time the Chinese press stated that the establishment of the Common Market created obstacles for all-European co-operation and would result in the "deeper division" of Europe. (*Kwangming jihpao*, March 18, 1957, quoted in *International Affairs*, Moscow, No. 3, March 1972, p. 19.)

² *Jenmin jihpao*, January 5, 1973.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

number of Chinese trade delegations, which in 1971-1972 visited France, Italy, the FRG and Britain, and likewise in trade delegations from these countries visiting Peking. An extensive programme of West European trade exhibitions in China has been planned and is under way. Important trade treaties have been signed with the FRG and Italy. After a long lapse due to the "cultural revolution" Chinese foreign trade companies have begun talks on the purchase of complete plant from Western Europe. A number of important contracts have already been signed with firms in France, the FRG, Italy, Britain and other countries for the delivery of transportation equipment, and generating and petrochemical plant and machinery. Talks have begun with leading airlines of the EEC and EFTA countries for opening regular services to China.

Economic interests are an important, but not decisive, reason for Peking's desire to develop contacts with the EEC. The Chinese leaders are already counting on the fact that economic integration will entail a political and military union of the West European countries, and are making plans to establish political and diplomatic relations with the world's "third power" in order to make use of it to further their own ambitions for world hegemony.

Clearly, the Chinese leaders are encouraging the West European countries in the creation of a "United States of Europe" above all because they see it as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union and the socialist community. For them, as for reactionary conservative circles in Western Europe, the idea of a West European political union is a useful counter to the idea of creating a system of collective security in Europe.

**The basic conclusions to be drawn
from Peking's policy towards Western Europe**

The Peking leadership can be seen to hold an attitude of unmitigated "pessimism" and often outright hostility to almost all questions concerning a détente in Europe, the strengthening of collective security, troop reductions and the development of economic co-operation on the continent. This attitude is becoming more and more evident.

It is not so difficult to correctly diagnose the "pessimism" of the Peking leaders with regard to major international problems. The French newspaper *Tribune des Nations* was very close to the mark when in December 1972 it expressed concern over "whether the Chinese might not be using their partners to become a greater power, deliberately painting a gloomy picture of the world".

The policy of encouraging division and rivalry that Peking has been pursuing in Europe represents a serious threat both to the European nations and to China herself. It essentially conflicts with the interests of wide sections of the population of the West European countries, who hope for a development of security and international co-operation. Such a policy is also a danger to the Chinese people, for it could easily boomerang against its authors, the Maoist leaders.

CHINA AND QUESTIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITYPeking's attitude to questions of
security in Asia at the present stage

The problem of ensuring stable peace and security in Asia, where war and conflict has gone on continuously since the Second World War, is of the utmost importance and urgency. The struggle against the imperialist policy of "bloc-formation" assumes a special importance in this part of the world. It is necessary to overcome the division that this policy leads to and campaign for the development of relations based on mutual understanding, co-operation and peace throughout the continent.

The Soviet proposal for a collective security system in Asia is intended to solve these difficult tasks. "The burning issues of today," said Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, "do not blind us to the more long-term tasks, namely, the establishment of a system of collective security in those parts of the world where the threat of a new world war and military conflicts is concentrated. Such a system is the best substitute for the existing military-political blocs. . . . We believe that the course events are taking places the creation of a collective security system in Asia on the agenda."¹

The Soviet initiative was met with interest in Asia. However, Peking's reaction was sharply negative. The Chinese leaders regarded the Soviet proposal as no more no less than "an attempt by the USSR to achieve the imperialist encirclement of China and create an anti-Chinese

¹ International Meeting of Communist and Worker's Parties, Moscow, 1969, p. 91 (in Russian).

grouping". "The purpose of this proposal," Chou En-lai declared, "is to promote the accomplishment of the USSR's aggressive, annexationist designs towards China."¹

That these wild assertions are totally unfounded is quite evident if only in view of the fact that China, along with all the other Asian countries, was invited to take part in creating the system of collective security on the basis of the principles of "renunciation of the use of force in inter-state relations, respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, and extension of economic and other forms of co-operation based on complete equality and mutual advantage".² It is surely beyond dispute that these principles, underlying the foreign policy of the USSR, correspond to the fundamental interests of all nations that genuinely desire peace and co-operation.

The point is that these principles no longer suited the Chinese leaders, since they conflicted with their designs for hegemony. It is significant that at the time when the Chinese Government was adopting an internationalist stand and supporting peace in Asia not only in word but in deed, its attitude to the creation of an Asian collective security system was quite different. In 1957 a joint Sino-Soviet communiqué was signed in Peking which condemned the imperialist policy of "bloc-formation". It contained this statement: "The two sides consider that exclusive military groupings should be replaced by a system of collective peace and security."³

Now Peking has changed its attitude to this matter since its policy has radically altered and no longer serves the interests of peace and security but quite contrary aims. For this reason, in 1971 the Maoist leaders turned down Soviet proposals for a non-aggression treaty and rejected many other Soviet peace initiatives intended to improve relations between the two countries. They have continued to foment a war psychosis in the country with the myth of "the threat of Soviet invasion".

¹ *Jenmin jihpao*, March 26, 1969.

² L. I. Brezhnev's speech at the Fifteenth Soviet Trade Union Congress. (See: *Pravda*, March 21, 1973.)

³ *Problems of the Far East*, No. 1, 1973, p. 15.

This policy of creating all kinds of obstacles to a normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and to a settlement in Asia was also reflected in Peking's reluctance to co-operate in the creation of a collective security system. It was accompanied by persistent efforts by the Maoist leaders to come to terms with the most reactionary circles in the imperialist countries, with which links and contacts were being established, and demagogical attempts to "soothe" the developing countries and disperse the anxiety caused by Peking's crude interference in their internal affairs during the years of the "cultural revolution" and by the adventurism and pragmatism of their foreign policy.

At the beginning of the seventies Peking ceased criticising the imperialist "bloc-formation" policy. China let it be known that she was in favour of a continued American military presence in Asia and the renewal of the Japanese-American "security treaty", and accepted the intensive rearmament of Japan, which she had only recently opposed. Clearly, this "volte-face" in Maoist foreign policy, ignoring the vital interests of the Asian nations, was by no means dictated by concern for their security. Peking's "peace" assurances really had nothing to do with peace or security in Asia, any more than its former demagogic "anti-imperialist" policy ("at bayonet point") had anything to do with genuine struggle against imperialism. The Maoists were simply changing their tactics. Their chief strategic aim—struggle for "spheres of influence" in Asia and the eventual establishment of Chinese hegemony there—remained unchanged. The point was that the threats and crude interference in the internal affairs of her neighbours that China had resorted to in the sixties had not brought the expected results. It had simply increased China's isolation by providing numerous stimuli to the "bloc-formation" policy, which was largely oriented against China.

With their change of tactics the Peking leaders hope to achieve the same ends by means of "peaceful infiltration" of the Asian countries, taking advantage of China's favourable geographical position and long-standing trading, cultural and other ties, and also the support of the millions of overseas Chinese who have a great influence on the econo-

my and political life of these countries. Anti-Sovietism and flirtation with the imperialist powers are intended to help secure the support of the most reactionary circles in these countries while the "soft line" policy and demagogical appeals for "peaceful coexistence" have the purpose of "softening up" the Asian nations, and reducing their suspicions with regard to Peking's carefully camouflaged plans for hegemony.

In pursuance of this "flexible tactic", Peking announced support for the neutral tendencies which have become widespread in Asia recently. The Peking leaders claim to express and defend the interests of the Third World countries in the UN, and at international conferences and congresses. In 1971 Peking called upon the overseas Chinese "not to regard China as their homeland, but to consider themselves citizens of their country of residence", while at the same time continuing to spread Maoist views among them.

However, all these and other steps taken by the Chinese leadership, reflecting its "new approach" to the problems of Asia, were very often purely demonstrative and intended to serve the far from peaceful aims and aspirations of the Maoists.

It is characteristic that while speaking of "peaceful coexistence" Peking has by no means ceased its interference in the internal affairs of Asian countries, and continues to give support (now covertly) to anti-government Maoist forces (in the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Burma, Singapore, India and Bangladesh). Special emissaries were sent to several of these countries in 1971 with the mission of explaining to the local Maoists the new factors in Sino-American relations, and assuring them that the thaw in relations between China and the USA according to dual revolutionary tactics did not in any way mean a slackening of Chinese support for "revolutionary movements".¹ *Christian Science Monitor* wrote that essentially nothing had changed: Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Burma were grappling with guerrilla activities incited by Peking; India was worried by Peking's support for the Naga and Muso tribesmen, and its policy over Bangladesh; in Indonesia Peking

¹ See *Newsweek*, May 1971.

was encouraging forces of unrest; throughout Asia it was making use of local Chinese residents for the furtherance of its policy.¹

China's activity in the UN

This two-faced policy has had its logical continuation in Peking's approach to such vital current issues as ensuring international security and disarmament and in its activity in the UN.

Clearly a country's approach to these matters, to the need to remove the threat of nuclear war, is the chief touchstone of any declarations its leaders may make in favour of peace and security. Only fanatics who are out of their minds can support the continuation of the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, which could plunge mankind into total catastrophe. The demand for averting such a catastrophe unites all states and nations, the whole of mankind. An awareness of the need to achieve this goal by banning nuclear arms and pursuing disarmament is the only basis for building inter-state relations on principles of peace and peaceful coexistence.

However, this is not the view of the Maoist leadership in China. The Soviet proposal at the Twenty-Sixth session of the UN General Assembly in 1971 for a world disarmament conference at which all countries could discuss and take measures on major aspects of disarmament (above all nuclear) was received with understanding and approval by the great majority of member-states. The Chinese delegation, however, was opposed to it.² The head of the Chinese delegation, Chiao Kuan-hua, said: "It would be best not to hold such a conference," and claimed that China was obliged to continue developing nuclear weapons since she stood "under a nuclear threat". It is significant that when China firmly rejected an earlier Soviet proposal for a conference of the five nuclear powers (the USSR, the USA, Britain, France and China) to examine questions of nuclear disarmament, she insisted that such matters should be discussed at a world conference attended by all the countries concerned.

¹ *Christian Science Monitor*, March 16, 1972.

² HAIB, No. 3986, November 30, 1971, pp. 14-15.

The Chinese took an even more obstructive stand on the resolution (also approved by the majority of members) calling for an end to all nuclear testing and a ban on setting up nuclear devices in outer space or on the floor of the seas and oceans. The Chinese delegation also refused to support the UN resolution calling upon all countries to take further effective measures to implement the Declaration on strengthening peace and international security (passed in 1970 at the Twenty-Fifth session of the General Assembly on the initiative of the Soviet Union). Against the will of the majority, the Chinese condemned the measures designed to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict and tried to sabotage Resolution No. 242 of November 22, 1967, providing for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories.

The stand taken by the Chinese representatives in the UN produced strong criticism in many countries. But their activity at the next session of the General Assembly, the Twenty-Seventh, in the autumn of 1972, gave even more cause for concern and indignation, revealing as it did the noxious nature of the policy of China's Maoist leaders.

During the debate on the important resolution in which the General Assembly in the name of the member-states according to the UN Charter announced the renunciation of force or the threat of force in all forms in international relations and an all-time ban on the use of nuclear weapons, the Chinese delegation declared that China firmly opposed this resolution. "To campaign for the renunciation of force in international relations indiscriminately, unconditionally and categorically, means in practice to demand that the peoples of various countries renounce armed struggle," said Chiao Kuan-hua. "China supports armed struggle."¹ "The Soviet proposal is unacceptable for China," the Hsinhua Agency wrote, "since she is developing nuclear weapons exclusively for defence."²

The document proposed by the Soviet Union was approved by the great majority of countries. But the Chinese represen-

¹ HAIB, No. 4289, November 16, 1972, p. 7; No. 4303, December 2, 1972, p. 16.

² HAIB, No. 4294, November 22, 1972, p. 5.

tatives (together with the South African racialists and the Portuguese fascists) opposed it, rejecting all practical measures designed to affirm the principle of renunciation of force.

The Chinese representatives motivated their opposition to the Soviet proposal with a number of slanderous charges against the Soviet Union, maintaining that the USSR "threatens" China. But as Leonid Brezhnev noted in his report on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the USSR, "If these statements are not hypocritical, it is impossible to understand why in this case China has not replied to our proposal, repeatedly made since 1969, to assume clear, firm and permanent commitments ruling out an attack by one country on the other. If Peking is really concerned about China's security, why has not the PRC leadership agreed to conclude a special treaty renouncing the use of force, the draft of which was submitted to the Chinese side on January 15, 1971? The draft of this treaty stated unequivocally that the sides... 'shall not use against each other armed forces employing any type of arms, including: (a) conventional, (b) missile, or (c) nuclear'."¹

The Chinese delegation took an equally negative stand when the General Assembly came to discuss the question of practical preparations for calling a world disarmament conference. The Hsinhua Agency wrote, in an attempt to justify the Chinese stand: "Since when has disarmament, replacing the struggle of the peoples, become a factor determining historical development and guaranteeing international security? A world disarmament conference would do more harm than good."²

In full accordance with this standpoint, dictated by anything but concern for "peaceful coexistence" and the security of the Third World countries, the deputy head of the Chinese delegation, Huang Hua, spoke in the first committee against the resolution on banning chemical and bacteriological weapons, declaring it to be a "product manufactured by one or two 'superpowers' after many years of horse trading

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, Moscow, 1972, pp. 46-47.

² *Hsinhua*, November 8, 1972.

behind the scenes".¹ Another Chinese delegate, speaking at the plenary session of the General Assembly, described the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (which has already been signed by over a hundred states) as "a big hoax cooked up jointly by the USA and the USSR". "The Government and people of China," he said, "firmly oppose this treaty."² The head of the delegation, Chiao Kuan-hua, sharply criticised all who objected to "the further development of nuclear weapons by countries with a very small stock of nuclear weapons or none at all".³

At the Twenty-Seventh General Assembly session the Chinese delegation once more rejected all the constructive proposals made and implicitly called for a renewal of military actions in the Middle East. The speech of the leader of the Chinese delegation at the plenary session was full of slanderous charges against the USSR. "Puny Israel only dares to behave so rashly because it enjoys the support of the two 'superpowers'."⁴ Huang Hua said. This kind of charge is patently absurd, for the whole world knows that the Soviet Union has always adopted a highly principled stand of condemnation of the Israeli aggressor and has offered all-round practical support, including military assistance, to the Arab countries in their just struggle.

At the Twenty-Seventh session China made more fierce attacks on the young republic of Bangladesh (which Peking refused to recognise), obstructing her admission to the UN.

Thus, from the moment China joined the UN, the Maoists' activities in the Organisation have been distinctly negative, which inevitably resulted in the isolation of China at both the General Assembly meetings at which she was represented.

Both developed and developing countries took note of the fact that Peking stubbornly refuses to assume any obligations that would check its all-out militarisation of China and in any way restrain the Maoist pursuit of hegemony. Thus, China is not a party to any of the international agreements limiting the arms race of the last few years (the treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water or in

¹ *Jenmin jihpao*, November 23, 1972.

² *Jenmin jihpao*, October 5 and November 23, 1972.

³ HAIB, No. 4294, November 22, 1972.

⁴ HAIB, No. 4308, December 8, 1972, p. 9.

outer space, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the ban on setting up nuclear devices on the floor of the seas and oceans or in outer space, the total ban on bacteriological weapons, toxins, etc.). There is no indication that China intends to alter her negative attitude to these international agreements, which serve as a serious obstacle to the militarists and warmongers.

CONCLUSION

Peking's policy since the Ninth Party Congress, despite the "soft" appearance the Maoists have tried to lend it, has continued to serve the same aggressive aims which were announced at the beginning of the sixties and received such vivid expression during the "cultural revolution". It is therefore no accident that many statements by the Maoist leaders during the last few years, like the statements of Chinese representatives in the UN, expressed the idea that war is inevitable and that it is a constant factor, while the reduction of tension is a temporary, transient phenomenon. This is no doubt the reason why Mao's strategy of "preparing for war and natural disasters" has been promoted again recently and the Chinese press has appealed to "dig the trenches deeper".

This dangerous policy is confirmed by the practical actions of the present Chinese leadership, its attempts to aggravate existing difficulties and create new ones in the path of normalisation of the situation in the Indian subcontinent, Indochina and the Middle East, in the solution of urgent international problems, by its hostile policy towards the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. Even in Europe Peking is trying to sow the seeds of strife and distrust, attempting to torpedo the efforts of the governments and broad sections of the public to normalise the situation there by creating a firm collective system of peace and security.

The Chinese leaders' attitude to General Secretary Brezhnev's visit to the United States in June 1973, his talks with President Nixon and the important agreements which were signed was highly characteristic and predictable. The results of these talks were met with approval everywhere. Yet Peking did, and continues to do, everything in its power to prevent the implementation of the principles of peaceful

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coexistence, to discredit Soviet foreign policy and arouse wherever possible mistrust and suspicion over the talks and agreements. At the time the Peking propaganda machine was working all out to spread the myth that the talks represented a "new partition of the world between the superpowers", trying to convince a number of other countries, and especially Third World countries, that this was the case. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Chi Peng-fei, made a special visit to Britain, France, Iran and Pakistan to "alert" the governments of these countries to the danger of the "spectre of hegemony and domination of the superpowers", which was "still haunting the international arena". The results of this trip were, as we know, modest.

Peking was particularly incensed by the historic agreement to prevent nuclear war signed by Leonid Brezhnev and President Nixon on June 22, 1973. As we have seen, the principles underlying the agreement do not suit the Maoists with their feverish attempts to increase China's nuclear capacity.

In hatching its plans for an expansionist policy towards the neighbouring Asian countries, Peking is trying at this stage to find a "common language" with the USA on an anti-Soviet basis. In November 1973, while US State Secretary Henry Kissinger was on a visit to the People's Republic of China, the Chinese leaders, during their talks with him, again appealed for Washington's "co-operation", insisting that the USA should not withdraw from Asia too quickly, claiming that this might create a "dangerous vacuum" for what the Maoists imagine to be "Soviet expansion" in that region.

At the same time, Peking continued its bitter attacks on the Soviet Union and other peace-loving states which were making positive efforts with a view to the relaxation of international tension. In autumn 1973, at the Twenty-Eighth session of the UN General Assembly, the Chinese representatives attempted to disrupt the resolution proposed by the Soviet Union for a 10 per cent reduction in military budgets by all the member-states of the Security Council, and for the allocation of part of the funds thus released for economic aid to the developing countries. In his speech at the plenary session of the General Assembly on October 2, 1973, the head

of the Chinese delegation, Chiao Kuan-hua, described this proposition as "empty words". He categorically declared that to talk about general disarmament was a complete waste of time.

The Chinese delegation at UN is prepared to make use of any opportunity to discredit the idea of collective security not only in Europe, but on the Asian continent as well, where there is still some tension.

In his speech on October 26, 1973, at the World Peace Congress in Moscow, L. I. Brezhnev stated: "The peoples of Asia most certainly need lasting peace and constructive co-operation no less than, say, the peoples of Europe. It is probably safe to say that the peoples of Tokyo and Tashkent, of Hanoi and Teheran, Peking and Rangoon, Delhi and Colombo—all the hundreds of millions of inhabitants of the world's largest continent—have an equal stake in lasting peace and tranquil peaceful labour. I am convinced that all of them are interested in this."

L. I. Brezhnev categorically rejected any assumptions to the effect that collective security is aimed against China and intends to isolate that country. "No one," he declared, "has ever raised the question of China's non-participation, let alone any form of 'isolation' (and in any case, the notion of 'isolating' such a big country is altogether ridiculous). As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it would welcome the participation of the People's Republic of China in measures aimed at strengthening Asian security."

Soviet people are profoundly convinced that the Chinese, like any other people on this earth, are vitally interested in a durable and stable peace, for only in peaceful conditions is it possible to solve all the deep-rooted economic and social problems facing the People's Republic of China.